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Contemporary mindfulness research at the level of self-report has often represented 
mindfulness as a latent (trait) variable. Recently, a novel psychometric methodology has been 
developed which allows mindfulness to be modelled as a complex system or network at the 
level of self-report. This network perspective is argued to provide a more plausible 
conceptualisation of mindfulness.  
A network perspective implies that a more densely connected network of practices 
may be indicative of a greater level of development of mindfulness. It also implies that 
certain practices may be more strongly interconnected or central than others. These highly 
central practices may be potentially useful targets for interventions.  
Mindfulness networks were estimated for practitioners and non-practitioners using the 
Friedberg Mindfulness Inventory (Study 1) and an adapted version of the Applied 
Mindfulness Process Scale (Study 2). A total of 371 regular mindfulness practitioners, 224 
non-practitioners and 59 irregular practitioners were recruited online from the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk database.  
Across both measures, comparisons between practitioners and non-practitioners’ 
networks indicated that network density did not significantly differ, whereas evidence was 
found in support of a significant difference in network structure. Exploratory analyses 
revealed practitioners’ networks to be characterised by greater differentiation in their 
community structures relative to non-practitioners across both measures. In Study 1, 
Acceptance was revealed to be much more central to the practitioners’ network relative to 
non-practitioners; and Returning to the Present much more peripheral. The practice of 
Attending to Actions and/or the negative path it shared with Self-kindness were identified as 





practices were revealed to be more central to the practitioners’ network relative to non-
practitioners, whilst more foundational de-centering practices were more peripheral.  
These studies provide support for the plausibility of investigating mindfulness as a 
complex network at the level of self-report. However, the lack of difference in network 
density indicates that future research is needed to examine network dynamics in the context 
of regular mindfulness practice. Future research is also required to establish whether the 
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Mindfulness has become a rapidly expanding phenomenon. Perhaps the most well-known 
definition comes from Kabat-Zinn (1994) who described mindfulness as “paying attention in 
a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (p. 4). This was 
later expanded to include “an affectionate, compassionate quality within the attending, a 
sense of openhearted, friendly presence and interest” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 145). A number 
of contemporary authors have suggested that mindfulness be considered an umbrella term for 
a number of practices, procedures and processes largely defined in relation to the capacities 
of attention, awareness, memory/retention, and acceptance/discernment (Van Dam et al., 
2018). In this thesis, mindfulness will be referred to as a practice or set of practices in both 
the sense of the verb (i.e., an activity) and noun (i.e., a habit or point of repetition). This 
represents a pragmatic definition of mindfulness, for the noun form simply reflects the verb 
form at a later point in time.  
In contemporary mindfulness, practices generally resemble each other in their basic 
procedures and goals (Bishop et al., 2004). Meditation has generally been considered core to 
mindfulness (Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1994; Griffiths, 1983) and a description of a 
sitting meditation is illustrative. Sitting meditations are often one of the first meditations a 
novice practitioner may cultivate, especially in the Vipassana, Zen and Tibetan traditions 
(Sharf, 2015). In a sitting meditation, the practitioner sits upright on the floor, a cushion or 
straight-backed chair. They will typically be instructed to focus their attention on a physical 
marker of their breath, such as the rise and fall of their chest, or the sensation of the breath 
through the nostril. The practitioner will regularly be instructed to simply notice when and 
perhaps where, their attention wanders, as it invariably will. On these occasions, the 
practitioner is encouraged to intentionally return their attention to the breath in a non-





resembles its popular definition (i.e., “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the 
present moment, and non-judgmentally”; Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4). 
Beyond formal meditation, the practitioner is typically encouraged to utilise the above 
refocusing procedure whenever they perceive themselves to be engaging in unhelpful 
thinking styles or practices. Through encouraging such anchoring practices, a mindful state is 
believed to emerge, which is claimed to provide a non-elaborative and non-judgmental space 
between one’s perception and response (Bishop et al., 2004). The practitioner is thus afforded 
an ability to disengage from habitual responding and flexibly pursue more adaptive practices 
(Garland, Farb, Goldin, & Fredrickson, 2015a; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). 
As a practice develops, the practitioner may shift from a focused monitoring on the breath to 
a more open monitoring practice in which the practitioner concurrently monitors all present 
moment experiences in addition to that of the breath (Lutz et al. 2008). In an open monitoring 
practice, the practitioner may be concurrently monitoring a number of sensations in their 
environment (such as sound and touch), in addition to internal phenomena such as thoughts 
and feelings. As practices of these sort become more refined, the practitioner is believed to 
come into contact with a pure or bare experience, stripped of projective and associative 
meanings (Thera, 1973; Chisea, 2013; although see Bodhi, 2011; Sharf, 1995 for critique).  
Van Dam and colleagues (2018) suggest that investigations of mindfulness first 
gained traction with researchers in 1987 following the establishment of the Mind and Life 
Institute. The Mind and Life Institute facilitated formal regular dialogues between the Dalai 
Lama and prominent scientists and clinicians.  From 2004 onwards, these exchanges came to 
include regular summer meetings, coinciding with a period of exponential growth in 
mindfulness publications (see Figure 1). Many empirical reviews now attest to the efficacy of 
mindfulness beyond its initial application to pain reduction (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1982). 





psychiatric symptoms (e.g., Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010; Piet & Hougaard, 2011; 
Khoury et al., 2013; Kuyken et al., 2016; Blanck et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018), health 
conditions such as substance abuse (Li, Howard, Garland, McGovern & Lazar, 2017; Black, 
2014), obesity (e.g., O’Reilly, Cook, Spruijt-Metz & Black, 2014), cancer (Haller et al., 
2017), fatigue (Ulrichsen et al., 2016), and chronic pain (Hilton et al., 2017). Brain imaging 
studies have revealed positive relationships between mindfulness and various neural 
functions associated with well-being (Farb et al., 2007; Hölzel et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2007, 
2009; Tomasino & Fabbro, 2016; Zeidan et al., 2015). Effects on the immune system and 
stress parameters have also been reported (Black & Slavich, 2016; Pascoe, Thompson, 
Jenkins & Ski, 2017).  
 
Figure 1. Mindfulness journal publications by year, 1980-2017 Figure reprinted with 






The growing literature around mindfulness has encouraged the expansion of 
mindfulness practices into different segments of society. Mindfulness is now offered as a 
standard psychotherapy in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, and many 
psychotherapies have come to incorporate mindfulness principles (Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, 
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy, Mindfulness-Based Relapse Prevention, Mindfulness-Based 
Trauma Therapy, and Mindfulness-Based Eating Awareness Training). Mindfulness is also 
gaining momentum in the educational system (Bender, Roth, Zielenski, Longo & Chermak, 
2018) where it has become part of standard education for approximately 6,000 school 
children in London (Torjesen, 2015). In New Zealand, several programmes are being piloted 
in primary and secondary schools (e.g., Bernay, 2014; Bernay, Graham, Devcich, Rix, & 
Rubie-Davies, 2016). Mindfulness has also been adapted for use in prison populations with 
promising results (Dafoe and Stermac 2013; Didonna 2009; Shonin, Van Gordon, Slade, & 
Griffiths, 2013).  
The rapid expansion of mindfulness into diverse settings has been criticised for 
proceeding beyond the available evidence (Farias & Wikholm, 2016; van Dam et al., 2018). 
In experimental studies, the efficacy of a given mindfulness intervention is often determined 
by quantifying the difference between the intervention group and a control group; however, 
the efficacy of an intervention can often be overstated if the control group is of poor quality.  
Many studies included in mindfulness reviews have used wait-list controls (participants who 
are assigned to a waiting list for a mindfulness intervention but receive this after the 
experimental study) or no control conditions at all (Goyal et al., 2014). Such studies cannot 
disentangle the effects of the mindfulness intervention (the active ingredient) from other non-
specific aspects involved in an intervention, such as group support, expectation effects, 





Braun, Freeman, McDaniel & Brown, 2016 for a discussion of possible non-specific factors). 
Control groups which aim to replicate non-specific aspects of an intervention without the 
active ingredient are known as active controls. Experimental designs with active controls 
allow greater confidence that observed effects are associated with the active treatment. When 
mindfulness interventions are matched to such active controls, the results are less conclusive. 
In a meta-analysis of the pro-social effects of mindfulness, Kreplin, Farias and Brazil (2018) 
found that mindfulness meditation had little influence on aggression, prejudice and 
connectedness, but caused a modest increase in compassion and empathy. These effects 
declined when active controls were used. In their highly influential meta-analysis, Goyal and 
colleagues (2014) reviewed 18,753 citations and found that only 47 trials (3%) included an 
active control or suitable psychological control (i.e., a placebo condition). Limited to these 
studies, mindfulness meditation programs had moderate evidence of improved anxiety, 
depression, and pain, and low evidence of improved stress reduction and quality of life. They 
found no evidence that mindfulness influenced other variables such as positive mood, 
attention, sleep or substance use. Furthermore, no difference was found between mindfulness 
and other interventions such as physical exercise, relaxation or anti-depressant medication. 
This latter finding replicated  a previous meta-analysis by Khoury and colleagues (2013), and 
a lack of any comparative advantage in mindfulness treatments over other treatment options 
has also been reported in the areas of obesity (Daubenmier et al., 2016), smoking cessation 
(Vidrine et al., 2016) and back pain (Cherkin et al., 2016). Recently, mindfulness was found 
to demonstrate moderate relief for psychiatric symptoms in suitably controlled studies, but 
again, no difference was found between mindfulness therapies and other first line therapies 
(Cognitive Behavioural Therapy and antidepressant medication; Goldberg et al., 2018).  
The task of measuring a practice relevant to many areas of society necessitated the 





given practice or intervention was actually cultivating mindfulness, as opposed to some other 
quality. Mindfulness constructs in popular mindfulness measures have been shown to be 
sensitive to change with mindfulness training (e.g., Khoury et al., 2013; Quaglia et al., 2016), 
and these changes have been shown to mediate important outcomes (e.g., Bränström, 
Kvillemo, & Moskowitz, 2012; Nyklícek & Kuijpers, 2008; Raes, Dewulf, Van Heeringen & 
Williams, 2009; (Shapiro, Oman, Thoresen, Plante, & Flinders, 2008; Vøllestad, Sivertsen, & 
Nielsen, 2011; although see Gu, Strauss, Bond & Cavanagh, 2015; Visted, Vøllestad, 
Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2015, for methodological weaknesses).  
Although proving useful (i.e., predicting various outcomes), substantial heterogeneity 
exists in how these scales have conceptualised mindfulness. Mindfulness has now come to be 
defined as anything from how well a person might describe and observe their experiences 
(Kentucky Mindfulness Scale, KMS; Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004; Five Factor Mindfulness 
Questionnaire, FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer & Toney, 2006), to their novelty 
seeking and producing abilities (Langer Mindfulness Scale, LMS; Pirson, Langer, Bodner & 
Zilcha-Mano, 2012), to how often they think they experience lapses in attention (Mindfulness 
Attention and Awareness Scale, MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), to how people characterise 
their openness and personal identification with present experience (Freiburg Mindfulness 
Inventory, FMI; Buchheld, Grossman & Walach, 2001; Toronto Mindfulness Scale, TMS; 
Lau et al., 2006). Mindfulness has further been conceptualised as both a uni-dimensional 
general construct (FMI; Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale-Revised, CAMS-R; 
Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson & Laurenceau, 2007; Southampton Mindfulness 
Questionnaire, SMQ; Chadwick, Hember, Symes, Peters, Kuipers & Dagnan, 2008) and a set 
of two to five constructs (KIMS, FFMQ, TMS,  Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale, PHLMS; 





established mindfulness to be simultaneously holistic (Leary & Tate, 2007; Walach et al., 
2006) yet modular (Baer et al., 2004, 2006; Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Lau et al., 2006).  
This diversity of definitions has led commentators to question the claims that each 
measure accurately measures mindfulness (Bergomi, Tschacher, & Kupper, 2013; Grossman, 
2008; Sauer et al., 2013; Siegling & Petrides, 2016). Despite demonstrating good 
psychometric properties, correlations between these measures have been found to be only 
modest (Baer et al., 2004; Carmody, Reed, Kristeller, & Merriam, 2008; Thompson & Waltz, 
2007), raising concerns around what construct validity represents in contemporary 
psychometrics.  
Construct validity is often thought to refer to whether a measure actually measures 
what it purports to, and arguably this represents the working definition of many researchers 
(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003, 2004). Formulated in this way, construct 
validity refers to a property of a test, and it tends to demand a realist conceptualisation of the 
attribute being measured; namely, that the attribute really exists independent of the measuring 
procedure (Borsboom et al., 2004). Implicit in this idea is also the assumption that the 
attribute being measured should cause the changes observed in a measure (i.e., the changes 
observed in questionnaire item responses). Taken together, the postulation of a really existing 
attribute with causal properties constitutes a casual theory of measurement advanced by 
Borsboom and colleagues (2004); specifically, “a test is valid for measuring an attribute if 
and only if (a) the attribute exists and (b) variations in the attribute causally produce 
variations in the outcomes of the measurement procedure” (p. 1061).  
Interestingly, establishing construct validity in contemporary psychometrics refers to 
something quite different. In this domain, construct validity is often established by 
investigating how a construct relates to similar or different constructs in a nomological 





constructs, their observable manifestations, and their inter-relations. Construct validity hence 
shifts from a property of a test (i.e., whether the test measures what it should) to a property of 
test score interpretations (i.e., how to interpret the construct with respect to its nomological 
network). In this latter system, researchers need not make any commitment as to whether the 
construct really exists beyond their measurement procedures, thus the situation emerges 
where one can create a valid measure of an attribute which at the same time, need not exist.  
Maul, Torres Irribarra and Wilson, (2016) attribute this confusion to the continuing 
influence of the philosophies of Logical Positivism and Operationalism in mainstream 
psychometric conceptualising (philosophies long abandoned in other scientific fields). 
Logical positivism advanced the idea that “statements regarding unobservable (theoretical) 
entities or forces should only be regarded as meaningful if such statements can be linked to 
observations in a clear and consistent manner” (Maul et al., 2016, p. 3). Operationalism 
maintained that theoretical attributes were synonymous with the way they are measured 
(Bridgeman, 1927). For the operationalist, “there [was] neither a need nor a place for 
postulating attributes which are prior to the measurement operation” (Borsboom, 2005, p. 
93). Taken together, these systems created a context in which psychological attributes were 
equated with statistical representations, and their identities (i.e., what the attribute refers to), 
fixed by the relationships observed between these statistical constructs and other constructs.   
Although contemporary researchers need not explicitly consider the question of 
whether their constructs really exist in validation, it will be argued here that a realist position 
is typically endorsed. It is argued that the mindfulness construct of contemporary 
questionnaires is thus treated as referring to something really existing (i.e., that it has material 
referents to the physical world), despite no evidence being offered to support this assumption. 





problem in mindfulness research (Garland, et al., 2015a; Grossman, 2011b; Grossman & van 
Dam, 2011).  
This thesis was motivated by the question “what is mindfulness?” Answering this 
question required an understanding of how mindfulness has been conceived across different 
traditions. In chapter 1, a traditional conceptualisation of mindfulness is advanced by which 
mindfulness is considered constituted by, or an expression of, relevant practices. By way of 
contrast, it is suggested that contemporary conceptualisations of mindfulness treat it as an 
explanation of practice. On this basis, it is suggested that an important shift has occurred in 
the conceptualisation of mindfulness; namely mindfulness as practice shifts to mindfulness as 
a cause of practice.  
Chapter 2 introduces two contemporary psychometric representations of mindfulness, 
one of which corresponds to conceptualisation of mindfulness as an explanation or cause of 
practice (termed a reflective factor model). It is suggested that this statistical model implies a 
realist position with respect to the mindfulness variable, which facilitates the reification of 
this variable. Chapter 3 introduces a novel psychometric representation in which mindfulness 
is modelled as a phenomenon constituted by practices. This statistical model supports an 
alternative ontology for mindfulness; namely the traditional conceptualisation advanced in 
which mindfulness is interpreted as an expression of practice. Two cross-sectional studies are 
then proposed, and the tone of the thesis changes. It is suggested that a regular mindfulness 
(or related meditative) practice may lead to synergistic interactions developing among 
relevant practices, such that a dense network emerges. Differences in network density might 
hence be observed between practitioners and non-practitioners at the cross-sectional level. On 
this reasoning, the studies hypothesised that the networks of regular practitioners would be 





 Networks have both central and peripheral practices. Highly central practices have 
been suggested to be relatively more important to network dynamics relative to more 
peripheral practices. At the cross-sectional level, these differences may manifest in 
topological differences in network organisation. To this end, an exploratory analysis was 
conducted to determine the most prominent group level network differences. An introduction 
to the estimation of networks from self-report data is provided in chapter 4. The methodology 
of the two studies is detailed in chapter 5, and chapter 6 outlines the results and their 
interpretation. Chapter 7 constitutes a general discussion of the results and the limitations of 






Chapter 1: Traditional and Contemporary Conceptualisations of Mindfulness 
Mindfulness practice derives from Buddhism. Few researchers would contest the 
diversity of systems falling under the rubric Buddhism, although canonical assumptions and 
goals are still typically endorsed as they provide a useful starting point. To this end, an 
introduction is first outlined. A conceptualisation of mindfulness is then advanced which 
arguably captures elements of mindfulness associated with more traditional formulations. 
This traditional conceptualisation is then contrasted with a conceptualisation of contemporary 
mindfulness. It will be argued that the conceptualisation of mindfulness has shifted in an 
important way; namely, that which was practice appears to have become that which stands 
apart from practice; and ultimately, explains it.  
1.1 Conceptualising Traditional and Contemporary Mindfulness  
Buddhism is claimed, first and foremost, to be the story of Siddhartha Gautama 
(Buddha) and his path to liberation (Carrithers, 2001). Arguably, Buddhist practitioners 
aspire to emulate Buddha by following the path he used to achieve what is believed to be his 
enlightenment (Sanskrit: Bodhi). In effect, Buddha outlined this path in what is considered to 
be his first sermon following his enlightenment. Known as the sermon on the Four Noble 
Truths (Sanskrit: catvāri āryasatyāni), Buddha is believed to have articulated 1) that the 
human condition is marked by suffering (Sanskrit: duḥkha); 2) that suffering is caused by 
greed and desire, ignorance or delusion, hatred and destructive urges; 3) that one can liberate 
themselves from this suffering by letting go of desire and attachment; and 4), that the path to 
enlightenment and liberation is the Noble Eightfold Path (Sanskrit: āryāṣṭāṅgamārga; 
Tsering, 2005). The Noble Eightfold Path thus functions as Buddha’s conceptual prescription 
for the relief of suffering, and it is here that mindfulness is found, alongside other 
concentration practices (right effort and concentration), ethical practices (right speech, action 





Meditative practices have generally been considered the most important path for 
developing mindfulness (Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1994; Griffiths, 1983), and this is 
especially true of modernist schools of Buddhism such as the Vipassna and Zen Buddhism 
(Sharf, 2015). Through practicing mindfulness, the practitioner is believed to encounter what 
Buddhism believes to be the true nature of mind and self; namely, its illusoriness and 
impermanent nature. Specifically, the practitioner may learn to recognise that “all temporal 
things, whether material or mental, are compounded objects in a continuous change of 
condition, subject to decline and destruction” (Rhys-David & Steed, 1921, p. 335). For 
Buddhist practitioners, it follows then that attachments to (or craving for) transitory 
phenomena may only invite loss, confusion and suffering.   
In Buddhism, insights of this sort are not considered philosophical or articles of faith. 
Rather, they have been described as experienced, embodied, enacted or embedded 
understandings (Bronkhorst, 1993; Grossman, 2015; Kirmayer, 2015; Monteiro, Musten & 
Compson, 2015; Stanley, 2012; Thompson, 2017). Taken together, these perspectives 
variously afford the body (embodiment), physical environment (enactivist), and even social 
environment (embedded), constitutive roles in cognitive processing and knowledge 
formation. Mindfulness has hence been conceived of emerging through the activity of a 
subject engaging reciprocally with their environment1 in specific ways, thus construing 
mindfulness as a relational phenomenon (Stanley, 2012; Thompson, 2017). In doing so, the 
researcher’s attention is directed to investigating the dynamic and reciprocal interactions 
among relevant components of mindfulness which may be, for want of better words, internal 
                                                             
1 Dewey (1916/2004b) notes that the term environment denotes something more than simply a subject’s 
surroundings. Rather, environment denotes the continuity of surroundings with the subject’s tendencies. This is 
because the environment provides reciprocal influence in that it strengthens some activity and weakens others. 






and external to the subject2.  In this way, conceptual aids which provide a model of the mind 
(and map out possible experiences), as with environmental elements such as calm and 
attentive spaces, come to be considered constitutive of mindfulness (Kirmayer, 2015).  
Cognitive phenomena are not eschewed in these perspectives, but rather subordinated 
to activity. By this, it is meant that conceptual phenomena, where they arise, are considered 
only waypoints or phenomena before the facts. What counts is the practical activity of 
knowing, by which it is meant the verification of cognitive phenomena through active 
experimentation (Dewey, 1916/2004a). Conceptual knowledge thus becomes embodied or 
enacted knowledge once verified in practical activity. This is not to say that conceptual 
knowledge sets in motion verification activity; rather embodied and enactivist approaches 
would generally consider the two synonymous: knowledge does not stand apart from activity, 
rather it is activity. A formulation of this type is inferred in the earliest English translation of 
the term mindfulness (Sanskrit: Smirti); namely, a “calling to mind and taking up” (Mendis & 
Horner, 1993, p. 37, emphasis mine). It is also consistent with Michel Foucault’s (1982/2005) 
conceptualisation of spiritual practices as modes of experience, by which experience in 
French has the dual meaning of experience and experiment3.  
Experimentation and verification happen in a social environment. A subject in a social 
environs cannot perform activities without taking others into account, for they are 
indispensable to the realization of his activities. As Dewey (1916/2004b) notes: “when he 
moves he stirs them and reciprocally” (p. 10). Experimentation and verification thus provide 
                                                             
2 Within the field of philosophy of mind, the internal/external distinction specified is contentious. The location 
of the constituents of certain mental states and processes critically differentiate embodied, enactivist and 
embedded perspectives from cognitivist perspectives which tend to consider cognitive phenomena to be 
materially situated in the brain. The location of cognitive constituents also differentiates embodiment (a place 
for the body in constituting cognitive processes and mental states) from enactivist perspectives (the physical and 
social environment are partly constitutive) and embedded perspectives (mental states and processes reside 
beyond the subject; see Alessandroni, 2017; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Glenberg, 2010; Ward, Silverman, & 
Villalobos, 2017). 
3 Interestingly, Raymond Williams (1976/1985) has suggested that this double meaning also existed in English 





the practitioner the opportunity to contemplate behaviour ethically. Behavioural discernment 
of this type is important to traditional perspectives which speak of right and wrong 
mindfulness (Bodhi, 2011; Monteiro, Musten, & Compson, 2015) or wholesome and 
unwholesome activity (Harrington & Dunne, in press). Mindfulness has thus been described 
as a commitment to a certain noble or wholesome way of life, if not an expression of it 
(Panaioti, 2015). Traditional formulations may thus differentiate the practitioner from non-
practitioner by way of the qualities or habits they practise. In the language of contemporary 
mindfulness, these may include habits of behavioural discernment, being open to the present, 
and practising non-judgment and/or compassion. In more traditional formulations of 
mindfulness, the mindful practitioner may be considered to enact habits which express the 
three characteristics; namely, everything is impermanent (Sanskrit: anitya); life is suffering 
(Sanskrit: duḥkha); there is no unchanging, self, soul or essence in living beings, (Sanskrit: 
anātman; Thera, 1973; Grabovac, Lau, & Willett, 2011). Regardless, the point to be made is 
that the very qualities which arise from a given mindfulness practice, constitute precisely 
those required to cultivate the practice in the first place. Put differently, the ends of 
mindfulness are simply the flourishing of its means. Mindfulness can thus be considered an 
autotelic practice or a practice which has purpose in and not apart from itself (see Keown, 
1996; 2007 for discussion of Buddhism and autotelic practice). At face value, typical 
mindfulness instructions support this formulation: the practitioner is explicitly directed to the 
means of any given activity (in which mindfulness forms the prefix), to the exclusion of the 
ends. For example, the mindful walker is specifically directed to attend to the walking itself 
(means), and not the destination (ends). In summary, a traditional perspective may imply that 
the practitioner does not seek out an experience (ends) which exists independent of practice 





1.2 Contemporary Mindfulness 
Contemporary formulations of mindfulness differ from the traditional formulation 
advanced here in several important ways. Firstly, contemporary mindfulness tends to 
emphasise clear end goals such as self-efficacy, wellbeing, happiness or symptom alleviation 
(Shonin, Williams, Van Gordon & Griffiths, 2013), which might at best, be considered 
secondary to traditional aims (Buttle, 2015). Secondly, although such goals are prescriptive 
and value-laden in and of themselves, contemporary mindfulness has generally downplayed 
normative or ethical prescriptions associated with mindfulness or Buddhism, possibly as a 
consequence of advertising itself as a Western value-neutral scientific endeavour (e.g., 
Wilson, 2014; Shonin et al., 2013b; Sun, 2014). Thirdly, contemporary mindfulness has also 
tended to be reductive, marginalising intention (Bodhi, 2011; although see Shapiro, Carlson, 
Astin, & Freedman, 2006, for an important exception). Mechanisms of mindfulness are 
increasingly framed in neurological terms (e.g., Black & Slavich, 2016; Farb et al., 2007; 
Hölzel et al., 2007; Pascoe et al., 2017; Tang et al., 2007, 2009; Tomasino & Fabbro, 2016; 
Zeidan et al., 2015); and psychological mechanisms – at face value intentional (e.g., self-
compassion, non-judgement, acceptance) – seem to be reduced to almost non-moral, non-
evaluative properties4. Finally, by considering mindfulness discoverable, contemporary 
mindfulness conceptualises mindfulness as an entity standing prior to and apart from 
empirical procedures or enquiries. Importantly, these enquiries demand nothing of the 
researcher beyond rigor in their methodology, which when met, allow results to be credited 
(at a minimum) a working existence beyond the means by which they were obtained (i.e., 
they come to constitute scientific knowledge). This has implications for the wider system in 
                                                             
4 It is noted that intentional and moral content, as well as challenging the idea of a value neutral science, are less 
amenable to being reduced to biology. This is because intentional states are likely to be multiply realisable; 
namely, their content may be realised (physical instantiated) in multiple ways within and between people 
(Fodor, 1974; Putnam, 1967; Pylyshyn, 1984; although see Bechtel & Mundale, 1999; Bickle, 2008; Gillet, 






which mindfulness has typically been considered embedded (i.e., the Eightfold Path): with 
the ends of mindfulness now fixed by science, large amounts of Buddhist doctrine and praxis 
may be written off as mere means to inculcate the now independently established ends. The 
mindfulness consumer, like the pharmaceutical consumer, need not understand the means by 
which their product was manufactured, or the mechanisms by which it achieves its (now pre-
defined) ends. The ends can simply be achieved by following a prescription. In the case of 
mindfulness, what is prescribed are rapid, evidence-based skills, tools or techniques, 
narrowly defined and fit for purpose (Purser & Loy 2013; see Marcel 1950/2015 for further 
discussion of the differences between religious and technical practices). Far from mindfulness 
as active experimentation, or a journey without a goal (Buttle, 2015), the consumer is 
seemingly shown the way to predefined ends.  
None of this is to undermine the gains demonstrated by such prescriptions, nor is it to 
suggest that contemporary practitioners may not expand their expectations from 
contemporary goals of symptom alleviation, to a greater interest in self-transformation 
(Shapiro, 1992; Shapiro et al., 2006). The aforementioned discussion serves only to highlight 
a shift that appears to have happened in the conceptualisation of mindfulness; namely, by 
severing the ends from the means, that which formerly was practice, now appears to stand 
apart from practice. Put differently, the distinction between means and ends, formerly only 
temporal (i.e., the ends are simply the means at a later point in time), now appears 
ontological. None of this occurred in a vacuum, however, and contextual considerations are 
discussed next.  
1.4 Buddhist Modernism and Contemporary Mindfulness  
Buddhist Modernism refers to a number of reforms developed in Buddhism in the 19th 
century (Gombrich & Obeyesekere, 1988; Lopez, 1995; McMahan, 2008; Sharf, 1995). 





Transcendentalism which emphasised themes of interiority, self-reflexivity, and subjectivism 
as guarantors of true knowledge (McMahon, 2008; Sharf, 1995). In the religious context, this 
manifested in the pursuit of authentic intuitive religious experiences in defiance of doctrinal 
authoritative interpretations of religious scripture, and its prescriptive rituals and ethics.  
Of particular interest to contemporary mindfulness is the modern Theravada Vipassna 
movement, and Japanese Zen Buddhism. The Vipassna movement emerged in colonial South 
East Asia, where an Asian Western educated middle class – prevented from ascending into 
colonial ranks, yet also alienated from their cultural roots – enacted a new identity in a series 
of reforms under the banner of Theravada Buddhism (Sharf, 1995). Likewise, Zen Buddhism 
emerged from the modernising reforms of Japanese intellectuals, facing internal suppression 
(Sharf, 1995). In both cases, forms of Buddhism emerged which often toned down elements 
of Buddhist ritual, cosmology, monasticism, clerical hierarchy and even core concepts such 
as karma (Jordt, 2007; Lopez, 1995; McMahon, 2008; Sharf, 2015). Rather, Buddhist 
Modernists emphasised other aspects, such as Romantic and Transcendentalist themes of 
interior exploration, self-reflexivity and satisfaction in one’s current life.  
Buddhist Modernists also reframed Buddhism as a mode of investigation or inner 
science (Lopez, 2008; MacMahan, 2008). Buddhism was argued to provide the means for 
investigating the contents of one’s consciousness and the realm of inner reality (Harrington 
& Dunne, in press). Typical of perennialism in religious scholarship (i.e., the belief that a 
single trans-religious, trans-historical truth underlies all religious traditions), this inner reality 
transcended Buddhism. Buddhism hence become more than a localised religion, for it 
prescribed a universal ontology of the mind, discoverable through mindfulness meditation. 
The latter henceforth became core to Buddhist Modernist schools (McMahon, 2008; Sharf, 
1995, 2015), and it was in this milieu that the technique of learning to focus attention on the 





(Goldstein, 1976). Through mindfulness meditation, the practitioner was believed to achieve 
bare attention, by which it was meant the bare registering of perennial facts, observed 
without judgment or reflection (Thera, 2005). Taken together, these developments largely 
constitute the popular contemporary definition of mindfulness, namely, Kabat Zinn’s (1994) 
definition of mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present 
moment, and nonjudgmentally” (p. 4). 
The significance of these reforms were not lost on commentators. Buddhist 
Modernists were charged with distorting mindfulness in their emphasis on passive 
momentary states over long-term active transformation; inner stillness over critical 
engagement with the canon; and satisfaction in one’s own life over ethical training (c.f., 
meditation sickness, Ahn, 2007; McMahon & Braun, 2017; Sharf, 2015). Of particular 
concern was the philosophical implications of the bare attention which contradicted 
traditional philosophical propositions (Bodhi, 2011; McMahon, 2008; Sharf, 2015; Bikkhu, 
2010). Of note, these same concerns persist in relation to contemporary mindfulness (e.g. 
Grossman & Van Dam, 2011; Monteiro et al., 2015; Purser & Loy, 2013). 
By privileging bare attention, the truth of Buddhism was fixed to experience, 
achievable first hand by lay meditators. In doing so, the authority of the clergy and monastic 
training was greatly diminished (hence Buddhist Modernism has also been termed Protestant 
Buddhism; Sharf, 1995). Readily accessible and hence imminently exportable, this 
formulation of mindfulness would eventually appeal to 1950’s American beat intellectuals 
looking for a form of liberal spirituality as opposed to religiosity (Carrette & King, 2004). By 
the 1970’s, this primarily intellectual movement had taken root in a number of established 
secular institutions across America, of which the Stress Reduction Clinic (later to be termed 
the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction clinic) would be particularly important. Established 





Reduction Clinic offered eight week mindfulness courses which aimed to help people by 
transforming how they perceived their ailments (Kabat-Zinn, 2011). 
The influence of Kabat-Zinn’s theoretical and clinical work on contemporary 
mindfulness cannot be overstated. His definition of mindfulness largely informed Bishop and 
colleagues (2004) two-factor model of mindfulness, which in turn has informed subsequent 
measures and their interpretation5. Verbal definitions aside, Kabat-Zinn’s (1982) Mindfulness 
Based Stress Reduction programme (MBSR) and derivatives (most obviously, Mindfulness 
Based Cognitive Therapy, MBCT; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002) continue to function as 
the gold standard for mindfulness research. This is because participating in some form of a 
MBSR or MBCT continues to constitute the mindfulness condition in many experimental 
studies (Ostafin, Robinson & Meier, 2015). 
In summary, traditional conceptualisations of mindfulness may differ from 
cotemporary conceptualisations by way of the ontology they prescribe for mindfulness. It was 
suggested that mindfulness is best considered an expression of ethical practice in the former, 
whilst the latter, drawing from Buddhist Modernist reforms which increasingly privileged 
experience, tends to conceptualise mindfulness as a discoverable really existing entity, 
standing apart from practice. The statistical representation of this conceptualisation is 
discussed in the next chapter.  
  
                                                             
5 Bishop and colleagues’ (2004) two factor model conceived of mindfulness involving components of regulated 
attention (i.e. sustained attention on the present moment) and an orientation to experience (an open, curious, 
non-judgmental attitude). This went on to inform the popular Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto, et al, 
2008), and analogous conceptualisations have come to inform other two-factor measures (State Mindfulness 
Scale, SMS; Tanay & Bernstein, 2013; Toronto Mindfulness Scale, TMS; Lau et al., 2006). As a conceptual 
device, two-factor models have further informed interpretations of measures initially conceived as uni-
dimensional or multifactorial (Kohls et al, 2009; Davis, Lau, & Cairns, 2009; Sauer, Walach, Offenbächer et al., 
2011; Baer et al., 2008; Tran et al., 2013). Two-factor models have also informed subsequent definitions of 
mindfulness which have arguably, only expanded on the second “orientation to experience component” of 
Bishop and colleagues (2004) model (Bergomi, Tschacher, & Kupper, 2013). As such, the mindful orientation 
to experience has expanded to include a compassionate and openhearted attitude, non-identification and non-
reactivity to experience, a decentred perspective, insightful understanding, and a “full participation” in the 
experience (Brown & Ryan, 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1994, 2003; Lau et al., 2006; Marlatt & Kristeller, 1999; Robins, 





Chapter 2: Psychometric Representations of Mindfulness and their Interpretation 
In this chapter, psychometric theory and the development of mindfulness scales are 
discussed. It is suggested that contemporary techniques risk reifying mindfulness, creating an 
ontologically implausible entity.  
2.1 Trait Mindfulness 
Similar to Buddhist Modernist framings of mindfulness as an inner science, Kabat 
Zinn conceptualised mindfulness as a “universal” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, p. 12) and “innate 
capacity” (Williams & Kabat-Zinn 2011, p.15). This meant that mindfulness, although 
developed within Buddhism, became non-proprietary to Buddhism (Lindahl, 2015; Gethin, 
1992/2001). Universality also presupposed that mindfulness would be effective across all 
contexts; henceforth, it became accessible to individuals of different religious persuasions, as 
well as those who endorse secularism (Brown, 2014; Kabat-Zinn, 2011). Mindfulness also 
became highly accessible to psychological researchers of the individual differences tradition 
who concerned themselves with investigating traits.  
Individual difference researchers have often thought about how different trait 
dimensions underlie consistencies in behaviour over time, and across context (McCrae and 
Costa, 1990). The nature of traits have been subjected to much academic enquiry in the field 
of personality research (e.g. Allport 1966; Cattell & Kline, 1977; Cervone, 2008; Eysenck, 
1947; Fridhandler, 1986, McCrae & Costa, 1990; Mischel, 1968; Tellegen, 1988); however  
standard assumptions exist. Fajkowska and Kreitler (2018) outline four such assumptions; 
namely, 1) underlying traits can be inferred from observable data, 2) they constitute the 
structure of personality, 3) they account for intra‐ and inter-individual differences, and 4) 
they are measurable and relatively independent of each other (see also Allport 1966; Cattel, 
1965; Eysenck, 1947; see Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman, 2009 for review). These 





considered instantiated in biology and/or genetics (Allport, 1966; Eysenck, 1947). Thus 
McCrae and Costa (1995) note, “the causal argument is in principle clear: traits as underlying 
tendencies cause and thus explain (in general and in part) the consistent patterns of thoughts, 
feelings, and actions that one sees” (p. 236).  
Although psychology has moved on from necessarily interpreting traits causally (e.g. 
probabilistic descriptions, Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; cybernetic theory, DeYoung, 
2015; see Matthews et al., 2009 for a review), the standard assumptions outlined underpin 
classical test theory (Lord, Novick & Birnbaum, 1968), reliability estimation (Nunnally, 
1978), and factor analysis (Harman, 1960). As such, the concept of traits as common causes 
for behaviour remains ever-present in the psychometric methodologies which dominate 
psychological and mindfulness research.  
2.2 Measuring Traits 
Given that direct enquiries into trait levels are prone to idiosyncrasy, researchers have 
typically developed relevant sets of items which capture the trait in ordinary language (Baer, 
Baer, 2011; Clark & Watson, 1995). In the context of mindfulness, this means making 
enquiries into how often an individual may “…sense [their] body, whether eating, cooking, 
cleaning” (FMI) or use mindfulness to “realize that [their] thoughts are not facts” (AMPS).  
Once a suitable set of items has been developed, the item set (now a measure) is then 
applied to a sample, following which statistical techniques known as principal component 
analysis (PCA) or factor analysis (FA) are typically performed on the data (or a correlation 
matrix of the item set). These statistical analyses will typically reveal an underlying factor or 
principal component (or several) which account for and explain a certain percentage of the 
(common) variance observed in (group level) item responses. These factors or components 
are then inferred to represent the attribute the researcher was interested in the first place. In 





account for a consistent percentage of covariance among questionnaire item responses in 
practitioners and non-practitioner samples. This two-factor model has also been revealed in 
purportedly unidimensional measures, and also at a higher order in multifactorial measures 
(Davis et al., 2009; Kohls, Sauer & Walach, 2009; Sauer, Walach, Offenbächer, Lynch, & 
Kohls, 2011; Tran, Gluck & Nadar, 2013). The two factors have been inferred to represent 
attributes of interest to mindfulness theory, such as Acceptance and Presence (e.g., Kohls et 
al., 2009; Ströhle, 2006), and the model has received some neuro-scientific support (e.g. Lutz 
et al., 2014).  
The next step in developing a measure involves establishing the construct validity of 
the underlying factor or principal component. Typically, this will involve correlating the 
factors or principal components with other related constructs. To the extent to which these 
correlations are in the right direction, the construct is considered valid (Borsboom, Cramer, 
Kievit, Scholten & Franic, 2009; Borsboom et al., 2004). In the context of mindfulness, the 
right direction means that trait mindfulness should positively correlate with constructs such as 
emotional intelligence and self-compassion, but negatively with concepts such as thought 
suppression (the tendency to try to get rid of unwanted thoughts, see Baer et al., 2006). This 
is because mindfulness is believed to foster a compassionate and accepting attitude. Other 
procedures can also be advanced in establishing the case for construct validity. Researchers 
may further associate their constructs of interest with relevant outcomes, or other related 
measures. Finally, the internal consistency of a construct can also be estimated (i.e., how well 
items positively associated with the same construct positively correlate with one another; 
Bollen & Lenix 1991). This is because measurement requires a degree of coherence in the 
construct to be measured (Nunnally, 1978). Borsboom, and colleagues (2004) have argued 
that validation efforts rarely go beyond these procedures, and Rau and Williams (2016) have 





Measuring mindfulness at the level of self-report has hence come to involve the 
development of a sum-score or observed score of mindfulness which constitute the attribute’s 
operationalisation. This is then submitted to various statistical tests (factor analysis or 
principal component analysis), and then (almost sleight of hand) the results applicable to the 
sum-score are generalised to the theoretical attribute itself. This represents the influence of 
operationalism, by which the construct is considered synonymous with the theoretical 
attribute. As Thompson (2004) citing Cronkhite and Liska (1980) note, the procedure has 
been fruitful:  
 Apparently, it is so easy to find semantic scales which seem relevant to sources, so 
easy to name or describe potential/hypothetical sources, so easy to capture college 
students to use the scales to rate the sources, so easy to submit those rates to factor 
analysis, so much fun to name the factors when one’s research assistant returns with 
the computer printout, and so rewarding to have a guaranteed publication with no fear 
of non-significant results that researchers, once exposed to the pleasures of the factor 
analytic approach, rapidly become addicted to it (p. 106).  
By shifting the focus of construct validation to investigations of internal consistency 
and how a construct relates to other constructs (i.e, the nomological network), ontological 
considerations of the attribute are circumvented. Put differently, the researcher circumvents 
the issue of whether their attribute really exists independent of their model fitting exercises. 
Salzberger (2013) suggests that “designing measurement instruments without evidence of the 
existence of the attribute as a quantitative latent variable is like taking the second step before 
ever having taken the first” (p. 3). A first step is however implied in the methodologies of 
factor analysis and principal component analysis, although this is rarely made explicit.  
In psychometrics, the proposition that an underlying psychological attribute exists and 





Theory can be investigated with factor analysis when it is assumed that 1) that the latent 
variable is the only cause of covariance (i.e. the “common cause”), and 2) that there are no 
direct associations between items after controlling for the effects of the latent variable 
(termed local independence; Bartholomew, 1980; Markus & Borsboom, 2013).  
Although the fit of the factor model does not prove Latent Variable Theory true, the 
model does formulate a casual latent variable as a hypothesis. As such, the fit of the model 
(i.e., when local independence is demonstrated) can be adduced as evidence for the 
hypothesis that the construct is causal and hence really exists (Arntzenius, 2010; Borsboom, 
et al., 2003, 2004)6. In the absence of local independence, a case can be made that the latent 
variable does not in fact account for all the covariance observed7.  
Several key implications follow. Firstly, causality is assumed to only travel from the 
latent variable to the items. This means that 1) changes in the latent variable must precede 
changes in the observable items; 2) that the omission or addition of observable items should 
not influence the latent variable; and 3), that associations between items should be considered 
spurious (as the latent variable is considered the only cause for covariance). Furthermore, 
items are considered equivalent representations of the latent variable, and are hence 
considered interchangeable.  
Latent Variable Theory reflects an attempt to model psychological measurement by 
way of analogy to physical measurement (Borsboom et al., 2003, 2004), of which the 
physical example of room temperature is illustrative. Room temperature can be considered an 
unobservable (latent) construct measured by an array of thermometers (the observable 
                                                             
6 Non-causal interpretation of latent variable models exist in the literature. For example, a latent variable model 
can be seen as an abstraction (Markus & Borsboom, 2013) or data reduction device (Bollen, 2002; Harman, 
1960; Nunnally, 1978), or technique for discovering regularities in data (Myung, Navarro, & Pitt, 2006). 
7 Latent variables can also be considered a partial causes of covariance with remaining variance being accounted 
for by direct associations between items (Bringmann & Eronin, 2018). That said, Cramer, and colleagues (2012) 
have suggested that such models are less useful as increasingly incorporating direct connections increasingly 






variables or items). As expected, changes in room temperature must precede changes 
observed in the thermometers, and likewise, the omission and addition of (equivalent) 
thermometers should have no influence on room temperature. Finally, the readings on one 
thermometer should not directly influence those of another.  
 
                       
Figure 2. Reflective (left) and formative (right) models relating a construct to indicators 
(blue). Causality travels from the construct to indicators in the reflective model, and from the 
indicators to the construct in formative models. 
 
Factor models interpreted this way are known as reflective factor models as the 
covariance in observable items reflects that of the latent variable (Figure 2; Bollen & Lennox, 
1991; Edwards & Bargozzi, 2000). Reflective models are often contrasted with formative 
factor models in which causality is assumed to travel in the opposite way; namely, from the 
observable items to the latent construct (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). Formative models can be 
modelled with principal component analysis (Edwards, 2011), and the prototypical example 
is Socio-Economic Status (formed from indicators such as salary and home ownership, 
amongst others). Formative indexes of this type usefully predict all sorts of different 
outcomes which make them very useful instrumentally, but they are less suited to 






not require internal consistency), and the identity of the construct changes with the addition 
or omission of observable variables (Edwards, 2011; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000; Guyon, 
2018; Howell, Breivik, & Wilcox, 2007). For this reason, they are often best considered data-
reduction devices (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). Ontologically, they are constructivist, for the 
latent variable (e.g., SES) is not assumed to exist as an independent entity (Borsboom et al., 
2003). 
2.3 Realism in Mindfulness Research 
Although ontological considerations are rarely made explicit, the choice of statistical 
tests imply different ontologies. Mindfulness could be considered a causal function of 
practices sampled in the case of principal component analysis (i.e., people are mindful 
because they frequently “accept unpleasant experiences”; FMI, item 8), or a cause of 
practices in the case of factor analysis (i.e., people frequently “accept unpleasant 
experiences” because they are mindful). The latter invokes realism, and indeed, this 
ontological position has been argued to be the default position of practising and psychologists 
(Borsboom et al., 2004; Haig, 2014)8, and scientists in general (Devitt, 1991).  
Realism is apparent in casual euphemisms by which mindfulness has been described 
as cultivating, fostering, enhancing, activating, yielding improved, determining, and leading 
to various outcomes. Realism also justifies using different scales (irrespective of their 
heterogeneity) to measure the same trait (e.g., Monteiro et al., 2015). This is because the 
scales can be argued to be imperfect measures of the underlying trait, much like an array of 
imperfect thermometers. Finally, realism is implicit in biological (e.g., Black & Slavich, 
2016; Pascoe et al, 2017), neurobiological (e.g., Holzel et al., 2011; Fox et al., 2014) and 
genetic investigations (Waszczuk et al., 2015) into mindfulness. 
                                                             
8 Curiously, this position contradicts the idea of operationalising constructs, for an independent discoverable 





2.4 The Plausibility of a Realist Interpretation of the Latent Construct.  
Hypothesising trait mindfulness as causal requires, at a minimum, specifying a 
reflective model (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). This may not however be plausible for 
mindfulness. Firstly, many items in mindfulness scales conceivably cause changes in other 
items in non-spurious ways. For example, a correlation between practicing being “friendly to 
myself when things go wrong” (FMI, item 9) and being able to “accept unpleasant 
experiences” (FMI, item 8) may plausibly be explained by a psychological mechanism over 
and above that of the presence of a common underlying (trait mindfulness) cause (i.e. self-
compassion may directly foster acceptance, or vice versa). The same appears true of many 
other items, and indeed, a causal structure among items can typically be hypothesised. 
Empirically demonstrated, such casual structures would render a casual latent mindfulness 
increasingly marginal to explanation, in turn, questioning its ontological status of really 
existing.  
Secondly, it is plausible that responses to items, rather than originating from a 
common source, have different aetiologies and predict unique outcomes. Put differently, 
questionnaire items are not passive reflections of an underlying trait, but rather index unique 
and agentic phenomena. Support for this interpretation exists at the facet level in research 
with the FFMQ. For example, Cash and Whittingham (2010) found that the Non-judgmental 
facet of the FFMQ predicted lower levels of depression, anxiety, and stress-related 
symptomatology, whilst the Acting with Awareness facet predicted lower depressive 
symptomatology (See also Anicha et al., 2012; Baer et al., 2006; Bergman, Christopher, & 
Bowen, 2016; Boughner, Thornley, Kharlas & Frewen, 2016; Carmody & Baer, 2008; 
Didonna et al., 2018). Mindfulness facets have also been shown to develop differently in 
various subgroups of individuals, affording different profiles (Cebolla et al., 2017; Liljia, 





agentic, rather that passive and reflective, and something similar might be assumed at the 
item level. In personality research, one of the most important aetiological questions is now 
whether traits correspond to latent common cause, or whether they emerge from more 
complex interactions among unique basic components (Baumert et al., 2017; Mottus, 







Chapter 3: Network Models of Mindfulness 
In this chapter the reader is introduced to a network model of mindfulness. The 
principles underpinning a network model are discussed, before briefly considering the wider 
literature in which the methodology has been applied. The chapter will conclude by formally 
outlining the main research question, relevant assumptions, and the relevance of the study to 
the field of mindfulness research.  
3.1 Principles Underpinning a Network Model of Mindfulness  
Recently, a novel psychometric model has emerged which bypasses some of the 
problematic issues involved in ascribing causal properties to a latent variable. Termed a 
network perspective (Schmittmann et al., 2013), psychological attributes are conceived of as 
emerging from a network of relevant causally interacting components. Network 
psychometrics (Epskamp, 2017) refers to the estimation of such networks, most often from 
self-report measures.  
 




Figure 3. Network alternative to reflective and formative models. Items directly cause each 
other. 
Networks consist of nodes and the edges which connect them (see Figure 3). At the 
level of self-report, questionnaire items can be modelled as nodes, and the statistical relations 
between them, edges. Applied to mindfulness, a network of this type could reconceptualise 
mindfulness as being constituted by practice (or an expression of practice) as opposed to a 





Four axiomatic principles would characterise a mindfulness network of this type9. 
Principle 1 affirms that mindfulness is best characterised in terms of the interactions among 
relevant practices in a network (complexity). Principle 2 suggests that these practices 
correspond to those behaviours, cognitions and affects indexed by mindfulness questionnaire 
items (item-practice correspondence). Principle 3 states that the structure of mindfulness is 
generated from direct causal connections between practices (direct casual connections). 
Principle 4 states mindfulness networks have a non-random architecture: their configuration 
determines their behaviour (mindfulness follows network structure). These principles 
constitute the assumptions of network psychometrics, which will be dealt with in turn. 
Item-practice correspondence is perhaps the most controversial of these assumptions, 
although this is not limited to network analyses. A mindfulness network model assumes that 
the items in a given measure correspond to relevant affective cognitive or behavioural 
practices (i.e. what people say they do, is what they do), yet this is not formally tested. 
Assuming direct casual connections is also contentious at the level of cross-sectional research 
as these designs only provide information on concurrent associations. To provide further 
support for causality, a timeline is required, as this allows the researcher to establish whether 
changes in one practice precede changes in another (Bos et al., 2018). Finally, associations 
need to be non-spurious (i.e., the association should not derive from a third variable).  
Individual level analyses with temporal data can provide information on time order, 
although ultimately, experimental designs provide the most powerful design for testing causal 
hypotheses. This is because experimental designs allow the researcher to establish association 
(two comparison groups), time order (e.g., by controlling who is intervened on and when), 
and non-spuriousness (random assignment). In the network literature, cross-sectional 
networks using partial correlations (the unique variance predicted by one node on another, 
                                                             





after controlling for all other nodes in the network) have been advanced as providing indirect 
support for causality. Partial correlations represent predicative associations and they go some 
way in removing spurious correlations. As such, partial correlations have been described as 
“potential causal relationships” (Epskamp et al., 2018, p. 419) or “clues about the causal 
skeleton of a network” (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013, p. 105; see chapter 4 for more detail on 
estimating partial correlation networks).  
Assuming direct casual connections also assumes that items represent unique or 
independent practices. This is because cause and effect do not make sense when practices 
overlap in content (i.e., are the same; Borsboom et al., 2003, 2004). This assumption is 
considered plausible given that scale construction generally involves removing item 
redundancies, although it is noted that no formal analyses are proposed beyond this (for a 
more detailed discussion on the assumption of node independence see chapter 7).  
The assumptions of complexity (principle 1) and non-random architecture (principle 
4) are considered plausible in light of 1) the established literature on Dynamical Systems 
Theory, and 2) the limitations of a Latent Variable Theory interpretation. In Dynamical 
Systems Theory, networks move through a trajectory of different states (Schmittman et al., 
2013) which can be explained in terms of entropy; namely, existing states remain stable until 
sufficient disorder (entropy) overwhelm their internal constraints. This then frees up the 
network to new forms of connectivity, which may eventually lead to new stable 
configurations (Heylighen 2002; Schneider & Sagan, 2005; for an accessible introduction to 
this concept of self-organisation; see Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). These stable 
configurations have often been considered attractor states in the literature (Newman, 2009), 
meaning states in which networks may repeatedly settle or converge into irrespective of their 





lowest point of the pendulum may be considered the attractor point or state. Irrespective of its 
initial state, a pendulum will eventually settle into this attractor point (due to gravity).  
In a mindfulness network of positive connections, practices may settle into a 
relatively stable configuration by way of dependencies among practices (e.g., being “friendly 
to myself when things go wrong” may lead to being able to “accept unpleasant experiences”, 
and so on).  Actively configuring one’s environment (e.g., seeking quiet spaces, using 
instructional aids) may further maintain such a configuration as it makes other possibilities 
less accessible (e.g. environments affording distraction). Mindfulness can thus come to be 
considered a relative equilibrium between the subject and their environment, analogous to an 
attractor state. This state would be considered stable so much as it is resilient to small 
disturbances. Thus, in the presence of a mindful attractor state, a practitioner will not always 
be mindful, yet out of character occurrences may become increasingly transient and rare.  
In summary, the elaborated theories of Dynamical Systems Theory provide a way of 
explaining how items may activate one another if they are connected in the network 
architecture. In doing so, items will co-vary in specific (non-random) ways, which across 
time, may lead to stable trait-like states. From this perspective, trait mindfulness becomes not 
a cause of item covariance, but rather an expression of it. This explanation can be contrasted 
with Latent Variable Theory which attributes item covariance to the causal influence of a 
common cause. Exactly how this influence occurs (i.e., the nature or mechanisms underlying 
the arrows in a reflective model) is left unspecified, and the plausibility of items being simply 
passive reflections of a latent variable is questionable.   
A network approach to mindfulness is not without precedent in the literature. Also 
citing concerns with reification, Garland and colleagues (2015b) have proposed that “it may 
be fruitful, for instance, to consider that there may be no actual entity called ‘mindfulness’, 





convenience, label ‘mindfulness’” (p. 2). Likewise, van Dam and colleagues (2017) have 
called for mindfulness research to move from efforts to obtain single unitary measures to 
data-driven dynamic approaches, less constrained by researchers’ a priori theories.  Chiesa 
(2013) has also recommended that a “new operational model of mindfulness…be developed 
and empirically tested while taking into account the components of mindfulness and their 
interactions”. Chiesa (2013) argued that such a network model was more consistent with 
traditional formulations which speak to synergy and mutually reinforcing inter-relationships 
between practices.  
Extant network models also exist in the literature. Garland and colleagues (2009, 
2010, 2015a) have proposed increasingly more integrated system theories of mindfulness in 
which various practices feedback into each other, fostering positive states of mind. A more 
neurobiological account is also found in Vago and Silbersweig’s (2012) influential systems-
based model which conceives of mindfulness as a “multidimensional skill set” (p. 3) which, 
in interaction, reduces self-processing biases and fosters a healthy mind. The network model 
proposed here thus represents an attempt to address recommendations made in the literature 
at the level of self-report. This is believed to be the first study of its kind in the field of 
mindfulness; however, the theoretical rationale and empirical methodology derive from 
psychological network studies in other fields. These are reviewed next.  
3.2 The Application of Psychological Networks in Psychology  
In their aforementioned influential review, van Dam and colleagues (2017) suggested 
that mindfulness research needed to shift to a data-driven network solution similar to what 
occurred in intelligence research. That field had been dominated by a conceptualisation of 
intelligence as an underlying g factor which caused the changes in observable tests. A marked 
void existed in conceptualising exactly what g was, although references to “mental energy” 





seminal texts. Although g has been shown to be heritable (see Plomin & Deary, 2015 for 
review), efforts to discover biological basis of this unitary entity remain unconvincing, 
possibly indicating the limitations of a realist interpretation of g (Gould, 1996).  
Network Psychometrics also derives from intelligence research. In their pioneering 
simulation study, van Der Maas and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that item covariation 
formally attributed to the g, could also be generated by direct reciprocal mutual interactions 
among observable indicators. Their data-driven mutualist model of intelligence was dynamic 
in that the cognitive processes, initially un-correlated, came to be correlated over time 
through their mutual interactions. 
 Much as factor analysis generalised to common causes in personality through the 
work of Cattell and Kline (1977), so too did the mutualist model in the work of Cramer and 
colleagues (2012). These authors demonstrated that the covariance observed in personality 
tests could be explained by reference to direct mutual interactions between the variables 
measured through personality items. In this way, co-variation in items such as ‘‘I like to go to 
parties’’ and ‘‘I have many friends’’ were explained by direct causal sequences (i.e. going to 
parties increases the likelihood of meeting more people, and people with more friends get 
invited to more parties). This explanation contradicted causal accounts by which underlying 
traits such as extraversion, or other “raw material” (McCrae, Gaines, & Wellington, 2012, p. 
75) were considered common causes (although see Ashton & Lee, 2005; DeYoung, 2015, 
Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Funder, 1991; Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman, 2009 for 
other conceptualisations). Recently, Mottus, Kandler, and colleagues (2017) have also shown 
that personality items uniquely predict different items, challenging the idea that they are 
equivalent. As such, Mottus, Bates, Condon, Mroczek and Revelle (2017) concluded that 
personality is best considered by reference to “specific aspects…rather than by a few 





 The field in which network models have found most fruition is in psychopathology 
research. In psychopathology, symptoms have often been construed as indicators of 
underlying disease entities, a fact implicit in the definition of symptom itself. This common 
cause model proved powerful in medicine where it contributed to advancing the field from 
symptom treatment to identifying aetiological pathways to the common cause. This allowed 
for targeted treatments at this underlying level, with upstream effects on the symptom array 
(Clare, 1980). Unsurprisingly, psychiatry sought to emulate this method (Borsboom, 2017a). 
To this end, research has demonstrated biological correlates and implicated genes involved in 
psychopathology, yet like g, no compelling reductive account of mental disorders has been 
provided (Borsboom et al, 2018). Thus after “decades of work, the genetic, metabolic and 
cellular signatures of almost all mental syndromes remain largely a mystery” (Adam, 2013, p. 
41; see also Deacon, 2013; Kapur, Phillip & Insel, 2012; Lacasse & Leo, 2005; Matins De-
Souza, 2013). The network perspective on psychopathology circumvents these problems in 
its suggestion that mental disorders do not exist as underlying common causes. Rather, from a 
network perspective, mental disorders are said to arise from a network of interacting 
symptoms (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas & Borsboom, 2010; 
Kendler, Zachar & Craver, 2011).  
In the last few years, the plausibility of network conceptualisations for mental 
disorders have been established for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD; van Borkulo et al., 
2015; (Fried, Epskamp, Nesse, Tuerlinckx, & Borsboom, 2016; Bringmann, Lemmens, 
Huibers, Borsboom, & Tuerlinckx, 2015), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and associated 
symptomology (Armour, Fried, Deserno, Tsai, & Pietrzak, 2017; Birkeland & Heir, 2017; 
McNally et al., 2015; McNally, Heeren & Robinaugh, 2017; Mitchell et al., 2017; Spiller et 
al., 2017; Vanzhula, Calebs, Fewell & Levinson, 2018) Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 





(Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2018; van Rooijen et al., 2017; van Rooijen et al., 2018;), Social 
Anxiety Disorder (Heeren & McNally, 2016), Eating Disorders (Levinson et al., 2017; 
Forbush, Siew, & Vitevitch, 2016; Olatunji, Levinson, & Calebs, 2018; Smith et al., 2018) 
and Substance Abuse (Rhemtulla et al., 2016). Common to this field has been the 
identification of highly central symptoms, by which it is meant symptoms with large numbers 
of connections to other symptoms in the network.  Highly central symptoms have been 
argued to be possible candidates for intervention, for changes in these symptoms should 
spread widely across a symptom network given their wide connectivity (see chapter 4 for a 
more detailed discussion of centrality and its caveats). Evidence in support for this was found 
by Boschloo, van Borkulo, Borsboom and Schoevers (2016), who showed that the most 
central depression symptoms in the baseline network of their sample were the most predictive 
of future Major Depressive Disorder onset six years later.  
It was within the field of psychopathology that the notion of network density (the total 
level of connectivity of a network) came to the fore. Several network studies using different 
types of data suggested that greater connectivity may be associated with greater symptom 
severity (Cramer et al., 2016; Bringmann et al., 2015; van Borkulo et al., 2015; Wichers, 
Groot, & Psychosystems, ESM Group, EWS Group, 2016; Wigman et al., 2013). Especially 
relevant to the current theory was the pioneering study by van Borkulo and colleagues (2015) 
which compared the networks of remittent and persistent MDD patients in a prospective 
study. Using a newly developed Network Comparison Test (NCT; van Borkulo et al., 2017), 
they found that the symptom network of patients with persistent MDD were more densely 
connected at follow-up than that of the patients who recovered. This meant that that increased 
overall network connectivity predicted a worse prognosis, and this remained even when their 
groups were matched on depression severity sum-scores. This finding stimulated further 





criterion for depression….namely, that a set of symptoms, experienced by a person, are part 
of a disordered system if and only if they stand in a certain configuration of causal relations 
with respect to one another” (p.8). In support of this, recent research has reported greater 
network connectivity (global density) in a sample of individuals with social anxiety disorder 
(Heeren & McNally, 2018) and comorbid Post Traumatic Stress Disorder-Eating Disorder 
(Vanzhula et al., 2018), compared with nonclinical samples. Interestingly, in both these 
studies, no changes were noted in the network structures (or architecture), suggesting that the 
difference between groups was a squarely a consequence of how strongly symptoms were 
connected, rather than how they were connected. Put differently, the potentially causal 
pathways did not change, but the strength of these pathways did.  
Recent results now provide a more complicated picture. A replication study of von 
Borkulo’s and colleagues (2015) study by Schweren and colleagues (2017) failed to find 
evidence of a significant difference in density between MDD treatment responders and non-
responders (although it is noted that the effect was in the direction predicted by von Borkulo 
and colleagues, 2015). Likewise, van Loo and colleagues (2018) failed to find evidence of 
density differences in a retrospective study in which patients with MDD were divided into 
different subgroups10. In another cross-sectional study, the network structures of depression 
symptoms in healthy people were found to be more highly interconnected that those in a 
group with MDD (Fried et al., 2016; see also Fried, 2017). The density hypothesis thus 
remains an open question.  
As the field has developed, technical critiques have emerged (Guloksuz, Pries & Van 
Os, 2017; Forbes, Wright, Markon & Krueger, 2017; Steinley, Hoffman, Brusco, & Sher), 
along with rejoinders (Borsboom et al., 2017; Epskamp et al., 2018) and refinements to 
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methodology (Bringmann & Eronen, 2018; Bringmann et al., 2018). Network psychometrics 
have extended into new areas (for example attitude structures, Dalege et al., 2016), and new 
network indices are regularly being proposed (e.g. “node predictability”, Haslbeck & Fried, 
2017).  It is into this fertile field that the current study aims to situate mindfulness.  
3.3 Study Aims  
To the author’s knowledge, the current study represents the first application of 
network psychometrics to mindfulness. The current study takes as its starting point the 
assumption that direct connections between practices evolve over time through a formal 
mindfulness practice. As such, practitioners’ networks are hypothesised to evidence greater 
connectivity than non-practitioners.  
 Denser networks (characterised by positive connections) may facilitate greater 
feedback among nodes, which afford the network the ability to maintain a stable state within 
itself. Akin to closely spaced domino tiles falling, changes in one practice may quickly 
populate across the network, inducing changes in many other practices. On these grounds, it 
has been suggested that global levels of connectivity or network density might function 
analogously to attractor states (Borsboom, 2017a; Cramer et al., 2016; Dalege et al., 2016). 
By way of contrast, less dense networks may require continuous external influence to 
maintain the same state (Newman, 2009). To stay with the domino analogy, continuous 
influence would be required to collapse dominos spaced widely apart (i.e., each may have to 
be pushed over separately). Density in a network of positive connections also confers 
vulnerability, as decreases in one practice may also populate across the network rapidly (i.e., 
vicious spirals). Less dense networks hence convey more resilience to such decreases.  
 In this thesis, mindfulness will be considered an expression or emergent phenomenon 
of the activation of a network of relevant practices. In theory, a stable mindfulness (system 





influence, albeit such a system also conveys vulnerability. Such a network is assumed to 
come about through a regular practice, forming the basis of the main hypothesis11.  
3.3.1 Aim 1: To determine whether the practitioners’ network is characterised 
by greater network density: A global test of strength invariance. The current research will 
investigate density differences in the mindfulness networks of practitioners and non-
practitioners utilizing the Network Comparison Test (van Borkulo et al., 2017). The 
hypothesis is that: the networks of regular practitioners will be characterised by greater 
overall connectivity (density) than the networks of non-practicing individuals. It is noted that 
this analysis is not truly confirmatory, for no pre-registration of the hypothesis was made 
outside of the university (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas & Kievit, 2012).  
3.3.2 Aim 2: Investigating the architecture of mindfulness: A global test of 
network structure invariance and exploratory analysis of network structure. To 
investigate whether networks differ in how they are connected in addition to how strongly 
they are connected, structural differences will be tested for significance using the NCT. 
Unlike network density, it was unclear how well group level network structures may translate 
to the individual level where substantial heterogeneity in structures may exist. As such, no 
hypotheses were hence made in relation to structural differences.   
3.3.2.1 Exploratory analysis of mindfulness networks. Bearing in mind possible 
heterogeneity, it was assumed that general or average features of a mindfulness architecture 
could be revealed through an exploratory analysis. For example, self-organisation theory 
suggests that paths may be broken, freeing up nodes to connect with new paths. This may 
                                                             
11 A stable mindfulness system state can also be achieved in a weakly connected network, albeit it may require 
continuous influence of greater magnitude. A weakly connected system might also generate mindfulness 
following an especially powerful influence (akin to the lead domino being pushed with such force, it slides into 
the others). In reality, the dynamics of proposed mindfulness networks are much more complex. This is because 
different changes may occur across different timescales, and negative edges, if present, may correct for 
increases and decreases. Likewise, different practices may be central or peripheral to a network, which may 







manifest in practices (nodes) becoming more central in a practitioners network as a 
consequence of their regular practice, relative to non-practitioners. In the absence of temporal 
and longitudinal data such dynamics remain hidden; however, at the cross sectional level, 
differences in practice centrality can be compared. Practice centrality will hence be 
investigated by comparing three well-known local node centrality measures: strength, 
closeness, and betweenness (Opsahl, Agneessens, & Skvoretz, 2010; see chapter 4 for a 
discussion of centrality and these metrics). Community structures will also be identified using 
the Exploratory Graphical Analysis (EGA; Golino & Epskamp, 2017), developed for use in 
network studies of the type proposed. The community structures provide information on how 
practices cluster in a network.  
3.3.3 Measure Selection. Two mindfulness measures were selected to determine the 
relevant practices for network estimation. Study 1 used the Friedberg Mindfulness Inventory 
– Short Form (FMI-14; Walach et al., 2006) which is a well-established mindfulness measure 
in the literature, informed by Buddhist sources. The FMI has been validated using a number 
of different psychometric methods (see chapter 6 for a review of these studies) and most 
importantly, is one of the few measures validated on both practicing and non-practicing 
samples (Sauer, Walach, Offenbächer et al, 2011; Sauer, Lemke, Zinn, Buettner, & Kohls, 
2015; Walach et al., 2006).  
A second process measure was used to more accurately capture the idea of practices as 
processes.  Study 2 uses the Applied Mindfulness Process Scale (AMPS; Li, Black & 
Garland, 2016) which is a brief process measure specifying the process required to achieve 
the various traits specified in popular measures (such as the FMI). The major limitation of 
this measure was its lack of validation beyond the original study and its adaption in this study 





different measures represent the different sides of the trade-off between theoretical relevance 
and psychometric validation.   
3.4 Relevance to the Literature 
Maris and Kruis (2016) have recently demonstrated that reflective, formative and 
network models are mathematically equivalent (see also Molenaar, van Rijn, & Hamaker, 
2007; Molenaar, 2010; Marsman et al., 2018). This does not entail, however, that the theories 
that drive these models are equivalent (Borsboom, 2017b). The network models proposed 
here seek to complement existing approaches in several ways. Firstly, in a very general sense, 
network models highlight unique covariance between pairs of variables which can 
complement extant latent variable approaches which focus on variance shared across all items 
(Costantini et al., 2015). Assuming item practice correspondence, the statistical relations in 
network models come from material referents in the real world (Fried & Cramer, 2017). 
Networks hence direct attention to casual mechanisms which appear more plausible than 
those specified in Latent Variable Theory. In the latter, the analogy reflective factor models 
make with physical systems of measurement break down when the nature of the causal paths 
is further examined. In the temperature example, the arrows from the latent variable to the 
indicators refer to a well-defined mechanism in which increases in ambient room temperature 
cause the temperature of mercury to increase, causing it to expand in the glass tube (Cramer 
et al., 2012). Nothing of this sort is offered in the psychological equivalent, and consequently; 
the descriptive aspect of trait theory (the pattern of behaviour from which the trait is inferred) 
remains disjointed from the explanatory aspect (mechanisms of structures which are the 
source of the pattern). The network models advanced suggest something different; namely, 
that the pattern of behaviour arises from direct causal interactions among the behaviours. In 
this way the distinction between description and explanation collapses, and so too the 





Secondly, metrics and postulates difficult to conceive of in extant approaches are 
explored. For example, concepts of density and structure provide a different and perhaps 
complementary way of thinking about transformation. Extant mindfulness measures typically 
consider change in terms of accumulation (i.e., sum-totals indexing high frequencies of 
behaviour); however, network models view change structurally (indicated in the covariance 
matrix). Advanced practitioners might thus differ from novice and non-practitioners not by 
way of the (sum-total) strength of their practices, but rather in how those practices work 
together. Node centrality represents another novel metric that may provide information about 
the dynamics of a network. In general, it has been suggested that “as highly central nodes go, 
so should go the network” (Robinaugh, Millner & McNally, 2016, p. 748)12, and thus highly 
central nodes have been advanced as possible targets for network interventions (Borsboom & 
Cramer, 2013; Borsboom, Cramer, Schmittmann, Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011; Newman, 
2004). Exploring centrality may hence generate hypotheses for future experimental work13. 
Finally, these studies provide proof-of-principle for future research which may wish to 
incorporate a much wider range of nodes. In these networks, biological, psychological, social 
and environmental variables may be found to be deeply intertwined in feedback loops, 
potentially challenging a purely reductionist vision of mindfulness. The networks can hence 
be interpreted from embodied, enactivist and embedded perspectives.  
                                                             
12 The situation is more complex when negative edges are present in a network because parts of a network might 
be suppressed by a highly central node, whilst other parts are activated (see Robinaugh, Millner & McNally, 2016 
for further discussion of this point and a novel centrality metric to address it).  
13 Interestingly, the concept of node centrality may help understand research reporting similar increases in 
mindfulness across both intervention and active control conditions (Goyal et al., 2014; MacCoon et al., 2012; 
Goldberg et al., 2018). Items such as being “friendly to myself when things go wrong” (FMI, item 9) represent 
practices which are likely non-specific to mindfulness, meaning they are amenable to a wide range of 
interventions such as those included in an active control. If items of this sort were particularly important to a 
casual structure within a measure (i.e. changes in this item cause changes in a number of other items), it might 
be expected that mindfulness levels in both groups may increase. Some support for this idea comes from a 
recent meta-analysis on self-compassion (Wilson et al., 2018), of which the item being “friendly to myself when 
things go wrong” is indicative. The authors found specific self-compassion therapies to demonstrate no 






Chapter 4: Network Psychometrics 
In this chapter, the reader is introduced to Network Psychometrics. This chapter is 
included only due to the relative novelty of network psychometrics, especially in the field of 
mindfulness. Those familiar with this methodology may well wish to move on to chapter 5 
where the method of the current studies is outlined.  
4.1 Introduction to Psychological Networks 
Network science has arguably transformed disciplines ranging from physics to 
sociology, such that a network takeover has been proposed (Barabasi, 2012). Whenever 
complex phenomena are modelled as networks, they converge on generic organizing 
principles suggesting common fundamental laws (Barabasi, 2016). Thus, despite each 
discipline bringing its own unique goals and technical challenges, they all share a common 
set of mathematical tools. This has led to a fertile cross-disciplinary science (Barabasi, 2016).  
Psychology has recently joined this enterprise through the work of Borsboom and his 
colleagues at the theoretical (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Borsboom et al, 2011; Cramer, et 
al., , 2010; Schmittmann et al., 2013; Fried et al., 2016) and computational levels (Epskamp 
et al., 2012; von Borkulo et al., 2014, Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018). Although social 
network analyses are well established in psychology, the network analysis of psychological 
constructs measured with self-report questionnaires is new. These networks differ from social 
networks in important ways. In social networks, the nodes of the network are represented by 
people, and the edges represent the relationships between them. As such, these networks can 
be considered representations of the raw data (Bringmann et al., 2018). In psychological 
networks, edges cannot be observed directly, and are hence estimated. As such, the edges of 
psychological networks are statistical relations (Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018).  
Several tutorials now exist to guide researchers lacking advanced statistical 





Borsboom, van Harreveld, & van der Maas, 2017; Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried., 2018; 
Jones, Mair, & McNally, 2018). Networks are most easily interpreted when they are 
visualised. With a visual topology, the most central items and most important edges become 
readily apparent. Psychological networks endorse an interventionist theory of causation 
(Woodward, 2003) which suggests that experimental (or natural) interventions on one node 
will change the probability distribution of the other nodes. Networks are hence useful for 
generating hypotheses around removing or rewiring edges, or weakening or strengthening 
nodes, which can be experimentally tested later (Epskamp, 2017).  
The following sections aim to introduce the reader to the field of Network 
Psychometrics. Methods commonly used to estimate psychological networks will be 
discussed first. Network interpretation will then be covered. Although far from an exhaustive 
review, it is anticipated that the material will provide the reader with the requisite knowledge 
for understanding the methodology, results and discussion of this study.  
4.2 Network Estimation 
Psychological networks can take many forms. They can consist of un-weighted edges 
which merely show that two variables are connected, or weighted edges which describe the 
magnitude of such associations. Psychological networks can also estimate directed edges (in 
which an arrow indicates the direction of predicted activation) with longitudinal data. This 
chapter will be limited to weighted undirected networks which are typical of the cross-
sectional data (for further information about directed networks, see Bringmann et al., 2016). 
Figure 4 shows a simple weighted network consisting of three nodes and three edges.  The 
two blue edges indicate positive associations between nodes 1 and 2, and 2 and 3. The single 
orange edge represents a negative association between nodes 1 and 3. The thickness of the 






Figure 4. A three node undirected weighted network. 
4.2.1 Partial correlation networks. Perhaps the most common type of cross-
sectional network estimated are partial correlation networks. Partial correlations are useful 
because they can remove spurious associations in the data. To illustrate this, Constantini and 
colleagues (2015) provide the example of the strong association which may be found between 
ice-cream sales and drownings. This is a spurious association because the two cannot cause 
each other; rather the association is a function of a common cause; namely, summer.  
Partial correlations usefully remove spurious associations by testing for direct effects 
(pairwise conditional dependence) between variables while controlling for all other variables 
included in the model. The unique association revealed is predictive, and hence considered 
potentially causal (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018). 
The partial correlation network is directly encoded through the inverse covariance 
matrix in the Gaussian Graphical Model (GGM; Constantini et al., 2015; Lauritzen, 1996). In 
the GGM, partial correlation coefficients edge weights range from -1 to 1. Edge weights of 
zero are particularly interesting to researchers, because they represent conditional 
independencies in the data (Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018)14. This means that the two 
variables could not have caused each other (Pearl, 2000).  
                                                             
14 This interpretation assumes multivariate normality which may not be satisfied in most psychological datasets. 





Conditional independence is unlikely to be found in real data due to background noise 
(“everything correlates to some extent with everything else”; Meehl, 1990, p. 204). Thus, to 
create more interpretable networks, very small associations are removed. Each correlation 
could be tested for statistical significance; however, this increases the likelihood of false 
positives (false edges being estimated due to multiple testing), which if corrected for (such as 
through the common Bonferroni correction) reduces the power of a study. Network 
modelling has hence turned to a different technique, known as regularisation (although see 
Williams, Rhemtulla, Wysocki, & Rast 2018, for non-regularized methods). 
4.2.2 Regularised Networks. Regularisation essentially involves shrinking all the 
partial correlation coefficients of a network such that arbitrary small edges reduce to zero 
(Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018; Epskamp, Kruis & Marsman, 2016). It employs 
machine learning algorithms such as the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator 
(LASSO; Tibshirani, 1996), of which a popular variant in the network literature has been the 
graphical LASSO (Friedman et al., 2008; henceforth referred to as ‘glasso’).  
The degree (or severity) of regularisation is controlled with a tuning parameter λ 
(lambda) set between 0 and 1. Lower values prioritise sensitivity over specificity. This means 
that fewer connections are removed, but at the cost of leaving too many potentially spurious 
connections (i.e. they increase the likelihood of false positives). Higher values are more 
liberal in their pruning, but increase the likelihood of removing too many potentially real 
connections (i.e. they increase the likelihood of false negatives).  
The task of selecting the optimal balance has usually been resolved by employing a 
data-driven procedure known as the minimizing the Extended Bayesian Information Criterion 
(EBIC; Chen & Chen, 2008). Optimal sparsity is achieved by generating a range of networks 
across the λ (lambda) parameter range, and then calculating the EBIC value for each 





many parameters to reduce over-fitting15. Simulation studies have shown that selecting λ 
models with the lowest EBIC value is effective in retrieving the true network structure 
provided it is a sparse network (Foygel & Drton, 2010; van Borkulo et al., 2014; Epskamp, 
2017; for limitations of the glasso/EBIC procedure in dense networks, or networks with high 
sample sizes, see Williams & Rast, 2018). The use of the EBIC does not completely absolve 
the researcher of the responsibility of choosing the optimal network, for the EBIC uses 
another γ (gamma) hyper-parameter to determine the level of sparsity. This is typically set 
between 0 and 0.5 and reflects the same trade-off between sensitivity and specificity 
discussed in relation to the λ tuning parameter. None-the-less, the literature has suggested 
using a γ value of 0.5 given that it has performed well in retrieving a true model in simulation 
studies (Epskamp & Fried, 2018).  
4.3 Network Inference 
Network inference involves asking questions about the ‘local’ and ‘global’ properties 
of networks. Investigating local properties involves the identification of edges and nodes 
which are most important to a network, and how they cluster.  This information can inform 
possible network interventions (Valente, 2012). Investigating global properties involves 
asking questions about the overall strength of a network’s connectivity, or its structure. This 
area is a recent field of investigation in which the statistical analyses are still being worked 
out.  
4.3.1 Local inference. Important edges are those with large edge weights. Nodes 
connected with strong edges are those able to influence each other more quickly than those 
connected by weak edges. One way to think about strong edges is to consider the distance 
between two people trying to communicate with each other. Communication is easiest with 
                                                             
15 Over-fitting is a problem in machine learning, because it leads to models which do not generalise beyond the 





shorter distances, and this can be represented by inversing edge weights. As such, edge 
weights can loosely convey information about how quickly activation may travel between 
nodes (Borgatti, 2005)16. That said, statistical analyses on data collected over time would be 
required to provide information about how long particular causal processes may take to 
operate. 
Edge strengths go on to inform centrality metrics. These metrics attempt to capture 
how important a node is in a network. Network science has developed a number of 
quantitative measures of centrality, the most common being strength, closeness, and 
betweenness centrality (Opsahl et al., 2010). Node strength centrality reflects the degree to 
which a given node is involved in the network.  This is calculated by simply summing the 
edges between the focal node and the other nodes in the network. In a cross-sectional 
(undirected) network, a node with a high strength centrality value is one which has either a 
large influence on a networks activation (common cause) or is influenced greatly by a 
network’s activation (common effect). In cross-sectional psychological networks, both may 
be true as psychological processes are likely reciprocal (Constantini et al., 2015).  
 The utility of strength centrality in terms of a networks overall activation can be 
overstated, for the index only takes into account the focal node and its neighbours. It has been 
argued that a more global index is required which can take into account the edge structures of 
the whole network (Scott, 2017). Closeness centrality achieves this by measuring the mean 
shortest paths between a given node and all other nodes in the network. Closeness centrality 
can thus provide an understanding of how quickly influence may travel between a node and 
the rest of the network (although again, formal analyses on data collected over time are 
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required to provide information of the actual time-scale in which causal processes may 
unfold).  
Betweenness centrality is another global index which measures how often a node lies 
on the shortest path between every combination of two other nodes. A betweenness value of 
one means that the node lies on the connecting edge between at least two other nodes. If it 
lies on the connecting edge of two further nodes, then it will have a value of two (and so 
forth…; Constantini et al., 2015). Nodes with high betweenness centrality are important 
because they mediate or facilitate the influence of activation between two nodes. Moreover, 
they act as bridges between communities of nodes. If a node with high betweenness (but 
perhaps low strength) is removed, we might expect the distances amongst other nodes or 
communities to increase (Barrat, Barthélemy, Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2004). 
Of these measures, strength centrality has been considered the most useful centrality 
metric for interpretation (Bringmann et al., 2018). This is because global measures of 
closeness and betweenness make assumptions on the overall network which are difficult to 
meet. Specifically, they assume that effects always travel the shortest path (Borgatti, 2005; 
Fornito, Zalesky & Bullmore, 2016). This implies that node knows the shortest paths in 
advance (Borgatti, 2005). This may be problematic in a psychological context, especially in 
the absence of any knowledge about the dynamics of a system (see Bringmann et al., 2018 for 
further discussion of the assumptions of centrality). 
As noted, nodes in networks often cluster forming communities. Under certain 
conditions, these communities have been shown to be mathematically equivalent to factors 
(Golino & Epskamp, 2017), although they afford different theoretical interpretations. One 
technique developed for network analysis is Exploratory Graph Analysis (EGA; Golino & 
Epskamp, 2017). The EGA first estimates a regularised network and then applies a 





algorithm is premised on the idea that random walkers on a network tend to get trapped in 
densely connected parts of the network, corresponding to communities (Pons & Lapperty, 
2005). Simulation and real-world research has shown that the EGA accurately identifies 
communities in data comparable or better than other methods (Golino & Epskamp, 2017).  
4.3.2 Global inferences. Psychological research often involves comparing two groups 
on some measure. From a network perspective, this involves comparing two network models. 
Recently, von Borkulo and colleagues (2017) developed a permutation test called the 
Network Comparison Test (NCT) which investigates the difference between two networks.  
The NCT works on the assumption that two networks differ to the extent that their 
architectures (or data-generating mechanisms) differ (von Borkulo et al., 2017).  These 
differences may be in global strength (S, the absolute sum all the edge weights in a network) 
or structure (L, the degree of difference in the edge that changes the most from one network 
to the other). The NCT works on the following premise: If only one network architecture is 
responsible for generating all the data observed for both groups (the null hypothesis), then 
reshuffling participants between groups (for example, 10,000 times) should not substantially 
alter global strength or structure. The NCT tests this proposition by first estimating the 
difference between the original networks (in either strength or structure), and then repeatedly 
calculates this difference in sets of randomly regrouped individuals (the permuted networks).  
This permutation procedure results in a reference distribution of values of strength or 
structure differences. These values can be compared with the values observed in the original 
networks.  If the observed result is found to fall in the tails of the reference distribution, then 
the two groups are considered significantly different (the reader is referred to the paper by 






Chapter 5: Method 
5.1 Participants and Procedures  
Participants consisted of 654 registered users of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
MTurk is a crowd-sourcing Internet marketplace where a pool of potential participants accept 
studies put up by researchers. Participants completed the study via a single online 
questionnaire using the TurkPrime interface (Litman, Robinson & Abberbock, 2017). 
TurkPrime provides a simple interface for researchers, and tools for controlling aspects of 
their studies such as remuneration and selection.  
 A recent demographic survey of the MTurk population found that US workers 
comprised 75% of respondents, followed by Indian (16%) and Canadian respondents (1.1%; 
Difallah, Filatova, & Ipeirotis, 2018). The current studies restricted respondents to US 
workers, which has been recommended for clinical research (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; 
although see Milland, 2017 for a critique). This is because US worker data has consistently 
been shown to be of better quality than data collected from Indian workers (Kazai et al. 2012, 
Khanna et al. 2010, Shaw et al. 2011), possibly due to language difficulties (Litman, 
Robinson, & Rosenzweig, 2015). US worker data has also been shown to be less biased by 
financial compensation compared to non-US worker data (Litman et al., 2015). The 
demographic characteristics of US workers are also better understood. Demographic research 
has shown that MTurk users in the United States are representative of the general population 
(Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015), and more representative of the 
general population than traditional university subject pools (Paolacci, 2010). 
Participants also had to be over the age of 18 and have a study approval rate of greater 
than 95%. This means that a participant must have adequately completed 95% or more of the 
previous studies/tasks to the standards of the requester. Setting the approval rate at 95% helps 





literature (Litman, et al., 2017). In this study, all participants could receive remuneration 
without having to answer any questions.   
At the time of writing, mindfulness research using MTurk was limited. No studies 
recruiting only mindfulness practitioners was identified, although one study had recruited a 
sample of 130 mindfulness practitioners and practitioners of a related contemplative practice 
(Hanley, Warner & Garland, 2014). The current study aimed to recruit at least as many 
participants as the number of parameters required for network estimation (120 parameters), 
but ideally three times that (it has been suggested that network studies recruit a minimum of 
three persons per parameter; Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018). Recruitment hence aimed 
for 360 mindfulness practitioners and non-practitioners (see Section 5.3 for details on sample 
size estimation). Given the uncertainty around how many mindfulness practitioners existed in 
the MTurk population, the criteria for selection was expanded to include practitioners of 
mindfulness and those of a related meditative practice.  
The MTurk platform allowed participants to select a study based on a study’s listed 
title and a short description of the study. To maximise the likelihood of attracting 
mindfulness practitioners, two separate studies were listed with the first directly appealing to 
mindfulness practitioners in the title and description (See Table 1). A second study was then 
listed to target non-practitioners. Practitioners and non-practitioners could complete either 
survey, but not both. This discrimination was achieved using a restriction tool in the 
Turkprime toolbox.    
 
Table 1 
Mechanical Turk Study Titles and Descriptions for Each Group 
 Practitioner Group Non-Practitioner Group 







Description  2 surveys for people who regularly (at least 
weekly) practice mindfulness or a related 
meditation 
2 brief surveys for people who are 
not involved in mindfulness or any 
other related meditative practice 
 
Upon selecting a study, all participants were provided with a title page (Appendix A) 
with the following description regarding Mindfulness: 
Mindfulness is a popular meditation practice that has often been defined as ‘paying 
attention in a particular way; on purpose, in the present moment, and 
nonjudgmentally‘, although many people have their own understanding. It often 
involves certain meditations and practices that are common to other contemplative 
traditions (such as vipassana, zen, transcendental meditation, amongst others). 
Typically, mindfulness practices involve sitting and walking meditations, mindful 
yoga, body-scans, mantras or contemplative prayers, loving-kindness or compassion 
meditations, amongst others. 
Participants were then presented with a drop-down item with the following options: “I 
regularly practise mindfulness or a related meditation (at least weekly)”, “I do not practise 
mindfulness or a related meditation or contemplative practice” or, “I infrequently practise 
mindfulness or a related meditation”. Participants indicating infrequent practice were further 
provided a free response space to describe the frequency of their practice.  
 All participants were compensated US $0.80 after completing a single online survey 
session which included two mindfulness measures. This compensation was consistent with 
typical remuneration of $US 0.10 a minute for studies using the Mechanical Turk platform 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The average session lasted approximately 8.6 
minutes, with the median time being 6.6 minutes. After removing missing data (section 5.4), 
there was 654 respondents, of which 364 identified as frequent practitioners (weekly), 224 as 
non-practitioners, and 59 as practicing infrequently. The socio-demographic information for 





between 25-35 years (49%), with either a four-year college degree (35%) or some college 
education (28%). Respondents most frequently reported having no religious affiliation (52%), 
with the second largest group being protestant Christian (24%). There were slightly more 
males (54%) than females (46%) in the total sample. These differences generally 
characterised all three groups.   
 
Table 2 
Demographics and Characteristics  
  Practice Controls Irregular Total 
  (n = 364) (n = 224) (n = 59) (n = 654) 
Age, n (%)      
   15-24  66 (18) 27 (12) 10 (17) 103 (16) 
   25-34  188 (52) 95 (43) 29 (50) 312 (48) 
   35-44  62 (17) 66 (30) 11 (19) 139 (22) 
   45-54  29 (8) 21 (10) 4 (7) 54 (8) 
   55 -64  17 (4) 11 (5) 3 (5) 30 (5) 
   65 plus  3 (1) 2 (1) 2 (3) 7 (1) 
Education, n (%)       
   Less than high school  1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 
   High School  37 (10) 35 (16) 5 (9) 77 (12) 
   Some College  102 (28) 62 (28) 19 (32) 183 (28) 
   2-year College Degree  58 (16) 23 (10) 5 (9) 86 (13) 
   4-year College Degree  130 (36) 74 (33) 19 (32) 223 (35) 
   Master’s Degree  31 (9) 21 (10) 8 (14) 60 (9) 
   Doctoral Degree  2 (1) 4 (2) 2 (3) 8 (1) 
   Professional Degree  3 (1) 3 (1) 1 (2) 7 (1) 
Gender, n (%)      
   Male  201 (54) 119 (54) 30 (51) 350 (54 





Race, n (%)      
   White/Caucasian  265 (73) 174 (79) 49 (83) 488 (76) 
   African American  32 (9) 20 (9) 2 (3) 54 (8) 
   Hispanic  2 (6) 9 (4) 1 (2) 30 (5) 
   Asian  39 (11) 16 (7) 7 (12) 62 (10) 
   Native American  3 (1) 0 0 3 (1) 
   Other  5 (1) 3 (1) 0 8 (1) 
Religious Affiliation, n (%)      
   None  182 (50) 129 (58) 30 (51) 341 (53) 
   Protestant Christian  88 (24) 57 (26) 14 (24) 156 (24) 
   Roman Catholic  33 (9) 22 (10) 10 (17) 65 (10) 
   Buddhist  20 (6) 0 (0) 2 (3) 22 (3) 
   Other  44 (12) 14 (6) 3 (5) 61 (10) 
 
 Researchers have often used attention checks such as trick questions to improve data 
quality. These can then be used to screen out inattentive participants prior to analysis 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). An attention check may involve a nonsensical 
question such as “Have you ever, while watching TV, had a fatal heart attack” which 
inattentive respondents might affirm (Paolacci et al., 2010).  Alternatively, a question such as 
“which sports do you like?” may be preceded with a lengthy block of text containing 
information to disregard the question. Several reviewers have suggested attention checks are 
less useful for MTurk research (Chandelr & Shapiro, 2016; Hauser & Schwarz 2015; Peer, 
Vosgerau & Acquisti, 2014; Vannette, 2017). Firstly, removing respondents who fail 
attention checks may introduce a demographic bias. This is because inattentive responders 
may not represent a random subset of the population (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014; 
Vanette, 2017). Secondly, attention checks may have other consequences, such as inducing 
Hawthorne effects (motivating self-censorship or desirable responding; Clifford and Jerit 





That said, research with MTurk has shown that restrictions on approval rate (such as used in 
the current studies) is effective in discriminating attentive from inattentive participants (Peer 
et al. 2014). 
5.2 Mindfulness Measures 
5.2.1 Friedberg Mindfulness Inventory – Short Form (FMI-14). The FMI, in its 
short form, is a 14-item scale designed to measure mindfulness as a stable trait (Appendix B). 
It has been shown to be useful in distinguishing between participants with and without 
meditation experience (Sauer, Walach, Offenbächer et al., 2011; Sauer et al., 2015; Walach et 
al., 2006). 
The FMI-14 was constructed to reflect mindfulness from the perspective of Buddhist 
Psychology (Wallach et al., 2006). The scale was initially developed as a unidimensional 
scale; however, research also supports a two-factor solution of Presence and Acceptance 
(albeit different studies have attributed different items to these factors; see for example, 
Kohls et al., 2009;  Ströhle, 2006). Presence is generally thought to reflect the awareness of 
stimuli in the subjective now (Sauer et al., 2012), and Acceptance, “a non-judgmental stance 
toward all kinds of experience” (Kohls et al., 2009). The FMI utilises 4-point rating scale 
(“rarely”, “occasionally”, “fairly often” and “almost always”). The 14 items are listed in 
Table 3.  
  
Table 3 
Friedberg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI) Items 
Item Item Description 
FMI 1 I am open to the experience of the present moment 
FMI 2 I sense my body, whether eating, cooking, cleaning or talking 






FMI 4 I am able to appreciate myself 
FMI 5 I pay attention to what's behind my actions 
FMI 6 I see my mistakes and difficulties without judging them 
FMI 7 I feel connected to my experience in the here-and-now 
FMI 8  I accept unpleasant experiences 
FMI 9 I am friendly to myself when things go wrong 
FMI 10 I watch my feelings without getting lost in them 
FMI 11 In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately Reacting 
FMI 12 I experience moments of inner peace and ease, even when things get hectic and 
stressful 
FMI 13 I am impatient with myself and with others 
FMI 14 I am able to smile when I notice how I sometimes make life difficult 
Note. Item 13 is reverse coded.  
The FMI has been validated using a number of different psychometric methods. In the 
original study (Walach et al., 2006), a principal component analysis suggested one common 
component, and good internal consistency was achieved in lay, meditating and clinical 
participants (Cronbach’s alpha = .86).  Correlations with other relevant constructs (self-
awareness, dissociation, global severity index, meditation experience in years) were 
significant in the medium to low range. In a subsequent analysis, Ströhle (2006) reported 
evidence for a two-factor solution comprised of two inter-correlated sub-factors (Presence 
and Acceptance). In a confirmatory factor analysis, Kohls and colleagues (2009) reported 
good internal consistency for both the one factor model (α = 0.83) and two factor models 
(Presence, α = 0.69, items 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10; Acceptance α = 0.77, items 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14), 
but found both models to have suboptimal fit indices. A subsequent exploratory analysis 
revealed an 8-item solution which demonstrated an improved fit. FMI-14 scores were 
associated with substantively lower anxiety and depression scores, which was largely 
accounted for by the Acceptance factor. In a non-clinical sample, Sauer, Walach, Schmidt 





their broad proposition that Acceptance is probably involved in regulation of emotions, and 
Presence, attentional regulation.  
Using an Item Response Theory methodology (Rasch Analysis), Sauer, Walach, 
Offenbächer and colleagues, (2011) investigated the psychometric properties of the FMI in a 
clinical sample (patients with psychosomatic conditions). The analysis did not support a uni-
dimensional model, and item 13 did not fit the Rasch model. They found good support for a 
13-item two-factor solution (Acceptance and Presence) in which the negatively worded item 
(item 13) was removed. A Rasch analysis can identify whether items are equally difficult for 
different groups such as practitioners and non-practitioners. Lack of this property is called 
Differential Item Functioning (DIF). The authors found no evidence of Differential Item 
Functioning between mindfulness practitioners, non-practitioners and practitioners of other 
spiritual practices (such as prayer or meditation in general). Strong floor and ceiling effects 
were reported which they suggested may limit the discriminative capabilities of the 
instrument. The two factors (Acceptance and Presence) exhibited good adherence to the 
Rasch model, although reliability could be improved. A difference in the difficulty of items 
was also reported, such that the Presence items were found to be substantially easier to 
interpret than Acceptance items. They suggested that this may support Kohls and colleagues 
(2009) assertion that the ability to be present is established before the ability to accept things.  
In a qualitative study, Belzer and colleagues (2013) found evidence that many of the 
items may be subject to differential interpretations by practitioners and non-practitioners. 
Contrary to the findings of Sauer, Walach, Offenbächer and colleagues (2011), they found 
that Presence items were the most difficult to understand for persons without mindfulness 
experience. Those with mindfulness experience comprehended all the items of the FMI-14 as 





The FMI has also been validated with a novel statistical method derived from 
machine learning. Sauer and colleagues (2015) used a Random Forest algorithm to generate a 
set of decision trees for the purpose of ascertaining the predictive accuracy of FMI items in 
correctly classifying whether an individual was a practitioner or non-practitioner (see Strobl, 
Malley & Tutz, 2009 for a detailed discussion of Random Forest in psychological research). 
The researchers used two samples to allow for the replication of results. The samples also 
allowed them to assess the influence of data quality. What they designated as their high 
quality sample consisted of 38 expert mindfulness practitioners with at least five years of 
regular practice, age and gender matched with a group of 28 non-practitioners (see Sauer et 
al., 2012 for further details of this group). Their low quality sample consisted of 72 regular 
practitioners (mindfulness training included Buddhist meditation, Thai Chi, or Yoga 
exercises) and 129 non-practitioners recruited online. The authors found that the FMI-14 was 
capable of distinguishing practitioners from non-practitioners across both samples, but that 
many individual items were unable to reliably predict class membership. This was especially 
true for the low quality sample, raising issues of sensitivity (only item 2 could accurately 
discern the groups). Consistent with previous findings (Sauer, Walach, Offenbächer et al., 
2011), item 13 made no contribution to predictive accuracy in either of their samples.  
5.2.2 Applied Mindfulness Process Scale (adapted). The Applied Mindfulness 
Process Scale (AMPS; Li et al., 2016) is a recent mindfulness scale designed to measure the 
frequency with which people use various mindfulness skills to cope with daily stressful 
events (Appendix C). The AMPS is a 15-item scale where each item reflects a different 
mindfulness skill, as well as the processes required for achieving the specific trait 
mindfulness characteristics previously described in trait scales (Li et al., 2016).  
In the AMPS, respondents are asked to indicate how often they have used mindfulness 





items). A 5-point rating scale is employed with response options ranging from 0 (“Never”) to 
4 (“Almost always”). Higher scores indicate the more frequent use of each mindfulness 
process, and these can be summed to create a total process score.  In its original publication, a 
potential three factor solution was identified by a visual analysis of scree plots. The subscales 
were labelled decentering (items, 1, 3, 12, 13, 15), positive emotion regulation (items 5, 9, 
11, 14) and negative emotion regulation (items 2, 5, 6, 8, 10). This three-factor model was 
then subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis where it achieved good internal consistency 
(Cronbach's α = 0.91), but only borderline acceptable fit. In the original study, the AMPS 
total score was positively correlated with a number of measures, including the FMI (r = .52), 
and partial correlations revealed it to demonstrate incremental validity over the FMI (Li et al., 
2016). In this study, the AMPS was adapted for use with non-meditating populations by 




Preliminary AMPS Instructions Provided to Each Group 
 Practitioners  Non-practitioners  
Instruction  Everyone gets confronted with 
negative or stressful events in 
daily life, and people who 
practice mindfulness 
experience these events in 
different ways. Please indicate 
how often you have used 
mindfulness in each of the 
following ways for the period 
of the last week 
Everyone gets confronted with 
negative or stressful events in 
daily life, and people 
experience these events in 
different ways. Please indicate 
how often you may have done 
each of the following for the 






The AMPS is a novel measure in the literature in that it incorporates mindfulness 
practices which the authors believe promote well-being and eudemonia. The Mindfulness to 
Meaning Theory advanced by Garland and colleagues (2015a) attempts to explicate this. 
Briefly, the MMT suggests that in a single iterative step, mindfulness facilitates de-centering 
from stress into a non-evaluative, metacognitive state of mindfulness. This leads to a 
broadening of awareness to encompass previously unattended information. In turn, this 
broader awareness allows for increased flexibility and ultimately, a basic re-appraisal of the 
stressor. This basic re-appraisal is then proposed to lead to more durable positive emotional 
regulation processes such as positive reappraisal (seeing the positive side of a stressor), and 
hedonic and implicational savouring. These terms informed the labelling of AMPS nodes (see 
node descriptions, Table 5) which were used for the sake of brevity when presenting results.  
 
Table 4 
Applied Mindfulness Process Scale (AMPS) Items and Node descriptions 
Item Item description Node description 
AMPS 1 observe my thoughts in a non-attached 
manner 
De-centered Observation  
AMPS 2 relax my body when I was tense Relaxation 
AMPS 3 see that my thoughts were not necessarily 
true 
Metacognitive Perception. 
AMPS 4 enjoy the little things in life more fully Hedonic Savouring 
AMPS 5 calm my emotions when I was upset Emotional Calming. 
AMPS 6 stop reacting to my negative impulses Non-reactivity to Impulses 
AMPS 7 see the positive side of difficult 
circumstances 
Positive Re-appraisal 
AMPS 8  reduce tension when I was stressed Reduce Tension 
AMPS 9 realize that I can grow stronger from 
difficult circumstances 
Implicational Savouring 





AMPS 11 be aware of and appreciating pleasant 
events 
Awareness and Appreciation 
AMPS 12 let go of unpleasant thoughts and feelings Letting Go 
AMPS 13 realize that my thoughts were not facts Meta-cognitive Realization. 
AMPS 14 notice pleasant things in the face of 
difficult circumstances 
Broadening Attention 
AMPS 15 see alternate views of a situation Flexibility 
 
The AMPS was designed to measure mindfulness in populations participating in a 
mindfulness intervention. An important consideration in these studies was the use of the 
AMPS for populations it was not designed for or validated on; namely, regular practitioners 
(versus participants in a formal intervention) and more importantly, non-practitioners.  
5.3 Sample Size Determination 
Determining an adequate sample size is often referred to as power analysis (Cohen, 
1977) in the literature. To conduct a power analysis, an expectation of the effect size is 
required. The network equivalent is an expected (weighted) network structure (Epskamp, 
Borsboom & Fried, 2018); however, as the first study of this type, no previous mindfulness 
networks had been estimated. Sample size was hence determined from a general rule of 
thumb suggested in the literature; namely, three individuals per parameter (Epskamp, 
Borsboom & Fried, 2018). Allowing for the possibility of fully connected networks (whereby 
all nodes share paths with all other nodes), the 15 node AMPS network would require a 
maximum of 120 parameters whilst the 14 node FMI network would involve 105 
parameters17. This means that the two studies needed group sizes of 360 and 315 participants 
to meet the “rule of thumb” respectively. These numbers were also considered adequate given 
that simulation studies have suggested that a sample size of 250 is generally sufficient for 
networks with around 25 nodes, based on continuous data (Epskamp, 2017). These numbers 
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were achieved for the practitioners’ group (n = 371) but were not met for the non-practicing 
group (n = 224). Given that regularised networks remove some edges, a slightly smaller 
sample size may suffice. Nonetheless, it was unclear whether regularisation was sufficient to 
achieve an optimal sample size for the non-practitioner group.  
5.4 Missing Data  
Participant compensation was granted when participants opened the survey and was 
not conditional on answering the survey questions. In 23 cases, participants did not answer 
any of the survey questions and were excluded from analysis. In four cases, participants 
completed a survey twice. This led to two entries in the dataset from the same subject. In all 
four cases, the first entry was incomplete, but the second entry complete. The second entry 
was used, and the first entry excluded from analysis.   
In three cases, participants completed the entire AMPS but not the FMI. Likewise, in 
six cases, participants completed the entire FMI, but not the AMPS. Only the completed 
measures were used in the analysis. In one case, two of the 15 items of the AMPS were 
missing. For this case, the average item score was calculated, and this value was used as a 
replacement for the missing values. 
5.5. R Code and Materials Sharing 
All R code and the dataset are available on the Open Science Framework for 
reproduction and replication purposes (https://osf.io/vr3aj/). All identifying information has 
been removed.  
5.6 Analysis Plan  
All analyses were conducted using the R statistical software, version 3.5.3 (R Core 
Team, 2019). Networks were estimated with using the R package qgraph, version 1.5 
(Epskamp, Cramer, Waldorp, Schmittmann, Borsboom, 2012). Formal tests of network 





version 2.0.1 (Van Borkulo et al., 2017). Community structures were estimated using the 
Exploratory Graphical Analysis R package, version 0.4 (Golino & Epskamp, 2017).  
5.6.1 Aim 1: To determine whether the practitioners’ network is characterised 
by greater network density: A global test of strength invariance. Network connectivity 
(density) was calculated with a global strength test statistic S, which is the absolute sum of all 
connections in a network (Barrat et al., 2016; von Borkulo et al., 2017). To determine how 
commonplace any given group difference in S might be, a 2-tailed non-parametric 
permutation test (NCT; von Borkulo et al., 2017) was performed. This generated an external 
standard by which any difference in S could be tested for significance. 500 permutations were 
selected (for further detail on the NCT, see chapter 5).  
The NCT requires equal sample sizes across groups as the EBIC penalises networks 
more severely as sample size decreases, leading to sparser networks (Rhemtulla et al., 2016). 
As such, unequal samples can confound network comparisons. Although cases could have 
been dropped from the practitioners sample to achieve a comparable sample size with non-
practitioners, this would sacrifice power. Low power reduces ability of the NCT to detect 
differences, and hence an alternative procedure was used to maximise the power of the study. 
This involved two steps. First, the smaller irregular and non-practitioner samples were 
combined to increase the sample size of the non-practicing group. Visual inspection and an 
analysis of path weights and centrality indices revealed this to be a viable strategy for both 
the FMI and AMPS comparisons (see Appendix D and Appendix E). The second step used a 
bootstrap procedure to create equal groups, similar to that used by Rhemtulla and colleagues 
(2016). This involved drawing 500 resamples of n = 325 (with replacement) from each group 
(the sample size of 325 was chosen because it was the average of the two samples combined). 
NCTs were then performed on each resample, such that a range of 500 results were 





distributions for significant results, the median of this distribution was chosen as the best 
statistic to represent the central tendency of the data. To maximise the sensitivity of the NCT 
to detect differences (von Borkulo et al., 2017), a gamma value of 0 was used. The trade-off 
for lower gamma values is the possibility of increased false positive rates, although research 
has suggested that with large samples, a gamma of 0 reveals error rates close to the nominal 
level (α = .05; von Borkulo et al., 2017). When the central tendency of the data suggested a 
significant difference, the same procedure was repeated at the higher gamma levels of 0.25 
and 0.5 to assess the potential stability of this difference.  
Terluin, de Boer and de Vet (2016) have shown that network correlation coefficients 
can be biased if the variance of one or both items is restricted (see also, Goodwin & Leech, 
2006). If an item shows a floor effect, it will often have small variance, which in turn means 
that the variable cannot correlate strongly with other variables. This poses problems for 
comparing networks as differences in connectivity may be solely due to differences in item 
variances. To address this concern, the centrality and standard deviation of each item was 
correlated. In the case of a high correlation, differential variability of the nodes in the 
network may drive the centrality of the nodes, and hence network structure. Floor and ceiling 
effects were also visually investigated by inspecting the item score distributions in density 
plots (Appendix F). Finally, the centrality and mean of each item were correlated to check 
whether centrality may have been driven by mean scores. 
5.6.2 Aim 2: Investigating the architecture of mindfulness: a global test of 
network structure invariance and exploratory analysis of network structure. NCT tests 
of structural invariance were conducted using the aforementioned procedure. The NCT 
Structural Invariance Test calculates the maximum absolute difference in edge weight 
between two networks, represented in the test statistic L. Put differently, L represents the 





Borkulo et al., 2016). Because networks have only to differ in one edge to be deemed 
different in the NCT, the edge lists of the exploratory networks were correlated to provide 
another difference measure known as the coefficient of similarity (Borsboom et al., 2017; 
Fried et al., 2018; Rhemtulla et al., 2016). A correlation of 1 implies that the networks are the 
same (perfectly linearly related), and a value of zero indicates no detectable (linear) 
correspondence. A value of minus one would suggest that the networks are opposites 
(Borsboom et al., 2017). 
5.6.2.1 Exploratory Network Estimation. Network estimation for the exploratory 
analysis involved estimating undirected partial correlation networks (also called Gaussian 
Graphical Models; Costantini et al., 2015; Epskamp & Fried, 2018; Lauritzen, 1996) for 
practitioners and non-practitioners, with and without regularisation.  
Psychological data rarely meet the assumption of normality; however, this assumption 
can be relaxed if it is assumed that the observed data is a transformation of a latent normally 
distributed score (Liu et al., 2009). With ordinal data, a threshold function known as a 
polychoric correlation has become the standard transforming function in the network 
literature (Epskamp & Fried, 2018). Polychoric correlations have been shown to be generally 
robust to moderately skewed data (Flora & Curran, 2004; Quiroga, 1992), and they have been 
shown to perform well in recovering the true network in a simulation study with moderately 
skewed data (Epskamp & Fried, 2018). Polychoric correlations were calculated using the 
corauto function in the qgraph package (Epskamp et al., 2017), which outputs a covariance 
matrix.  
Polychoric correlations can become unstable whenever the pairwise cross-tabulations 
of items contain zeros or show only a few cases (i.e. below 10; Olsson 1979). Following the 





networks estimated with Spearman’s correlations to check for their stability. Cross-tables 
were also inspected.  
 Regularization of the partial correlation networks were conducted using the graphical 
LASSO in combination with Extended Bayesian Information Criterion (EBIC) model 
selection (Foygel and Orton, 2010). This was implemented in the qgraph package (Epskamp 
et al., 2017). The tuning parameter was left at the default value of 0.5, which has been shown 
to yield accurate network estimations (Epskamp & Fried, 2018). In visualising the networks, 
the Fruchterman–Reingold algorithm (Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991) was used. This 
algorithm tends to migrate the most central nodes to the centre of the graph.  
5.6.2.2 Exploratory Network Analysis. The NCT and coefficient of similarity can 
indicate whether differences exist between networks, but not what these are. The exploratory 
analysis sought to reveal differences by visualising the networks. Further to this, community 
structures were estimated, and centrality indices calculated.  
Community structure was estimated using the Exploratory Graphical Analysis R 
package (EGA, Epskamp & Golino, 2017). The EGA uses a walk-trap algorithm to find 
communities of items in a network. In effect, the walk-trap algorithm simulates random 
walks through a networks structure, such that random walkers spend a long time (become 
“trapped”) in dense areas (i.e., areas of the network with lots of edges among nodes). It is 
important to note that an item can only be part of one community using this procedure.  
Strength, closeness and betweenness centrality were calculated using the 
centralityPlot function, implemented in qgraph (Epskamp et al., 2017). Briefly, strength 
centrality provides a measure of the likelihood that activation of a given node will be 
followed by activation of other nodes. Closeness centrality indexes the topological distance 
between two nodes, and hence provides an implication of how fast information might travel. 





influence between two other nodes. The main analyses explored the differences in centrality 
using Z-scores. A given Z score represent the difference between a nodes centrality value and 
the mean centrality value of the sample, divided by the standard deviation of the node 
centrality value.  This allows a common standard to be set for both practitioners and non-
practitioners (i.e., a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1). Raw score equivalents can be 
found in Appendix G.  
5.6.2.3 Accuracy and Stability Estimation. Networks must be accurate and stable if 
they are to be plausibly interpreted. Accurate and stable networks are those which are robust 
to sampling variation and their interpretation remains similar across sample sizes. Edge 
weight stability was determined for the exploratory networks by using a bootstrap procedure 
to construct 95% confidence intervals around each edge in the networks. Bootstrapping 
involved simulating numerous data sets (set at default = 1000), and then repeatedly 
estimating edge weights in these. This creates a distribution for each edge, allowing for a 
confidence interval to be calculated. Data was simulated using a non-parametric method, 
which involved randomly resampling the original data with replacement. This meant that in 
the first bootstrap, subject A may be there three times, but not subject B. In the second 
bootstrap, subject B may be there twice, but subject A may be absent. The non-parametric 
bootstrap function is implemented in the R package bootnet, version 1.2 (Epskamp, 
Borsboom & Fried, 2018).  
Bootstrap procedures have not proved reliable for complex statistics such as centrality 
(Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018). Instead, Epskamp and Fried (2018) have suggested 
determining the stability of the centrality estimates with another method. This involves 
creating subsets of the original network by progressively dropping nodes or people from the 
network. Centrality metrics of the original (full) data set are repeatedly correlated with those 





correlation changes considerably as persons are dropped, then the centrality estimate may be 
problematic. 
Epskamp, Borsboom and Fried (2018) have also developed an index to quantify the 
effects of this person-dropping procedure. For each subset level, an interval can be 
constructed of the correlation coefficient. Epskamp, Borsboom and Fried (2018) have 
suggested that this interval should entirely be above 0.7. This value was chosen given that it 
typically represents a large effect in the behavioural sciences (Cohen, 1977). The Correlation 
Stability coefficient (CS) thus represents “the maximum proportion of participants that can be 
dropped while maintaining 95% probability that the correlation between centrality metrics 
from the full data set and the subset data are at least 0.7 or higher” (Epskamp, Borsboom & 
Fried, 2018; p. 200). The CS ranges from 0 (no linear correspondence) to 1 (a perfect linear 
correspondence), and simulation research has shown that centrality indices generally do not 
differ when the CS falls below 0.25. A cut-off value of 0.5 has hence been recommended 
(Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018). Finally, bootstrapped significant difference tests were 
performed for centrality and edge weights. These tests determine the difference between the 
bootstrap values of two edges or centrality estimates, and then constructs a bootstraped 
Confidence Interval around the difference scores (Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018). The 
presence of zero in the bootstrap CI can be interpreted as indicating that the difference is not 
statistically significant (Chernick & LaBudde, 2011)18. It is important to mention that no 
corrections for multiple testing were involved in these tests (see Epskamp, Borsboom & 
Fried, 2018, for details on the problems of correcting for multiple testing in the network 
context). The person drop bootstraps, CS coefficients and bootstrap significance tests were all 
                                                             
18 Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried (2018) have stressed that it is important that bootstrapped results should not be 
used to test for the significance of an edge being different from zero in regularized networks. This is due to the 






conducted using functions in the R package bootnet, version 1.2 (Epskamp, Borsboom & 
Fried, 2018). 
5.7 Nomenclature.  
The network model of mindfulness proposed here conceptualise mindfulness as 
emerging from relevant practices which are causally interconnected. Questionnaire items are 
considered to represent the relevant practices and these constitute the nodes of the network. 
The term path has been used to represent network edges as this term better conveys the idea 
of activation travelling along a causal pathway between practices. That said, the edges 
estimated in the studies networks are only statistical relations. The use of flow metaphors 
such as “travelling activation” thus represent conceptual devices beyond the data. Another 
important note relates to the qualitative descriptors used in network interpretation. 
Descriptive terms used to characterise paths strengths (i.e., a strong, moderate, or weak path) 
reflect arbitrary interpretations of the thickness and saturation of paths as they are visualised 
in the networks. They do not correspond to established standards such as Cohen’s (1977) rule 
of thumb (i.e., an r of .1 represents a small effect size, .3 a medium effect and .5 a large 
effect).  
5.8 Ethics.  
The methods used in this research were considered low risk in consultation with 
supervising staff and by reference to the Massey Code of Ethical Conduct for Research, 
Teaching and Evaluations involving Human Participants (Massey University, 2015). A low 
risk notification was reported to the Massey University Human Ethics Committee (Human 






Chapter 6: Results and Discussion 
This chapter outlines the results of the two studies and their interpretation. A general 
discussion of the results and study limitations are detailed in chapter 7.  
6.1 Study 1: Network Analysis of the FMI 
6.1.1 General differences. After removing missing data, a total of 651 participants 
were involved in the Network Comparison Tests (NCT) of the Friedburg MindfuIness 
Inventory (FMI). The exploratory analysis involved 592 participants (irregular practitioners 
were excluded). A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the self-attributed total FMI 
Mindfulness scores across the three groups. There was a significant difference in total 
mindfulness levels across the groups (F(2, 648) = 57.24, p < .001). Post hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for practitioners (M = 40.35, SD = 
7.10) was significantly different (p < .001) to the mean score of non-practitioners (M = 34.19, 
SD = 7.68) and irregular practitioners (M = 37.64, SD = 7.98. No significant differences were 
observed between irregular practitioners and non-practitioners.  
6.1.2 Aim 1: To determine whether the practitioners’ network is characterised 
by greater network density: A global test of strength invariance. The Network 
Comparison Test (NCT; von Borkulo et al., 2016) was used to test the hypothesis that the 
practitioners’ FMI mindfulness networks would be characterised by greater connectivity 
(density) than the non-practitioners’ networks. Only 15% of the 500 resampled networks 
achieved significant p-values (p < .05) at the gamma level of 0 (median S = .76, median p = 
.33). As such, the null hypothesis could not be rejected: when networks were adjusted for 
sample size, it appears that networks of practitioners and non-practitioners were similar in 
overall connectivity (density).   
6.1.3 Aim 2: Investigating the architecture of mindfulness: A global test of 





aim of the study was to explore the structural profiles of practitioners’ and non-practitioners’ 
mindfulness networks. To this end, the NCT was first used to test whether the groups 
significantly differed in network structure. Across 500 resamples, 62% achieved significant p 
values (p < .05) at the gamma level of 0 (median L = .24, median p = .03).  NCTs were then 
performed at higher gamma levels of .25 and .5 to check for the stability of this difference. At 
higher gamma levels of .25 (median L = .23, median p = .04) and .5 (median L = .23, median 
p = .04), significant p values (p <.05) were only observed in 58% and 54% of the resamples 
respectively.  
Item variance (standard deviation) and practice strength centrality were moderately 
correlated in the non-practitioners’ sample (rS = .45), but not in practitioners (rS = -.08). 
Visual analysis of item distributions (Appendix F) did not reveal substantive differences in 
item distributions, and floor and ceiling effects were not considered a concern. Mean levels of 
items did not appear to drive strength centrality in either sample (practitioners’ rS = -.06 non-
practitioners’ rS = -.24).  
6.1.3.1 Network stability and accuracy of exploratory networks. Network stability 
must be inspected before interpreting networks because networks with low path weight 
accuracy and unstable centrality indices are prone to error and cannot be meaningfully 
interpreted. As such, these results are reported before the exploratory analysis. 
The accuracy of the order of centrality was explored using the subset person-drop 
procedure recommended by Epskamp, Borsboom and Fried (2018). Figure 5 shows the 
average correlations between centrality indices of networks sampled with persons dropped, 
and the centrality indices of the original sample. It depicts the maximum proportion of the 
original sample that can be dropped (X axis) while confidently retaining a correlation above 
.7 with the centrality indices in the original (full) sample (Y axis). Figure 5 shows that 





in the glasso networks. This means that when (close to) 30% of the people were dropped 
from the FMI networks, the order of the practice strength and closeness centrality remained 
relatively stable. The results for betweenness centrality were mixed: betweenness centrality 
appeared stable in the non-practitioners’ networks but declined steadily in the practitioners’ 
networks. The regularized networks substantially outperformed the partial correlation 
networks where centrality indices dropped substantially in subsets in which persons were 








Figure 5. Average correlations between centrality indices of (glasso) networks sampled with 
persons dropped, and the centrality indices of the original sample for practitioners (top) and 
non-practitioners (bottom). Legend: blue = strength, green = closeness, red = betweenness. 
 
To provide a quantitative measure of stability, centrality stability coefficients (CS) 
were calculated. Epskamp, Borsboom and Fried (2018) suggest that the stability coefficients 
should be between .25 and .5 to be meaningfully interpreted. Analysis of the CS-coefficients 
suggested that only practice strength could be interpreted with some confidence for both 
practitioners (CS = .43) and non-practitioners (CS = .36). CS-coefficients suggested that 
comparisons between closeness would need to be interpreted with care (practitioners’ CS = 
.29, non-practitioners’ CS = .28). Betweenness was interpretable for practitioners (CS = .36), 
but not for non-practitioners (CS = .07). On the basis of these results, centrality analysis was 
limited to strength centrality given its relative robustness. Strength centrality also benefits 





To assess the path weight stability of the exploratory networks, 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) were obtained for each path via a non-parametric bootstrap method (Epskamp, 
Borsboom & Fried, 2018). Figure 6 shows the results of the bootstrap procedures for the 
glasso networks of both groups. Substantial 95% CI ranges were obtained for most of the 
paths across both networks suggesting that the models were only moderately accurately 
estimated. This meant that only the strongest paths differed from the weakest, and this was 
confirmed in by bootstrap significant difference tests (Appendix I, Figure 24). For both 
groups, dense networks were selected which meant that the smallest edges need to be 
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Figure 6. Bootstrapped confidence intervals (CIs) of estimated pathway weights for the 
estimated practitioners’ (top) and non-practitioners' (bottom) regularised FMI mindfulness 
networks.  The red line indicates the sample values, and the black line, bootstrapped mean 
levels. The grey area indicates the bootstrapped CIs. Each horizontal line represents one 
pathway in the network, ordered from strongest to weakest. Y-axis labels have been removed 
to avoid cluttering. 
 
6.1.3.2 Exploratory analysis of network structures. An exploratory analysis was 
conducted to determine how the two networks may differ. To this end, community structures, 
centrality indices and discriminating topological features were compared. The exploratory 
networks were estimated with polychoric correlations and subjected to regularisation using a 
tuning (gamma) value of 0.5. Polychoric correlations are widely used in estimating 
psychological networks in the literature given that they are generally considered most 
appropriate for ordinal data and have been shown to be robust to moderately skewed data. 
The NCT however is currently limited to comparing networks estimated with Pearson’s 





correlations) were compared to networks estimated with Pearson’s correlations to determine 
how comparable they were. Centrality indices and edge weights were strongly correlated 
between Pearson’s and polychoric networks for both groups (see Appendix D). These results 
suggested that the networks were broadly comparable.  
Figure 7 shows practitioner and non-practitioner FMI regularized (glasso) networks. 
The corresponding items, descriptions, abbreviations, sample means, and standard deviations 
for each network are presented in Table 6. The results of the centrality analysis are shown in 






















































Figure 7.  Glasso FMI mindfulness networks for practitioners (left) and non-practitioners 
(right). Each node represents a questionnaire item (abbreviated; see table 6). Each pathway 
represents the regularized covariance between two components. Thicker pathways signify 
stronger associations. Blue denotes a positive association and orange denotes a negative 
association. To assist comparisons, identical positioning (layout) of practices was imposed in 
the top networks. This involved taking the mean of the individual layouts represented in 
bottom figures. Minimum path weight for inclusion was set at 0 for both networks, and the 





was 0.5. Graphs depict communities detected using the Exploratory Graphical Analysis 
package (EGA, Golino & Epskamp, 2017). The Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm (FR, 
Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991) was used to layout all graphs. This algorithm tends to cause 
the most central nodes to migrate to the centre.  
 
Table 5  
FMI items, content, abbreviations, means, and standard deviations. 
   Practitioners Non-
practitioners 
   (n =368) (n = 224) 
Item Item content Abbreviations M (SD) M (SD) 
FMI1 I am open to the 




3.11 (0.68) 2.80 (0.77) 
FMI2 I sense my body, whether 
eating, cooking, cleaning 
or talking 
Sensing the Body 
(Sen)  
2.86 (0.81) 2..29 (0.96) 
FMI3 When I notice an absence 
of mind, I gently return to 
the experience of the here 
and now 
Returning to the 
Present (RtP)  
2.80 (0.77) 2.20 (0.95)  




3.05 (0.81) 2.64 (0.93) 
FMI5 I pay attention to what's 
behind my actions 
Attending to 
actions (AtA) 
3.10 (0.75) 2.67 (0.87)  






2.67 (0.81) 2.15 (0.92) 
FMI7 I feel connected to my 
experience in the here-
and-now 
Connected to the 
Present (CnP) 
3.00 (0.73) 2.54 (0.82) 
FMI8 I accept unpleasant 
experiences 





FMI9 I am friendly to myself 




2.67 (.90) 2.36 (0.95) 
 
FMI10 I watch my feelings 






2.84 (0.80) 2.39 (0.96) 
FMI11 “In difficult situations, I 




2.86 (0.80) 2.51 (0.88) 
FMI12 “I experience moments of 
inner peace and ease, 
even when things get 
hectic and stressful” 
Experiencing 
Inner Peace (IP) 
2.76 (0.84) 2.09 (0.87) 
*FMI13 “I am impatient with 
myself and with others” 
Patience (Pat) 3.03 (0.88) 2.95 (0.90) 
FMI14 “I am able to smile when 
I notice how I sometimes 




2.69 (0.83) 2.12 (0.88) 

























































           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           






Figure 8. Standardized strength centrality values for practitioners’ (blue) and non-
practitioners’ (red) 14 item FMI mindfulness network. Z-scores are shown on x-axis rather 
than raw centrality indices to allow for comparison. 
 
The exploratory networks shared a similar number of paths (practitioners = 69 paths; 
non-practitioners = 67 paths). Interestingly, a visual inspection suggested that many of the 
paths in the non-practitioners tended to be stronger than those in their practicing counterparts. 
Broad similarities were observed as evident in the strong correlation between the path 
weights of the practitioner’s and non-practitioners networks (co-efficient of similarity rs = 
.51), and moderate correlation of strength centrality indices (rs = 0.36; n.b., strong 
correlations were found for closeness centrality rs = 0.55 and betweenness centrality rs = 
0.64). The community detection algorithm (EGA; Golino & Epskamp, 2017) revealed two 
communities of items in the practitioner sample, and the practices of each closely resembled 
the items attributed to previous two-factor (Presence and Acceptance) models recovered in 
the FMI factor analysis literature. Those naming conventions were used accordingly. Three 
communities of items were recovered in the non-practitioners’ network. Communities of 
items resembling the Presence and Acceptance communities were identified in the 
practitioners’ network, although both these communities lost items to a third community 
which now mediated their influence on each other. This community was termed a brokering 
community given its relative autonomy, yet mediating function19.  
The community level differences were borne out in differences in centrality and path 
structure. In the practitioners’ sample, a number of highly central practices (Decentred 
                                                             
19 In the wider network literature, Csermely (2008) has suggested that nodes which functionally perform a 
partially random sampling of the whole network, whilst connecting distant modules might be considered “active 
centres” or “creative elements”. Csermely (2008) suggests that the relative autonomy of these “creative 
elements” afford greater flexibility to networks experiencing atypical situations. This is because they switch 





Observing, followed by Connected to the present, Sensing, Self-Kindness and Acceptance) 
were identified. Bootstrapped statistical difference tests revealed no significant differences 
between the strength centrality values of these practices (no correction for multiple testing; 
see Appendix J, Figure 27). By way of contrast, the non-practitioners’ network was 
dominated by the highly strength central practice of Self-Kindness, which statistically differed 
from all other practices in that network (no correction for multiple testing; Appendix J, 
Figure 27). 
The exploratory analysis focused on those practices which evidenced the greatest 
differences in centrality across networks. It was thought that these differences might imply 
structural changes associated with a regular practice. Figure 8 shows that the most prominent 
differences in centrality were observed in the three practices of Returning to the Present, Self-
kindness, and Acceptance. To a lesser extent, differences were also observed in De-centered 
Observation, Sensing, Connected to the Present, Patience and Attending to Actions.  
Returning to the present was found to both much more peripheral to the practitioners 
relative to non-practitioners. Self-kindness was a highly central practice for practitioners, yet 
remained substantially less central to their network relative to its position in the non-
practitioners’ network. The practice of Acceptance, peripheral to non-practitioners, was found 
to be substantially more central to practitioners. These practices formed the focus of further 
visual (topological) analysis. 
Across both networks, Returning to the present shared prominent paths with the 
practices of Sensing and Connected to the present, the former stronger in the non-
practitioners network (practitioners: RtP-Sens M  = .22, 95% CI [.11, .33]; RtP-CnP = .15, 
[.01, .28]; non-practitioners: RtP-Sens = .33, [.18, .47];   RtP-CnP = 0.15, [-.01, .31]. In the 
non-practitioners network, additional prominent paths were shared with Openness to the 





practitioners network, the former path was missing (RtP-OpP = 0, [-.07, .07]) and the latter, 
attenuated (RtP-Sap = .04, [-.06, .14]).  
Self-kindness shared several common paths across both networks. The most obvious 
paths were with the practices of De-centered Observation, Non-Judgmental, Acceptance, and 
Self-appreciation. These paths tended to be stronger in the non-practitioners’ network with 
the exception of Decentred Observation (practitioners: Sfk-Obs = .26, [.14, .39]; SfK-NJ = 
.28, [.15, .40]; SfK-Acc = .15, [.02, .27]; SfK- SAp = .27, [.14, .40]; non-practitioners: SfK-
Obs = .19, [.06, .32]; SfK-NJ = .36, [.23, .49]; Sfk-Acc = .19, [.06, .32]; SfK-SAp = .33, [.17, 
.49]. In the non-practitioners’ network, Self-kindness shared unique paths to Inner Peace 
(SfK-IP = .16, [.02, .30]) and Attending to Actions (SfK-AtA = -.12, [-0.31, .08]) which were 
absent in the practitioners network (SfK-IP = 0, [-.7, .7]; SfK-AtA = 0, [-.05, .5]).  
The topology of Acceptance differed in important ways. Falling in the Presence 
community in practitioners, Acceptance shared prominent paths with the affiliated Presence 
practices of Openness to the present (Acc-OpP = .16, [.02, .30]), Connected to the present 
(Acc-CnP = .18, [.04, .31]), and a uniquely negative path with Sensing (Acc-Sens = -.11, [-
.26, .04]). These paths were either missing or much attenuated in the non-practitioners’ 
network (Acc-OpP = 0, [-.06, .06]; Acc-CnP = .06, [-.07, .20]; Acc-Sens = 0, [-.07, .07]). 
Instead, Acceptance fell in the Acceptance community in the non-practitioners’ network. 
Here, it shared its most prominent paths with Self-Kindness (Acc-SfK = .20, [.06, .32]), 
Smiling in Difficulty (Acc-SPD = .13, [-.01, .28]), and the brokering practice of De-centered 
Observation (Acc-Obs = .20, [.06, .34]). All these paths were attenuated in the practitioners’ 
network (Acc-SfK = .15, [.02, .27]; Acc-SPD =.08, [-.03, .18]; Acc-Obs = .12, [.01, .26]).  
The stability of negative paths was investigated by comparing the networks with 
networks estimated with Spearman’s correlations (Appendix K). Comparisons between the 





and Attending to Actions was likely a stable network feature, but that the path between 
Acceptance and Sensing should be interpreted more cautiously (this path was missing in the 
Spearman’s network). The negative paths between Patience and both Returning to the 
Present and Smiling at Personal Difficulties in the non-practitioners’ network (Pat-RtP = .07 
[-.64, .64]; Pat-SMD = -.04 [-.02, .09]) were also maintained in the corresponding 
Spearman’s network.  
Cross-tables were also explored to ascertain whether adequate sampling had occurred. 
Olsson (1979) has recommended that cells should have at least 10 cases for stable polychoric 
correlations. Inspecting the cross-tables for all four negative paths revealed that no cells had 0 
cases; however, for all four paths, seven of the 16 cells had less than 10 cases. Taken 
together, these results suggest some caution in interpreting the negative paths, especially that 
between Acceptance and Sensing in the practitioners’ network.   
6.1.4 Discussion of the FMI results. As a general point, the estimated networks 
revealed the plausibility of a network conceptualisation of mindfulness: plausible bi-
directional paths (predictive associations) were revealed among most, if not all the items. 
Negative paths and missing paths were revealed which are more difficult to reconcile with a 
latent variable approach, as a common factor model would imply a fully connected network 
of positive edges (Marsman et al., 2018). That said, the effects of regularisation cannot be 
discounted as it by design, retrieves a sparser network.  
6.1.4.1 Network comparison tests. It was proposed that network density may 
distinguish practitioners from non-practitioners. The evidence favoured the null hypothesis: 
the majority of practitioners’ and non-practitioners’ resampled networks did not statistically 
differ in global strength. Support was found for a significant difference in network structure 
(62% of 500 networks), albeit this attenuated as the networks become more similar (i.e., the 





 The failure to reject the null hypothesis is not inconsistent with the mixed findings in 
psychopathology studies which have investigated group level density differences between 
symptomatic and asymptomatic participants (e.g., Fried et al., 2016; Schweren et al., 2017; 
van Loo et al., 2018). Although the results can be taken as evidence against the main 
hypothesis, the absence of a statistical difference does not necessarily mean the two groups 
did not differ (i.e. an absence of evidence is not evidence of an absence). Rather, 
methodological and statistical considerations need to be taken into account (Lesaffre, 2008). 
To this end, it is noted that the study may have been underpowered. The NCT requires a lot 
of power to detect differences (Fried, 2017), and although the current study came close to 
achieving a recommended sample size (three persons per parameter), the networks were only 
moderately accurate in their estimation. This is suggestive of insufficient sampling which 
may have reduced the power of the NCT to detect network differences. 
The quality of sampling may also have contributed to reduced sensitivity. In a 
previous study, Sauer and colleagues (2015) found that only one FMI item (item 2, Sensing) 
had acceptable discriminative properties for differentiating practitioners from non-
practitioners in a study using online recruitment. By way of contrast, many more items were 
found to be discriminative in a second high-quality sample in which practitioners represented 
subjects with at least five years of daily meditation practice20. Future research may wish to 
sample different populations (e.g., university practitioners), although it is noted that the 
results of the current study were found to better resemble those obtained from Sauer and 
colleagues (2015) high-quality sample (this is discussed further in a later section).  
Two further points bear mention. Firstly, a visual inspection of the two networks 
appears to suggest that a larger number of relatively weaker interconnections characterised 
                                                             
20 The high quality sample consisted of 38 expert mindfulness practitioners with at least five years of regular 






the practitioner’s network, relative to fewer, but stronger paths in the non-practitioners’ 
network. Summing the interconnections would lead to comparable density scores which 
obscures the possibility of different underlying developmental processes (i.e., the 
development of more associations between practices versus the development of stronger 
associations). The concept of density may thus require further theoretical refinement.  
Secondly, evidence of range restriction was found in the non-practitioners’ sample 
(variation was moderately correlated with practice strength). A visual analysis of floor and 
ceiling effects suggested that this was unlikely to have biased network structure, but it may 
however, limit the generalizability of results. This is because observed differences may not 
remain in other populations in which item variance differs (for example, samples in which 
variability may be found to be comparable across all items).  
6.1.4.2 Community analyses. The exploratory analyses ascertained how the networks 
may have differed across groups. At the community level, greater differentiation was 
observed in the practitioners’ network relative to the non-practitioners’ network (manifest as 
strong intra-community paths, but weaker inter-community paths). This is interesting in light 
of factor research which has suggested that factorial differentiation may reflect the 
development of an attribute (see General Discussion, chapter 7 for further consideration).  
6.1.4.3 Centrality analysis. The centrality analysis revealed a number of Presence 
community practices (Decentred Observing, Connected to the present, Sensing, Acceptance) 
to be highly central for practitioners relative to non-practitioners (with the exception of Self-
kindness). Of these, De-centered Observation (“I watch my feelings without getting lost in 
them”) was the most strength central, but this did not statistically differ from other Presence 
practices. This means its prominence may not generalise beyond the sample. For non-
practitioners, Self-kindness (“…friendly to myself when things go wrong”) dominated the 





In interpreting centrality, it must be remembered that relatively higher strength 
centrality does not infer relatively higher mean levels of a practice, for mean levels are not 
taken into account in estimating the covariance matrix. Nonetheless, generally higher strength 
centrality may index a greater degree of development of a practice given that connectivity, 
summed to provide the strength centrality index, was theorised to increase across the 
development of a mindfulness practice21. Some evidence in support of this may be found in 
research investigating the FFMQ observing facet (attending to internal and external 
experience)s, of which the Presence practices are considered representative. FFMQ research 
has shown that observing is a key facet of mindfulness, but only once a certain level of 
meditation practice has been established (Baer et al., 2008; see also, Camody & Baer, 2008; 
Lilja, Lundh, Josefsson, & Falkenström, 2013; Williams, Dalgleish, Karl, & Kuyken, 2014). 
The current study thus compliments factor research by suggesting that high item centrality 
may offer an additional way of indexing development, beyond the summation of mean levels 
of item endorsement.  
The high centrality of Self-kindness across both groups could be considered consistent 
with research which has established the importance of self-kindness (Manavipour & 
Saeedian, 2016; Stallman, Ohan & Chiera, 2017) and self-compassion (of which self-
kindness is a considered a facet; Neff, 2003) to mindfulness (Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 
2011; MacBeth & Gumley, 2012; Marsh, Chan, & MacBeth, 2018; Shapiro et al., 2005; van 
Dam, Sheppard, Forsyth & Earleywine, 2011; Zessin et al. 2015). The broader concept of 
self-compassion has been shown to increase with mindfulness instruction (Shapiro et al., 
2005), better predict health outcomes than mindfulness (van Dam et al., 2011) and mediate 
the association between mindfulness and positive outcomes (Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 
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2011). A number of meta-analyses have also associated higher levels of self-compassion with 
lower levels of mental health symptoms (MacBeth & Gumley, 2012; Marsh, Chan, & 
MacBeth, 2018), as well as greater overall psychological well-being (Zessin et al. 2015).  
In undirected networks, it is unknown whether highly strength central practices are 
common causes  (by which the direction of causality travels from the focal node to other 
nodes in the network), common effects (in which causality travels to the focal node from 
other nodes in the network), or both. When it is assumed that highly strength central practices 
are common causes, these practices have been considered candidate practices for network 
interventions (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Borsboom et al., 2011; Newman, 2004). This is 
because changes in these practices may propagate across the network. In the absence of 
information on directionality, the results of this study generate a hypothesis that targeting De-
centered Observation may be an important practice for galvanising (or maintaining) 
mindfulness in regular practitioners. Prima face, targeting Self-kindness may be important for 
galvanising mindfulness in non-practitioners22.   
6.1.4.4 Network differences. The most apparent differences in centrality were found 
in the practices of Self-kindness, Returning to the Present (relatively more central to non-
practitioners), and Acceptance (relatively more central to practitioners’). A prominent 
negative path between Self-kindness and Attending to Actions was also found to be unique to 
the non-practitioners’ network. This will be discussed first.  
The unique negative path helps account for the high centrality of Self-kindness in non-
practitioners, for it is taken as an absolute value in centrality calculation. Although 
speculative, the negative path can be interpreted in two ways: either being “…friendly to 
myself when things go wrong” (Self-kindness) predicts less “…attention to what’s behind my 
                                                             
22 A caveat on this recommendation is the suggestion in the literature that self-compassion may arise after 
mindfulness (Neff, 2003; Birnie, Speca, & Carlson, 2010; Bergen-Cico & Cheon, 2014). This interpretation is 





actions” (Attending to Actions) in non-practitioners only (i.e., a letting one off the hook 
explanation); or alternatively, regularly attending to what’s behind one’s actions predicts less 
self-kindness in non-practitioners only. An obvious interpretation is that Attending to Actions 
may index a more critical or judgmental process in non-practitioners, relative to practitioners. 
This interpretation is broadly consistent with the results of a qualitative study of the FMI 
(Belzer et al., 2013 in which non-practitioners were found to interpret Attending to Actions in 
the context of a moral evaluation of pro’s and con’s. By way of contrast, practitioners 
interpreted the item (more homogenously) in the context of “continuous action monitoring” 
(p. 40) or the “mere registration of impulses, emotions, behaviours of the self in the present 
moment” (p. 40)23.  
The letting one off the hook interpretation has received little consideration beyond 
popular commentary (Neff, 2012); however, the judgmental or critical processing 
interpretation, taken together with the absence of this path in the practitioners’ network, is 
consistent with a large body of work associating mindfulness with reduced self-criticism and 
rumination (e.g., Teadale, Segel & Williams, 1995; van der Velden et al., 2015). Plausibly, 
critical processing may have been ameliorated or impeded by a regular mindfulness (or 
related meditative) practice, accounting for its absence in the practitioners’ network. 
Presuming that the practitioners’ network resembles a network architecture conducive to the 
capacity to be mindful, the results suggest that interventions targeting this negative path may 
facilitate a network more conducive to mindfulness. Certainly, the centrality of Self-kindness 
would become more comparable, for beyond the negative path, the topology of the practice is 
markedly similar across groups. It might also be predicted that Acceptance may become more 
central, for this is almost an antonym for critical processing,  
                                                             
23 Perhaps consistent with this, a relatively stronger path was seen between Attending to Actions and 






The convergence between network topology and qualitative results makes it difficult 
to distinguish whether a regular mindfulness practice may attenuate the negative path 
between the practices (presumed invariant across the groups), or lead to a practice being 
interpreted differently, or both. This has implications for investigations into network 
dynamics and intervention recommendations, for these presume measurement invariance 
(i.e., that the nodes/practices themselves do not change across time or represent different 
things to different groups). It thus remains unclear whether the practice of Attending to 
Actions (interpreted as a judgmental/critical process) is the appropriate target, or whether the 
path it shares with Self-kindness is the preferred target. In theory, the latter intervention 
would not change the nodes per se, for it only targets the mechanisms underpinning the 
(presumed) causal association. In practice, this issue is likely less of a concern as 
psychological interventions are typically fat-handed, by which it is meant that a number of 
variables are typically influenced (Bringmann et al., 2018).   
Determining whether practices are variant, or invariant is further complicated when it 
is recognised that any given practice may evidence both differences and similarities in 
topology (suggesting practice variance and invariance respectively). To suggest that 
Attending to Actions refers categorically to critical processing in non-practitioners will thus 
only create flow on problems in interpreting other paths. For example, one is left theorising 
why critical processing shares positive paths with Self-Appreciation, De-centered 
Observation, Connected to the Present and Sensing. A more plausible explanation may be 
that a degree of heterogeneity underlies the non-practitioner’s sample, such that different sub-
groups exist; one of which is characterised by high levels of self-critical processing. Person-
orientated approaches such as cluster analysis (e.g., Lilja et al., 2013) and Latent Class 
Analysis (e.g., Pearson, Brown, Bravo, & Witkiewitz, 2015) may be suited to elucidating 





In lieu of these considerations, the results are considered best interpreted as 
supporting the more general recommendation for interventions aimed at critical processing. 
This is considered consistent with the literature which has identified reductions in rumination 
as a mechanism of change in mindfulness (van der Velden et al., 2015). Future experimental 
and temporal research may help elucidate the effects of such interventions on network 
architecture and dynamics. 
Belzer and colleagues’ (2013) study provides further insight into the topological 
differences in the other two practices in which the most pronounced differences in centrality 
were observed. In practitioners, Acceptance fell in the Presence community, consistent with 
Belzer and colleague’s (2013) findings that practitioners tended to stress the present moment 
aspect of the Acceptance practice in their interpretation of the item. By way of contrast, 
Belzer and colleagues (2013) found that non-practitioners tended to interpret the item as a 
statement about past experiences. Correspondence is less clear; however, the prominent path 
with Smiling at Personal Difficulties (“I am able to smile when I notice how I sometimes 
make life difficult”) might be considered consistent with this, given that the item content can 
imply a past tense.  
This present moment/statement of past experiences distinction also bears some 
resemblance to Grabovac, Lau and Willett’s (2011) distinction between awareness based and 
cognitive acceptance. Awareness based acceptance refers to awareness without judgment 
which was considered to develop with mindfulness practice. This was differentiated from 
cognitive forms of acceptance, which the authors associated with activity such as thinking 
accepting thoughts about one’s self or others. Although speculative, the paths with Presence 
practices in the practitioners’ network may thus be indicative of a more insight-based 
acceptance developed through a regular practice, whilst the paths Acceptance shared with 





considered more consistent with a cognitive practice (that said, the third prominent path with 
De-centered Observation could be considered inconsistent with this).  
Convergence between topology and observed comprehension differences may also 
inform the interpretation of Returning to the Present (“When I notice an absence of mind, I 
gently return to the experience of the here and now”). In the practitioners’ network, this 
practice featured prominent paths with practices indexing mindfulness skills such as 
Connected to the present (“I feel connected to my experience in the here-and-now”) and 
Sensing (“I sense my body, whether eating, cooking, cleaning or talking”). This was 
considered broadly consistent with Belzer and colleagues (2013) finding of the practice being 
interpreted as the prototypical mindfulness skill (“this describes exactly mindfulness 
meditation”; p. 39) in their practicing sample.  Correspondence was less clear for non-
practitioners, as the paths with Self- appreciation (“I am able to appreciate myself”) and 
Openness to the present did not obviously correspond to Belzer and colleagues (2013) 
findings of non-practitioners interpreting the item in the context of returning to everyday 
tasks after distraction (i.e., “waking up”, p. 39). This lack of correspondence might be taken 
to support the previous suggestion of possible heterogeneity underpinning the non-
practitioner’s sample.  
The final features warranting further discussion were the brokering practices (Self-
appreciation, Openness to the Present and De-centered Observation). Given that Openness to 
the Present and De-centered Observation have already been interpreted in the discussion of 
centrality differences, only Self-appreciation is analysed. 
Across both groups, Self-appreciation shared a common strong path with the only 
other positively worded introspective item; namely Self-kindness (“I am friendly to myself 
when things go wrong”). This is considered consistent with observations that semantically 





2018). Beyond this, the topologies differed markedly between groups24. In practitioners, Self-
appreciation shared one especially prominent path with the only truly experiential practice in 
the FMI; namely, Inner Peace (“I experience moments of inner peace and ease, even when 
things get hectic and stressful”). For non-practitioners, Self-Appreciation shared a number of 
prominent paths with the practices which appeared more performative; namely, Attending to 
Actions, Returning to the Present and Openness to the present25. Although purely speculative, 
this difference might be interpreted in lieu of the prominent conceptualisation of mindfulness 
as a practice which shifts practitioners from doing (in which awareness is dominated by 
relatively impersonal goal-oriented strategies) to being (in which awareness is dominated by 
a non-evaluative awareness of present subjective-self-experience; Barnard & Teasdale, 
1991). Accordingly, the path between Self-appreciation and Inner Peace may be indicative of 
being, whilst the broader connectivity with a number of performative practices evident in the 
non-practitioners’ network may be indicative of doing. In support of this interpretation, 
Belzer and colleagues (2013) reported Self-Appreciation to have been interpreted in the 
context of meditation experience for practitioners, but personal performance in non-
practitioners. 
Several other findings bear mention. Firstly, the identification of two communities in 
the practitioners’ network support the results found in factor analyses of the FMI, albeit with 
a different method. This is consistent with research suggesting that communities recovered in 
network analyses, under certain conditions, are mathematically equivalent to factors (Golino 
& Epskamp, 2017). Of course, the two models offer very different interpretations of the data: 
                                                             
24 It is worth noting that Self-Appreciation is similar in its relative centrality across both groups, despite being 
organised quite differently. A focus on centrality values alone can thus miss important topological differences.  
25 Although the path shared with Openness to the Present might be considered contrary to this, Belzer and 
colleagues ‘(2013) findings suggest that this item may been interpreted more performatively in non-practitioners’; 





community structures are assumed to represent interrelations forming among practices whilst 
factors represent underlying causes.  
 Secondly, the practices which demonstrated the most discrepant centrality (Self-
Kindness, Returning to the present, Acceptance, and to a lesser extent Decentred Observing, 
Connection to the present, Sensing and Attending to Actions) have also been identified as 
usefully discriminative in previous research. Using machine learning methodologies, Sauer 
and colleagues (2015) found all these practices (in addition to the practices of Self-
Appreciation and Inner Peace) to be those which best predicted group membership 
(practitioner or non-practitioner) in their high-quality sample. When both the high- and low-
quality samples were combined in a second study, a more limited selection of the same 
practices was also found to demonstrate high predictive accuracy using a different algorithm 
(Sauer et al, 2018)26. This convergence between the current study and a previous study using 
a high-quality sample may be taken as evidence in support of the sampling quality of the 
study, and the feasibility of using MTurk for mindfulness research. 
In summary, several conclusions follow. Firstly, the plausibility of a network 
explanation for the covariance observed in the FMI was established. The estimated paths 
were plausible and connectivity differences could meaningfully be interpreted in the wider 
literature. Secondly, convergence between topological interpretations and previous qualitative 
research brought into question the nature of the networks estimated. Comparative network 
studies have typically assumed that items index the same sampled behaviours across groups, 
and this was inferred in the hypothesis and rationale of this study (i.e., comparing density and 
centrality; postulating differential organisation and brokering practices). Contrary to this, 
evidence of convergence between practice topologies and comprehension differences 
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to the Present, Sensing, De-centered Observation, Inner Peace and Acceptance. That said, across all ten 
algorithms, the items that separated the mindfulness practitioners most strongly from the non-practitioners were 





suggested that some practices may have been interpreted differently by the groups. It also 
brought into question whether the main hypothesis was not so much unsupported, as untested 
(i.e., one cannot meaningfully compare density when networks sample different behaviours).  
In theory, future experimental research in which specific practices are subjected to 
manipulation may help discern whether practices are invariant across networks or not. This is 
because networks typically presume that their structures are potentially causal, which means 
that one can predict what should happen when practices or paths are manipulated 
experimentally. If experiments and longitudinal manipulations result in changes consistent 
with those predicted in both networks, it might be inferred that the practices are invariant. In 
the absence of this, it might be inferred that practices index different behaviours. 
Unfortunately, experimental research of this type may be less feasible in practice. This is 
because psychological interventions are typically fat-handed, such that number of practices 
and paths may be influenced.  
In this study, the negative path between Self-kindness and Attending to Actions in the 
non-practitioners’ network was an obvious target for future experimental research. This was 
interpreted as supporting a more general recommendation for interventions directed at critical 
processing. To this end, it is noted that self-compassion has been shown to mediate the 
relationship between depression and anxiety (Raes, 2010), with evidence suggesting that this 
may be achieved in part by reducing negative processes such as rumination (Krieger, 
Altenstein, Baettig, Doerig & Holtforth, 2013; Svendsen, Kvernenes, Wiker, & Dundas, 
2017). Self-compassion interventions (e.g., techniques such as self-compassionate 
meditation, imagery, therapeutic letter writing, dialogic role-play, Gilbert 2009; or 





targeting either the negative path between Attending to Action and Self-kindness, or the 
practice of Attending to Actions (interpreted as critical processing) itself27.  
A final point concerns the nature of the networks themselves. It was only assumed 
that the networks sample behaviour (i.e., the assumption of item-practice correspondence) 
and it is perfectly possible that the networks were purely semantic. In a semantic network, 
paths may represent logical and semantic relations as opposed to potentially causal 
behavioural paths. Future experimental research may contribute to this vexing question as 
effects consistent with predicted effects may be taken as evidence for paths being 
behavioural.  
6.2 Study 2: A Network Analysis of the Applied Mindfulness Process Scale (adapted). 
6.2.1 General Differences. After removing missing data, a total of 648 participants 
were involved in the NCT analysis of the (adapted) Applied Mindfulness Process Scale (367 
practitioners, 222 non-practitioner and 59 irregular practitioners). The exploratory analysis 
involved a total of 589 participants (367 practitioners and 222 non-practitioners). A one-way 
ANOVA revealed a significant difference in (self-attributed) total AMPS Mindfulness scores 
across the three groups (F(2, 645) = 71.50,  p < .001). Post hoc comparisons using the Turkey 
HSD test indicated that the mean score for practitioners (M = 54.89, SD = 9.9) was 
significantly different (p < .001) to the mean score of non-practitioners (M = 44.70, SD = 
10.49, p < .001) and irregular practitioners (M = 48.17, SD = 10.67). No significant 
differences were observed between irregular practitioners and non-practitioners. 
6.2.2 Aim 1: To determine whether the practitioners’ network is characterised 
by greater network density: A global test of strength invariance. Consistent with findings 
in Study 1, the NCT results failed to reject the null hypothesis:  Across the 500 resamples, 
                                                             
27 It is noted that many techniques will influence self-compassion, beyond those in name. In a recent review 
Wilson, and colleagues (2018) concluded that “we should…be cautious about claiming that it is possible to 
‘target’ self-compassion in therapy. Instead, it would seem that self-compassion is one of the many 





there was no evidence for a difference in global strength between the groups AMPS networks 
(median S = 0.80, median p = 0.20). Only 25% of the 500 resamples significantly differed in 
global strength at p < .05.  
6.2.3 Aim 2: Investigating the architecture of mindfulness: A global test of 
network structure invariance and exploratory analysis of network structure. Support for 
structural differences in the AMPS networks was found: 79% of the 500 resamples (median L 
= 0.28, median p = .02) were significantly different in network structure (p < .05), and this 
difference persisted at higher gamma levels of 0.25 (76% of samples significantly differed; 
median L = 0.27, median p = .01) and 0.5 (75% of samples significantly differed; median L = 
0.27, median p = .02). To check for the influence of range restriction on structural 
differences, practice strength centrality was correlated with item variance and means. For 
practitioners, practice strength centrality appeared unrelated to item variability (rs = -.01) but 
was moderately correlated with mean item levels (rs = .35). For non-practitioners practice 
strength centrality was unrelated to item variability (rs = -.11) or mean levels (rs = .05).  
6.2.3.1 Network stability and accuracy of exploratory networks. The results of the 
path weight bootstrap revealed substantial 95% CIs for most of the paths, limiting accurate 
comparisons beyond comparing the strongest from the weakest practices (Figure 9). This was 
confirmed by Bootstrapped significance tests (see Appendix I, Figure 25). The glasso 
selected a dense network for both groups which meant that the smallest edges of both 
networks required interpretation with care (Williams et al., 2018).  The person-drop 
bootstraps confirmed the superiority of regularized (glasso) networks over their un-
regularised counterparts in terms of the stability of centrality indices (Appendix H, Figure 







Figure 9. Bootstrapped confidence intervals (CIs) of estimated pathway weights for the 
estimated practitioners’ (top) and non-practitioners' (bottom) regularised AMPS mindfulness 





Figure 10 shows the results of the subset (person-drop) bootstrap. Only strength 
centrality in the practitioners’ network appeared stable, and this was confirmed by the CS-
coefficients calculated: the CS-coefficient for strength centrality in the practitioners’ network 
was above the recommended level of .5 (CS = .52), but closeness and betweenness fell below 
the recommended minimum level of .25 (Closeness CS = .13, Betweenness CS = .05). CS-
coefficients in the non-practitioners’ network were all below the minimum recommended for 
meaningful interpretation (strength CS = .13, closeness CS = .13, betweenness CS = .05). As 
such, the non-practitioners’ network was not considered robust, rendering centrality 
comparisons speculative and less meaningful beyond the sample. Bootstrapped significance 
difference tests revealed significant differences only between the most central and least 
central practices in the practitioners’ network (see Appendix J, Figure 28). This meant that 
the most central practices could not be distinguished from each other. Essentially none of the 
practices significantly differed in centrality in the non-practitioners network (see Appendix J, 







Figure 10. Average correlations between AMPS centrality indices of networks sampled with 
persons dropped and the original sample using the glasso networks for practitioners (top) and 
non-practitioners (bottom). Legend: blue = strength, green = closeness, red = red = 
betweenness.  
6.2.3.2 Exploratory analysis of network structures. A graphical depiction of the 
practitioners’ and non-practitioners’ AMPS networks is presented in Figure 11 with centrality 
estimates shown in Figure 12. Table 7 contains items, corresponding item descriptions, 
abbreviations, sample means, and standard deviations of the network of 15 items of the 
AMPS.   
  An analysis of paths revealed that the practitioners’ network had 74 paths and the 
non-practitioners’ network, 79 paths. Visual inspection revealed substantial structural 
differences, borne out in weak correlations across all centrality indices (strength rS = .16, 
betweenness rS = .01 and closeness rS = -.16). None-the-less, a moderate coefficient of 
similarity was obtained (rS = .48). No substantial differences in centrality or edge weights 





the exploratory networks (practitioners: strength rs = .78, closeness rs = .81, betweenness rs = 
.92; co-efficient of similarity rs = .96; non-practitioners: strength rs = 0.85, closeness rs = .67, 
betweenness rs = .78, co-efficient of similarity rs = .90). As such, the NCT and exploratory 
networks were considered comparable.  
The exploratory analysis focused on differences in community structure, borne out in 
differences of centrality and topology. The Exploratory Graphical Analysis (Golino & 
Epskamp, 2017) found four communities in the practitioners’ sample and two communities in 
the non-practitioners’ sample. Specifically, the practitioners’ network was characterised by 
two major communities and a peripheral cluster of three practices which constituted a further 
two communities (although it may be a misnomer to speak of a single practice as a 
community). By way of contrast, the non-practitioners’ network was characterised by one 






























































Figure 11. Glasso AMPS mindfulness networks for practitioners (left) and non-practitioners 
(right). Minimum path weight was set at 0, and the maximum 0.44. Gamma = 0.5. Graphs 
depict communities detected using the Exploratory Graphical Analysis package (EGA, 
Golino & Epskamp, 2017). The Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm (FR, Fruchterman & 
Reingold, 1991) was used to layout all graphs. To assist comparisons, identical positioning 
















Table 6  
Items, Content, Abbreviations, Means, and Standard Deviations for 15 AMPS Items. 
   Practitioners Controls 
   (n =368) (n = 224) 
Item Item content Abbreviation  M (SD) M (SD) 




3.32 (0.93) 2..23 (0.95) 
AMPS 2 relax my body when I was tense Relaxation (Rlx) 3.81 (0.89) 2.75 (0.91) 




3.38 (0.98) 2.42 (0.98) 




3.77 (0.95) 3.11 (1.05) 
AMPS 5 calm my emotions when I was upset Emotional Calming 
(ECm) 
3.82 (0.92) 3.18 (1.01) 




3.56 (0.91) 2.95 (0.97) 




3.71 (0.97) 3.16 (1.01) 
AMPS 8  reduce tension when I was stressed Reduce Tension (RT) 3.75 (.95) 3.02 (0.95) 




3.75 (0.99 3.16 (1.12) 




3.58 (0.91) 2.94 (1.01) 




3.81 (0.84) 3.50 (1.07) 
AMPS 12 let go of unpleasant thoughts and 
feelings 
Letting Go (LG). 3.69 (0.89) 2.99 (0.96) 




3.54 (1.03) 2.88 (1.06) 




3.59 (0.98) 3.00 (1.04) 






























































         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
  
Figure 12.  Strength centrality measures for practitioners (blue) and non-practitioners (red) 
for the 15 item regularised AMPS mindfulness networks.  
 
Those practices most strength central to practitioners were Broadening Attention, 
followed by Letting Go and Reducing Tension. Those practices most strength central to the 
non-practitioners’ network were Reducing Tension, Hedonic Savouring and Flexibility.  
Substantive group level differences in centrality were found in a large number of 
practices. The practitioners’ network was revealed to be one in which Positive Re-appraisal, 
Implicational Savouring, Emotional Calming, and Broadening Attention were highly central 
relative to their position in the non-practitioners’ network. The two Meta-cognitive practices 
(Perception and Realisation), Hedonic Savouring, and Flexibility were found to be much 
more peripheral to the practitioners’ network, relative to their position in the non-
practitioners network. The non-practitioners’ network was one in which the practices of 
Returning to the Present, Hedonic Savouring and Flexibility were highly central, but 
Emotional Calming and De-centered Observation, peripheral. The sheer magnitude of 





topological differences in the practices of Positive Reappraisal, Letting Go and Flexibility are 
noted.  
The presence and absence of negative paths also constituted important differences. A 
large number of negative paths were revealed between the De-centering practices (Meta-
cognitive Perception, Meta-cognitive Realisation and De-centered Observation) and other 
practices in the network in the non-practitioners network. Of these, the negative paths 
between De-centered Observation and Awareness and Appreciation (Obs-AAp M = -.06, 95% 
CI [-.17, -.05]), and Reducing Tension and Metacognitive Realization (RT-MR = -.1 [-.25, .4]) 
were maintained in the Spearman’s network (Appendix K; n.b., practitioners: Obs-AAp = .00, 
[-.06, .06]; RT-MR = .05, [-.04, .14]). Another prominent negative path was revealed between 
Hedonic Savouring and Flexibility which was maintained in the Spearman’s network (HSv – 
Fl = -.1 [-.29, .09]; absent in practitioners, HSv – Fl = 0, [-.03, .03]). In the practitioners, the 
negative path Letting Go and Implicational Savouring was maintained in Spearman’s 
network (ISv-LG = -.11 [-.27, .04]; absent in non-practitioners: ISv-LG = .00, [-.07, .07]). An 
inspection of cross-tables (Table 8) suggested that insufficient sampling belied many of the 
















Table 7  
Cross-Table Frequencies for Negative Paths 
Path  Frequency of n = 0 Frequency of n <10 
Non-Practitioners 





   RT-MR  0 13 
   HSv-Fl  3 19 
Practitioners 





Note. Total number of cells = 25. 
 
6.2.4 Discussion of AMPS results. The estimated AMPS graphs again demonstrated 
the feasibility of explaining the covariance observed in items by recourse to a network model. 
Mirroring the results of Study 1, the NCT provided support for the null hypothesis; namely, 
no differences in density were observed between practitioners and non-practitioners. Support 
for a significant difference in network structure was found. This was supported by the 
differences revealed in exploratory analysis; namely, the different community structures, 
weak associations between the centrality indices of the two groups, and the moderate 
difference in the path weight co-efficient of similarity.  
 The scale of structural differences and the poor estimation of the non-practitioners’ 
network made interpretation more difficult, warranting attention. The decision to adapt the 
AMPS for non-practitioners reflected a prioritisation of theory over psychometric validation. 
The results of this study do not support this decision, and future research would benefit from 
investigating how psychometric properties translate to network estimation. The AMPS was 
also selected on the belief that its less technical wording of items may increase the likelihood 





structural differences suggest that the more general wording of items allowed for much 
greater heterogeneity in item comprehension28.  
Another limitation of the measure relates to distinctiveness of items. Many of the 
items appeared to have over-lapping content and/or strong logical connections, manifesting in 
strong paths between items, common to both networks. For example, it is difficult to see how 
Metacognitive perception (“see that my thoughts were not necessarily true”) could not lead to 
Metacognitive realization (“realize that my thoughts were not facts”), making the path un-
falsifiable and arguably, pseudo-empirical (Smedslund, 2016). The same appears true also for 
the path between Reducing Tension (“reduce tension when I was stressed”) and Relaxation 
(“relax my body when I was tense”), and perhaps also, the path between Reducing Tension 
and Emotional Calming (“calm my emotions when I was upset”).  
By inducing stronger paths, strong logical connections and/or overlapping item 
content inflate centrality scores, rendering comparisons less meaningful. Interpretation is also 
less meaningful, for it makes little sense to speak of potentially casual pathways in practices 
which index the same behaviour (Bringmann & Eronin, 2018; Fried et al., 2016; Fried & 
Cramer, 2017). Likewise, strong logical connections are less informative as the path could 
only have been. More informative are paths which could have been otherwise, for this affords 
the possibility of structural variation, perhaps brought about by a regular practice29.  
Bearing in mind these limitations, several findings warrant mention. Firstly, greater 
differentiation was found in the community structure of the practitioners’ network, manifest 
in more distinct communities. This will be discussed in further detail in the General 
                                                             
28 Of the communities, only the De-centering community corresponded to that identified in the original (and 
only) validation study of the AMPS (Li et al., 2016). Interestingly, these items appeared the most technically 
worded items.  
29 The challenge in developing items is to thus allow for structural differences, yet word items in a way which 
both groups comprehend them similarly (practice invariance). More general wording brings the risk of greater 
subjectivity or heterogeneity in comprehension, yet too specific wording raises the risk of items being 





Discussion (chapter 7). A second interesting finding relates to the type of practices in which 
substantial differences in centrality were observed, and their position in the Mindfulness to 
Meaning Theory (Garland et al., 2015a) from which the AMPS was derived. To recap, the 
Mindfulness to Meaning Theory grants De-centering community practices a foundational role 
in mindfulness, from which increasingly higher order eudemonic (meaning-based happiness) 
practices develop. Central to the theory is Positive reappraisal which involves Broadening 
(the scope of) Attention to “appreciate that even aversive experiences are potential vehicles 
for personal transformation and growth” (Garland et al., 2015a, pg. 295). These eudemonic 
processes in turn, have adaptive benefits such as alleviating negative emotions (Teasdale, 
1993). In this way, meaning-making (eudemonic) practices are theorised to become 
increasingly important as a practice develops.  
Broadly consistent with this, the foundational De-centering community practices 
(Meta-cognitive Realization, Meta-cognitive Perception and to a lesser extent, Flexibility) 
tended to be those most central to non-practitioners relative to their position in the 
practitioner’s network (save Hedonic Savouring30). By way of contrast, more eudemonic 
practices tended to be those most central to practitioners (Positive Re-appraisal , Broadening 
Attention, Implicational Savouring), relative to their position in the non-practitioners’ 
network. Of these, Positive Re-appraisal appeared particularly important in maintaining its 
associated community. Taken together, these results suggest that meaning-making practices 
may become increasingly important in galvanizing or maintaining mindfulness (relative to 
other practices) as a formal regular practice develops. Future temporal and longitudinal 
research might further investigate this hypothesis.  
                                                             
30 One cannot rule out the likelihood of this practice sampling quite different behaviours across groups given the 





A third interesting finding related to the high strength centrality of Letting Go across 
both networks. A practice of this type features in Buddhist theory (i.e., the third Noble Truth 
claims that one can liberate oneself from this suffering by letting go of desire and 
attachment), but also, in the literature. For example, Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse and Neufeld 
(2008) suggested that an individual’s capacity to let go of negative automatic thoughts may 
promote cognitive flexibility, thereby increasing their potential range of responses to a given 
situation. Consistent with this, Letting Go featured a strong path with Flexibility in the non-
practitioners’ network, and more generally, mediated the influence of De-centering practices 
on purportedly upstream practices.  
Finally, the many negative paths revealed between De-centering community practices 
and other practices, unique to non-practitioners’ network, were interesting. Two of these 
negative paths were maintained in the networks estimated with Spearman’s correlations, of 
which the negative path between Metacognitive Realization and Reducing Tension may be 
illustrative. This path may suggest that realising that one’s thoughts are not facts may predict 
increased tension in non-practitioners only (or at least a subset of non-practitioners). 
Alternatively, it suggests that Reducing Tension may inhibit Metacognitive Realization.  
The possibility of Metacognitive Realization predicting increased tension has some 
precedent in the literature (see Lindhal, Fisher, Cooper, Rosen & Britton, 2017 for review), 
and deleterious effects have been suggested to be especially likely in the preliminary stages 
of a practice (Epstein & Lieff, 1981). Plausibly, realizing that one’s thoughts are not facts 
could invoke feelings of invalidation as beliefs lose their credibility and generate anxiety in 
the resulting uncertainty. Bearing in mind the limitations of inferring from group level data; 
the results might thus suggest that a regular mindfulness (or related meditative) practice may 
buffer individuals from such negative effects. Although speculative, two possibilities are 





of a developed sense of acceptance. A challenge of mindfulness involves combining high 
levels of self-observation with a high level of a self-acceptance (Grabovic et al., 2011; Lilja 
et al., 2013) which may have been absent in non-practitioners. In support of this, Acceptance 
was observed to be much more central to the practitioners’ network relative to the non-
practitioners network in study 1, suggested to be indicative of its greater level of development 
in the former. By way of contrast, it was suggested that the non-practitioners’ network 
evidenced practices of (self) critical processing. In addition, (or alternatively), it may be that 
a regular mindfulness or related meditative practice provides the appropriate conceptual or 
interpretive aids which help assimilate or mediate the consequences of the De-centering 
practices. This might be considered consistent with Wildman’s (2011) observation that “the 
intense experiences of nonreligious people are sometimes difficult to assimilate for the lack 
of any conceptual framework or social context for making sense of them” (p. 97, as cited in 
Lindhal et al., 2017).  
Interpreting Metacognitive Realization in the context of anxiety may also inform the 
interpretation of the alternative possibility; namely, Reducing Tension impeding 
Metacognitive Realization. If Metacognitive Realization was to index anxiety, and Reducing 
Tension, relaxation; a negative path might be expected between the two given that relaxation 
has frequently been shown to reduce anxiety (e.g. Eppley, Abrams, & Shear, 1989; Manzoni, 
Pagnini, Castelnuovo, & Molinari, 2008).   
The other prominent negative paths also bear brief mention if only because they may 
challenge a core contention of the Mindfulness to Meaning Theory; namely, that mindfulness 
and reappraisal are not contradictory psychological operations. For example, the negative 
path between De-centered Observation (“observe my thoughts in a non-attached manner”) 
and Awareness and Appreciation (“be aware of and appreciating pleasant events”) in the non-





(appreciative) and detached (de-centered). A similar dynamic might account for the other 
negative paths between Flexibility (detached) and Hedonic Savouring (attached), and Letting 
Go (detached) and Implicational Savouring (attached).  
In summary, the AMPS study revealed greater differentiation in practitioners’ 
networks relative to non-practitioners, in which more eudemonic practices tended to be more 
central, and more foundational mindfulness practices less central. The study also suggesting 
psychometric considerations be prioritised over theoretical considerations, and that greater 
consideration may be required in identifying appropriate nodes for a network when using 
extant scales. Finally, it highlighted possible deleterious effects of practicing De-centering 







Chapter 7 General Discussion 
The two studies hypothesised that a regular mindfulness (or related meditative) 
practice would lead to greater correlations among practices relative to a non-practicing 
sample. At the cross-sectional level, this would manifest in a density difference. Across both 
studies, evidence was found in support of the null hypothesis. Future research examining 
network dynamics in the context of regular mindfulness practice is hence required to 
investigate the hypothesis outlined.  
The second aim of this study was an exploration of network structures. Network 
structure has long been associated with network dynamics in the broader literature (i.e. 
Kolaczyk, 2009; Scheffer et al., 2012; Watts, 2002), and it was suggested that practices may 
re-organise differently across a regular mindfulness or related meditative practice. This may 
manifest in non-random structural differences at the cross-sectional level. Support was found 
for a significant difference in network structure across both studies. This was most obvious 
for the AMPS, but evidence was more tentative for the FMI (only 62% of 500 resampled 
networks significantly differed, and this reduced as gamma values increased).  
The results of Study 1 rendered it unclear whether structural differences represented 
the re-organisation of the same practices, or whether the networks represented the 
organisation of different practices (sharing the same name). In the case of the latter, the same 
networks may not have been compared, rendering the main hypothesis and centrality 
comparison less meaningful. Future research is hence required to establish the nature of 
network differences observed, and novel scales suited to network analysis may be required.  
Comparisons could not be made between the two scales as they indexed different 
practices. As such, future research would also benefit from comparing network structures 
across more comparable mindfulness measures. Bearing this in mind, one common finding 





practitioners’ networks. This manifested in practitioners evidencing distinct communities 
characterised by relatively stronger intra-community paths, and relatively weaker inter-
community paths.  
The factor analytic literature on factorial variance may shed some light on this 
common result. Factorial variance refers to shifting factor structures across groups or time 
points. In the mindfulness literature, factorial variance has been demonstrated across samples 
of meditators and non-meditators (i.e. Baer et al., 2008; Christopher, Charoensuk, Gilbert, 
Neary & Pearce, 2009; Van Dam, Earleywine & Danoff-Burg, 2009; Williams et al., 2014), 
and across time points (before and after mindfulness training; Grossman, 2008; Gu et al., 
2016). Factorial variance has often been considered a problem in the literature as it suggests 
that two groups are not being compared on the same latent construct/s (Grossman, 2008; Van 
Dam et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2014). Explanations advanced have been differential item 
responding or comprehension (Belzer et al., 2013; Grossman, 2008), and response shift (i.e., 
a subject’s frame of reference changing as their practice develops; Grossman, 2008; Gu et al., 
2016; Krägeloh, Bergomi, Siegert & Medvedev, 2017; see Güthlin, 2004 for further 
discussion of response shift).  
Comprehension differences (across subjects or within subjects over time) are 
interesting as perceptual shifts might be expected in a highly introspective practice measured 
by self-report (Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015; Grossman, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2006; Shonin, et 
al., 2013). To this end, Bucheld, Grossman & Walach (2001) suggested that the shifting 
factor structure they observed in their study may reflect “a meta-level shift in conception of 
the self and the nature of experience” (p.26). Differences in community structures may thus 
index something important to mindfulness, and it would be interesting to associate 





Alternatively, when practice invariance is assumed (i.e., practices refer to the same 
thing in both groups’ networks), the greater differentiation in the practitioners’ network could 
be considered consistent with developmental interpretations in the wider factorial literature 
(e.g., Bridges, 1932; Coan, 1966; Garret, 1938, 1946; Nesselroade, 1983; Piaget, 1947; 
Werner, 1956). For example, Nesselroade (1983) has suggested that “structural change is a 
prominent thread in the fabric of developmental theory and, to the extent that it is 
meaningfully represented as changes in factor-loading patterns, its appearance should not be 
summarily precluded’’ (p.63). More generally, Werner (1956) has proposed an “othogenetic 
principle”; namely, “wherever development occurs, it proceeds from a state of…lack of 
differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation and hierarchic integration” 
(p. 126). A developmental interpretation of this sort was suggested in Baer’s (2008) 
interpretation of shifting factor structures in their FFMQ study. Baer suggested that the 
Observing facet of the FFMQ may have been sensitive to changes in meditation, such that it’s 
associations with the other facets became stronger as a practice unfolded (see also, Camody 
& Baer, 2008; Lilja et al., 2013)31. In a different line of FFMQ research, Eisenlohr-Moul, 
Walsh, Baer, and Lynam (2012) used statistical interaction terms to show how the effects of 
one aspect of mindfulness, varied as a function of another aspect. They found that these 
interaction terms demonstrated incremental validity in predicting positive outcomes (see also 
Desrosiers, Vine, Curtiss, & Klemanski, 2013; Peters, Eisenlohr-Moul, Upton, & Baer, 
2013). Taken together, these studies could be considered consistent with a developmental 
interpretation of greater differentiation forming across time, affording the possibility for 
interactions (i.e., hierarchic integration). The results of study 1 were considered consistent 
with this in that the Presence community practices (which closely resemble FFMQ Observing 
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items) were found to be much more central to the practitioners’ network relative to their non-
practicing counterparts. These are precisely the practices a formal mindfulness practice is 
suggested to target or influence (Lilja et al., 2013).  
 Another possible explanation for differences observed in differentiation may be 
differences in sample heterogeneity. It may be that non-practitioners are more alike as 
practices increase and decrease more randomly due to external life influences. This could 
lead to a degree of homogeneity in item endorsement patterns (e.g. 222222) which would 
manifest in a more uniform community structure. By way of contrast, a regular mindfulness 
(or related meditative) practice may lead to practices beginning to influence each other in 
different patterns leading to different subgroups. Strong item endorsement patterns may 
hence emerge (e.g. 24314), manifesting in greater community differentiation. Put very 
crudely, all non-practitioners are alike, but all mindful people (practitioners) are mindful in 
their own way32. In support of this, latent class analyses and cluster analyses with the FFMQ 
have demonstrated distinct mindfulness sub-groups, suggested to have come by way of 
different learning trajectories (Lilja et al., 2013; Pearson et al., 2015). To this end, it must 
also be noted that different meditative practices might also plausibly lead to different item 
endorsement patterns. Although group level research may elucidate general tendencies, the 
presence of subgroups may require greater consideration in network analyses. Future research 
might also consider attempting to limit recruitment to practitioners of mindfulness, but not 
other related contemplative practices.   
A final point relates to the ontology of mindfulness in the network models proposed. 
The breakthrough of network models is their ability to examine and explain psychological 
data without having to resort to essentialism and biological realism (Lloyd, 2010). The 
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networks modelled could hence conceptualise mindfulness as practice, and not something 
standing apart from, and caused by practice. This is consistent with the idea of practices 
being autotelic, by which it is meant that practices are performed for their own sake, and not 
for the purpose of leading to something that exists independently or beyond them. From this 
perspective, it follows that a practitioner does not practice in order to become mindful, for no 
independent state exists beyond what they are doing. An idea (or narrative) of what 
mindfulness is does however exist, and this may form an exemplar. Formulated from an 
embodied or enactive practice, the practitioner might thus be said to practice not in order to 
become mindful; but rather, simply as if they were mindful. Sharf (2005) suggests much the 
same in his research in Zen Buddhism; namely, the practitioner practices seated meditation 
(zazen) “not in order to become an enlightened Buddha, but simply as if one were an 
enlightened Buddha” (Sharf, 2005 p. 256). For this reason, Sharf (2005) considers Zen 
Buddhism as ritual play: much as the child plays with a stick as if it were a horse, the 
practitioner engages in ritual as if they are a Buddha. Put differently, Zen training may be 
said to represent the ritual expression, embodiment, or enactment of Buddhahood. This thesis 
has argued that contemporary mindfulness may represent a reversal of this situation. It was 
suggested that contemporary conceptualisations framed mindfulness as a stand-alone, 
universal (trans-historical) experience (represented statistically in the reflective factor model). 
André van der Braak (2015) makes a similar point when he notes:  
Many Western zazen practitioners do not realize that zazen is conceived in Japan and 
China as the ritual embodiment of Buddhahood. They do not feel they are engaging in 
ritual play when they practice zazen. In terms of the Zen tradition: they do not sit as a 
Buddha, but in order to become a Buddha (p. 165, emphasis mine). 
To practice or play as if a state of mindfulness exists might be considered a sham, but 





of removing the subject from instrumental activity33. Secondly, playing as if things were true 
is consonant with the canonical Buddhist truth of impermanence; namely, it appreciates the 
intrinsic emptiness of all dependently arisen things. Finally, play reorients the subject to the 
object, a process commonly ascribed to mindfulness.  
At the most basic level, the networks modelled predict group level associations among 
practices. Given that autotelic intention was in theory crucial for distinguishing mindfulness 
from instrumental activity34, the absence of this information in the networks may cause pause 
in considering them network models of mindfulness. To stay with the play analogy, modelling 
predictive associations among practices to explore mindfulness may be akin to modelling 
predictive associations among objects to explore play. Play, like mindfulness does not reside 
in objects. To use terms common to mindfulness, play seems more about being than doing35, 
and in this way, it is intentional. That said, a network model in which objects (termed toys 
when played with) formed the nodes could tell us something very useful about which objects 
were central to developing a system of activity, which through reciprocal predicative 
associations, may become self-sustaining and potentially stable across time. It may go beyond 
the data to suggest that this is play, but something is happening, and perhaps this is enough to 
inform decisions on, for example, which objects might be purchased for a waiting room. Put 
differently, the networks may still be useful if we proceed as if objects were toys, and this 
logic is extended to the mindfulness networks. The studies hence proceeded as if the practices 
were carried out with autotelic intention which may constitute a limitation36.  
                                                             
33 André van de Braak (2015) cites the twentieth-century Zen master, Kōdō Sawaki (1880-1965), who makes a 
similar point of zazen; namely, it requires “leaving behind a means-end rationality” (p.160). 
34 Intention also was suggested here to differentiate contemporary and traditional formulations. This parallels a 
similar conclusion reached by Shonin and colleagues (2013) who suggested that intention “happens to be one of 
the principal factors that differentiates mindfulness as taught in MBIs from its Buddhist construal” (p. 2). 
35 It is interesting to reformulate Teasdale’s (1993) distinction between doing and being as doing and playing. 
36 Whether or how intention can be ascertained is beyond the scope of this thesis, although it is noted that 
Shapiro and colleagues (1992) have investigated motivations for mindfulness with open questions, and 
Grossman (2011) has suggested that researchers measure not only the frequencies of given practices, but also 





Other important limitations need mention. Firstly, cross-sectional generalisations may 
not correspond to causal mechanisms that characterise the development of mindfulness 
within persons (see Bos & de Jonge, 2014; Bos & Wanders, 2016; van Borkulo, Borsboom, 
& Schoevers, 2016 for further discussion of this point). Cross-sectional networks can thus 
only provide a starting point to investigate how mindfulness practices relate to each other on 
average. Future ideographic research is needed to investigate the substantial heterogeneity 
which likely exists at the individual level.  
 Another important limitation relates to assumptions underpinning the network density 
hypothesis and centrality estimates; namely, that all the relevant nodes in a network are 
present. The common factor model circumvents this problem by considering items 
interchangeable indicators of an underlying latent variable; however, the addition and 
omission of nodes in a network model changes the identity of the emergent construct (Fried 
& Cramer, 2017; Marius & Kruis, 2016). The failure to incorporate all nodes can thus 
misrepresent the network structure, and in theory, the assumption can never be met in a 
network study. Although more nodes might be considered superior to fewer, much larger 
samples are required to maintain adequate power (Fried & Cramer, 2017). The current studies 
were thus limited to choosing relatively prescribed measures (14-15 item measures), and 
future research may benefit from more using larger sample sizes with more comprehensive 
measures (e.g., the FFMQ). Future research may also benefit from focusing attention away 
from global network characteristics to examining specific paths between nodes.  
The centrality interpretation used in these studies also made further assumptions. 
Firstly, negative edges were treated as absolute values which is routine but somewhat 
arbitrary. One might just as easily take centrality at its real value leading to reductions with 
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negative edges. The presence of negative edges also brings into the question the utility of 
targeting central nodes. When negative edges are present, changes may populate across a 
network, but reciprocal feedback could make the change short-lived (Fried et al., 2018; Smith 
et al., 2018). For this reason, it has been suggested that network interventions might better 
focus on clusters or chains of practices in which central items are embedded (Letina, 
Blanken, Deserno, & Borsboom, 2018; Smith et al., 2018). 
Bringmann and colleagues (2018) have also challenged the use of flow processes to 
describe how influence travels down paths without further conceptual analysis (e.g., whether 
flow may be serial or parallel, across what timescales etc.). The authors also raise the issue of 
node distinctiveness which appeared a real concern in study 2. Currently, there are no 
established recommendations for determining node redundancy (Zhang & Horvath, 2005), 
although recent papers have advanced novel statistical solutions to help researchers identify 
relevant practices for a network (e.g., Bulteel, Tuerlinckx, Brose, & Ceulemans, 2016; see 
also R package NetworkTools, Jone, 2017). It also bears mention again that due to the cross-
sectional nature of the studies, it cannot be determined whether central practices with high 
centrality influence other practices, are the end result of other causal practice chains, or both. 
The current findings would ideally be replicated with designs using temporal data to uncover 
whether changes in one practice precede changes in another. Finally, Bringmann and 
colleagues (2018) note that centrality assumes that the practices are exchangeable much as 
latent variable theory does. This is inferred in calculating centrality by summing paths. This 
assumption is unwarranted as different practices may well turn out to be more important than 
others in terms of outcomes predicted. Taken together, Bringmann and colleagues (2018) thus 
suggest that “it is not enough to state that one wants to measure how central a node is, but one 





assumptions the centrality measure of choice entails” (p. 20-21). Future research would 
benefit from heeding these recommendations.  
 Another limitation relates to the power of the study to detect differences. Firstly, the 
sample sizes involved in these studies may have been insufficient. A rule of thumb exists 
suggesting three subjects per parameter, yet this appeared insufficient in the current studies as 
wide confidence intervals were still obtained for edges. This lack of precision reduces the 
chances of detecting network differences. Future studies would benefit from larger sample 
sizes to increase power and sensitivity. That said, determining appropriate sample sizes has 
proved problematic in the network literature. Epskamp and Fried (2018) have recommended 
a simulation approach for gaining insight into adequate sample sizes, although this requires 
an idea of an expected network structure, unavailable to the present research. Plausibly the 
current networks might be helpful for future studies using this approach.  
The quality of the online sample may have limited the sensitivity of the study to 
detect group level network differences. Limited sample quality can attenuate existing 
associations and hence the power of statistical tests such as the Network Comparison Test. 
Data quality was only ascertained by the restrictions on approval rate (implemented in 
Turkprime) and future studies may wish to use other measures such as attention checks 
(albeit these have limitations). Future research might also benefit from recruiting from more 
traditional sources or using established open source data. It is further noted that the use of 
regularization can also erode sensitivity given that it prioritises specificity (not detecting false 
edges). The evidence for structural differences observed only in the most sensitive FMI 
networks (gamma = 0) is illustrative. Williams and colleagues (2018) have suggested non-
regularised approaches which future research may consider.  
Limitations also exist in relation to the measures used in these studies. The two 





was psychometrically validated but employed quite technical language. The AMPS used 
more general language and was more theoretically coherent (it specified actual practices 
required to achieve the trait designation); however, it lacked strong psychometric support. 
Although it remains unknown how certain psychometric properties affect accuracy of 
network estimation, the lack of stability of the AMPS in non-practitioners may suggest that 
psychometric properties be prioritised over theory. Ultimately, network studies into 
mindfulness may require novel measures. Factor analysis measures are designed to maximise 
common variance pertaining to a pre-conceived mindfulness construct, but this common 
variance is excluded in a network analysis. A measure designed specifically for a network 
study might be advantageous by maximising unique variance. This requires a variety of 
relevant, but quite distinct items (cite; Mõttus et al., 2017). Given that extant ordinal scales 
may have issues with range restriction (causing correlations to be underestimated), it may be 
also be useful to use scales with a wider ordinal range. It has also been suggested that 
networks consider including parcels (i.e. querying participants using multiple questions) of 
items given that single items are subject to measurement error (Epskamp et al., 2016). Future 
research might also wish to combine network models with latent models to help reduce 
measurement error (Cramer et al., 2016; Epskamp, Maris, et al., in press; Fried & Cramer, 
2017; Markus, 2010). It has also been suggested that outcomes, if employed, match the 
breadth of predictors (whether items, parcels of mixed models; Mõttus et al., 2017). This 
means that in networks of items, more specific outcomes should be employed.  
Another limitation relates to the use of self-report data. Self-report data can rarely be 
independently verified meaning that item-practice correspondence can only be assumed (i.e., 
it is assumed that what people say is actually what they do; see Stone, Bachrach, Jobe, 
Kurtzman, & Cain, 1999, for a general review of self-report data and its limitations). This 





(i.e., they map only semantic or logical associations). In turn, this determines the relevance of 
recommendations for network manipulations which presume paths index behavioural 
processes.  
Beyond this, issues of response shift and differential item responding suggest that 
item variance is a real concern in self-report mindfulness measures. Social desirability issues 
have also been noted in the literature (Brown and Ryan 2003; Cardaciotto et al. 2008). These 
issues have frequently been raised in the mindfulness literature (e.g. Bergomi et al., 2012), of 
which it is typically concluded that either better measures are required, or that self-report 
measures may be unable to capture mindfulness (e.g., Grossman, 2008). To this end it is 
noted that more objective measures of purported physical correlates of mindfulness have been 
developed such as breath counting; however, where such studies have occurred, results have 
been mixed (see for example, Frewen, Lundberg, MacKinley & Wrath, 2011; Levinson, Stoll, 
Kindy, Merry & Davidson, 2014; see also Ring, Brener, Knapp & Mailloux, 2015 for 
potential problems with breath counting).  
A final point relates to the Exploratory Graphical Analysis used to identify 
community structures. The EGA has performed well on simulated and real data (Golino & 
Demetriou, 2017; Golino & Epskamp, 2017; Golino et al., 2018), but the technique is still 
new to the field. Future research should compare the EGA results with other community 
detection algorithms (Golino & Epskamp, 2017). 
7.1 Conclusion  
This is the first study to investigate the network structure of mindfulness at the level 
of self-report. Using tools unique to network analysis, networks were estimated on two 
mindfulness measures for practitioners and non-practitioners.  
The main hypothesis that practitioners’ networks would be characterised by greater 





two groups were unlikely to significantly differ in network density. Support for a significant 
difference in network structure was found for both measures, albeit this was limited to only 
the most sensitive networks for the FMI.  
The exploratory analysis revealed more differentiated community structures for 
practitioners across both measures which may reflect behavioural re-organisation as a 
function of regular practice. Several important differentiating features were identified.  
In Study 1, the practice of Acceptance was found to be relatively more central to 
practitioners, compared to its position in the non-practitioners’ network. By way of contrast, 
Returning to the Present was much more peripheral to practitioners, relative to non-
practitioners. A negative path between Self-kindness and Attending to Actions was also 
identified, unique to the non-practitioners’ network. This was considered a possible target for 
future network interventions. Study 2 revealed the practitioners’ network to be characterised 
by greater centrality in eudemonic practices relative to non-practitioners. In the latter, more 
foundational De-centering community practices were substantially more central.  
Further recommendations were advanced. Firstly, it was suggested that novel 
measures be constructed to advance the field of network studies of mindfulness. Secondly, it 
was suggested that future research involve outcome measures to determine the relevance of 
topological differences. Thirdly, the failure to find density differences indicated that further 
research is needed to understand network dynamics in the context of regular mindfulness 
practice. Finally, it was suggested that the issue of intention may need to be considered more 
thoroughly with respect to mindfulness.  
In summary, these studies suggest that mindfulness research should continue to 
employ data-driven predictive models as used here. Such models are arguably more 
consistent with traditional formulations of the construct, counteract tendencies for reification, 





researchers to empirically investigate more complex theories and models, and potentially 
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 Appendix D: FMI NCT Preparation and Exploratory Network Comparisons. 
In preparing the data for the NCT, non-practitioners and practitioners were collapsed into one 
group to help balance the sample size difference. Figure 13 shows the non-practitioner and newly 
combined non-practitioner and irregular practitioners’ networks. Figure 14 shows the centrality 
estimates for the respective networks. Visual analysis reveals no substantive differences in 
estimated networks and centrality. This was confirmed by the strong correlations in centrality 
(strength rs = .90, closeness rs = .74, betweenness rs = .90) and edge weights (co-efficient of 



















Figure 13. FMI Networks estimated for non-practitioners (left) and a combined non-practitioner 
and irregular practitioner sample (right). Maximum edge weight = .37. All networks estimated 
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Figure 14. Centrality metrics for non-practitioners (blue) and the combined sample (red).  
 
The resampling procedure used to correct for sample sizes makes it unfeasible to 
compare networks estimated in the exploratory analyses (using polychoric correlations) and 
those used in the NCT. None-the-less some assessment of comparability was required. This was 
achieved by estimating a network with Pearson’s correlations and comparing it to its exploratory 
counterpart (Figure 15). The gamma value was set to 0 for both networks.  
Figure 16 shows the centrality indices superimposed for both groups. Visual analysis 
suggested that the only substantive deviation was in the strength centrality of Sensing in the 
practitioners’ networks, which was higher in the exploratory networks than in those that may 
have been estimated in the NCT. Regardless, the practitioners’ exploratory network was 
considered to adequately characterise that which may have been estimated in the course of the 
NCT, as evident in the strong (Spearman’s) correlations between the centrality indices (strength 





similarity rs  = .98). No significant deviations are observed between the non-practitioners 
networks suggestive of their comparability (strength rs = .87, closeness rs = .82, betweenness rs = 
.78, co-efficient of similarity  rs  = .92). The same was true also of comparisons made at the 
higher gamma value of .5 (practitioners strength rs  = .87, closeness rs = .95, betweenness rs = 
.88, co-efficient of similarity  rs  = .97; non-practitioners strength rs  = .93, closeness rs = .70, 









































Figure 15. Networks estimated with Pearson’s correlations (left) and polychrolic correlations 
(right). The practitioners’ networks (top) have a maximum edge weight of .28. Combined non-
practitioners and irregular practitioners Person network (bottom left) and non-practitioners 
polychoric network (bottom right) have a maximum edge weight of .45.  Networks estimated 







Figure 16. Three centrality metrics. Top: practitioners’ Pearson network (red) and practitioners’ 
polychoric network (blue). Bottom: combined non-practitioners and irregular practitioners’ 
Pearson’s network (red) and non-practitioners polychoric network (blue). Z scores are used on 






Appendix E: AMPS NCT Preparation and Exploratory Network Comparisons. 
To investigate the feasibility of combining non-practitioners and irregular practitioners, networks 
were estimated (Figure 17) and centrality calculated (Figure 18). The networks were highly 
similar and this was corroborated by strong correlations in centrality (strength rs = .90, closeness 
rs = .84, betweenness rs = .67) and edge weights (co-efficient of similarity rs = .92). Limiting the 
analysis to strength centrality, the most obvious differences were in the practices Flexibility 
(more pronounced in combined group) and Letting Go (more attenuated in the combined group). 
 
Figure 17. AMPS Networks estimated for non-practitioners (left) and a combined non-
practitioner and irregular practitioner sample (right). Maximum edge weight = .38. All networks 






Figure 18. Associated centrality metrics for non-practitioners (blue) and the combined sample 
(red).  
To ascertain how comparable exploratory networks were with those which may have 
been estimated in the NCT, networks estimated with Pearson’s correlations were compared with 
those estimated with polychoric correlations for both groups (Figure 19). Visual inspections of 
networks and centrality (Figure 20) suggested broadly similar networks, albeit differences were 
apparent in some practices. Strong correlations were found between all centrality indices for 
practitioners (strength rs = .78, closeness rs = .91, betweenness rs = .81) and non-practitioners 
(strength rs = .84, closeness rs = .78, betweenness rs = .67). Likewise for edge weights 
(practitioner co-efficient of similarity rs = .96; non-practitioner co-efficient of similarity rs = .90).. 
Taken together, exploratory networks appeared fair representations of NCT networks at the 





.99, closeness rs = .99, betweenness rs = .84, co-efficient of similarity rs = .98; non-practitioners 
strength rs = .64, closeness rs = .90, betweenness rs = .70, co-efficient of similarity rs = .91). 
 
 
Figure 19. Top: Practitioners’ networks estimated with Pearson’s correlations (left) and 
polychrolic correlations (right). Maximum edge weight of .38. Bottom: combined non-





polychoric network (right). Maximum edge weight of .44. All networks estimated with a gamma 







Figure 20. Three centrality metrics for networks estimated with Pearson’s (red) and polychoric 
correlations (blue) for practitioners (top). Bottom: Pearson’ combined non-practitioners/irregular 







Appendix F: Exploring Floor and Ceiling Effects. 
Differences in item variance can meaningfully effect network comparisons when floor 
and ceiling effects occur (van Borkulo et al, 2015; Terluin et al., 2016)). These occur when large 
proportions of the study subjects have the minimum or maximum score on an observed variable, 
causing a restriction in range. This in turn influences network connectivity of the observed 
variable Range restriction was investigated by inspecting item score distributions in density 
plots. As shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22, item distributions appear similar across groups and 
approximate normal distributions. Taken together, it is unlikely that range restriction would 







 Figure 21. Density plots of FMI Mindfulness practice scores for mindfulness practitioners (red) 







Figure 22. Density plots of AMPS Mindfulness Component scores for mindfulness practitioners 






Appendix G: Raw Centrality Scores 
Centrality comparisons made in the main text were based on z-scores. The raw score equivalents 
are provided below.  
 
Figure 23. Raw scores for FMI strength centrality for non-practitioners (blue) and the combined 






Figure 24. Raw scores for AMPS strength centrality metrics for non-practitioners (blue) and the 






Appendix H: Person Drop Bootstrap for Unregularised Networks 
Estimated Networks must be accurate and stable for results to generalise. Epskamp, Borsboom 
and Fried, (2018) have recommended using a person drop bootstrap to determine the stability of 
the order of centrality. They also developed a centrality stability (CS) coefficient to this end (see 
Section 5.5.2.3 Accuracy and Stability Estimation for further details of this procedure). The 
stability of the order of centrality was analysed for unregularised partial correlation networks and 
the glasso networks (for both groups) to determine which networks were most suitable for the 
exploratory analysis.  
Figure 23 shows that all centrality indices drop substantially in FMI partial correlation 
(un-regularised) networks. This can be contrasted with the glasso networks in the main wherein 
strength and closeness appeared relatively stable up to around the 70% mark for both groups. 
The regularised networks were hence selected for the exploratory analysis. For completion, CS 
co-efficients were calculated for the partial correlation (un-regularised) networks. Epskamp, 
Borsboom and Fried (2018) have recommended only interpreting the order of centrality when CS 
coefficients exceed .5. A CS value of .25 was suggested as the minimum value for meaningful 
interpretation.  
CS coefficients for the un-regularised networks confirmed that the order of centrality was 
unstable for practitioners (betweenness CS = .05, closeness CS = .13, strength CS = .21), but that 
strength centrality might be interpreted with caution for non-practitioners (strength CS = .28, 
betweenness CS = .21, closeness CS = .21). CS coefficients for the regularised network can be 







Figure 25. Average correlations between centrality indices of subsamples (networks sampled 





practitioners (top) and non-practitioners (bottom). Red = betweeness; Green = closeness; Blue = 
strength. 
 
Figure 24 pertains to the stability analyse performed on the AMPS networks. Figure 24 
shows that correlations between centrality indices of subsamples (networks sampled with persons 
dropped) and the original sample using un-regularised partial correlation networks. The order of 
centrality metrics were not considered stable. This was confirmed by CS coefficients for 
practitioners (Strength CS = .13; betweenness CS = .05; Closeness CS = .13) and non-practitioners 
(Strength CS = .13; betweenness CS = 0.05; Closeness CS = .05). Regularised networks were hence 
selected for the exploratory analyses. The stability analyses for the regularised networks are 







Figure 26. Average correlations between centrality indices of networks sampled with persons 
dropped) and the original sample in un-regularised AMPS networks for practitioners (top) and 





Appendix I: Testing for Significant Differences in Network Edges. 
Bootstrapped difference tests can be used to determine significant differences between 
different network edges.  This test involves taking the difference between the bootstrap 
values of one edge weight, and constructing a bootstrapped CI around the difference scores. 
The null hypothesis can then be tested by checking if zero is in the bootstrapped CI. This can 
be taken as evidence that the edges may differ. No correction is made for multiple testing (see 
Epskamp, Borsboom & Fried, 2018 for further details on this test, and the issue of multiple 
testing). In this analysis, all edges were compared to inform the interpretation of network 
accuracy (see Sections 6.1.3.1 and 6.2.3.1, Network Stability and Accuracy of Exploratory 
Networks). As evident in Figures 25 and 26, only the strongest edges differed from the 











Figure 27. Bootstrapped difference tests (alpha = .05) between pathway-weights that were 
non-zero in the estimated practitioners’ (top) and non-practitioners’ (bottom) FMI 
mindfulness networks. Grey boxes indicate pathways that do not differ significantly from one 
another and black boxes represent pathways that significantly differ. Diagonal indexes path 
strength ranging from the strongest negative path (bottom left) to strongest positive paths (top 
right). Saturation reflects strength of correlation from positive (blue) to negative (red). No 











Figure 28. Bootstrapped difference tests in the estimated practitioners (top) and non-
practitioners (bottom) AMPS mindfulness network. Grey boxes indicate pathways that do not 
differ significantly from one-another and black boxes represent pathways that significantly 
differ. Diagonal indexes path strength ranging from the strongest negative path (bottom left) 
to strongest positive paths (top right). Saturation reflects strength of correlation from positive 






Appendix J: Testing for Significant Differences in Network Strength Centrality 
Bootstrapped values were used to test the null hypothesis that two different practice 
centralities did not differ. Practices were compared to help inform centrality interpretation. Of 
particular interest was whether the most strength central practices differed significantly from 







Figure 29. Bootstrapped difference test results for estimated centrality values for 
practitioners’ (top) and non-practitioners' (bottom) FMI mindfulness networks.  Raw scores 
are listed in the diagonal (white boxes) and significant differences between practices are 








Figure 30. Bootstrapped difference test results for estimated centrality values for 
practitioners’ (top) and non-practitioners' (bottom) AMPS mindfulness networks. Raw scores 
are listed in the diagonal (white boxes) and significant differences between practices are 






Appendix K: Comparing Regularised Spearman and Polychoric Networks 
 
 
Figure 31. Networks estimated with Spearman’s correlations (left) and polychoric 
correlations (right), for practitioners (top) and non-practitioners (bottom). Maximum Edge 
weights: practitioners’ Spearman (.24), practitioners’ polychoric (.35); non-practitioners’ 
Spearman (.38), non-practitioners polychoric (.44). All networks estimated with gamma 








Figure 32. Networks estimated with Spearman’s correlations (left) and polychoric 
correlations (right), for practitioners (top) and non-practitioners (bottom). Maximum Edge 
weights: practitioners’ Spearman (.32), practitioners’ polychoric (.37); non-practitioners’ 
Spearman (.37), non-practitioners polychoric (.44). All networks estimated with gamma 








Appendix L: Case Study 
As part of the requirements of this degree, a case study was required related to the thesis. The 
following represents a positioning essay developed early in the piece. The essay hence 
represents a characterisation of the research at a certain point in time. This case study has 
already been examined as part of the clinical component of my Doctorate of Clinical 
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Implications of a Network Approach to Mindfulness 
This essay aims to briefly explore the advantages of using a network perspective in 
the study of mindfulness. It is suggested that existing methodologies are susceptible to 
reifying the construct of mindfulness, which can render it too static. It is suggested that a 
network methodology provides another fruitful way to measure mindfulness which can 
achieve consilience with broader social theory.   
Conceptualising mindfulness 
Mindfulness has proven hard to define, although typically, contemporary definitions 
have emphasised practices most closely associated with the Buddhist Modernist revisions in 
the early 20th century; namely, focused attention in a non-judgmental or compassionate way 
(Baer, 2003; Bishop et al., 2004; Brantley, 2003; Germer et al., 2005; Kabat-Zinn, 1994; 
Salzberg & Goldstein, 2001). Further definitions in the literature may largely be said to have 
expanded on the second component to further incorporate aspects such as non-reactivity, full 
participation and other associated qualities (Begomi, Tschacher & Kupper, 2012). 
 Buddhist Modernism is credited with emphasising the role of meditation to the 
relative exclusion of traditional Buddhist doctrines, ritual and liturgical practice (Sharf, 2015; 
Stanley, 2013). The focus of meditation itself was also adapted in emphasising the concept of 
sati or bare attention. Meditation now came to be increasingly framed as an activity of 
focusing on whatever sensory objects arose in the moment-to-moment flow of consciousness 
(Sharf, 2015; Stanley, 2013). In this way, mindfulness became a practice more easily 
accommodated by the layperson, and contemporary (Western) definitions of mindfulness 
might be said to have further marginalised Buddhist soteriology to make the practices more 
palatable to a western audience (Purser & Milillo, 2015). Taken together, these revisions 
presented Buddhism as a rational, empirical tradition which can be studied in its own right, 





Through this dialogue, mindfulness has come to be viewed as a universal capacity or 
internal resource which can be cultivated by anyone willing to engage in specific, intentional 
mindfulness instruction. This conceptualisation was immediately translatable to research 
psychologists long accustomed to the concept of internal resources, known otherwise as traits 
in the individual differences literature. It is the terms trait or dispositional mindfulness which 
now populate the literature, and to a lesser extent the concept of state mindfulness (referring 
to an individual’s immediate experience). A number of self-report questionnaires have 
emerged to measure these concepts, by which the answers to items are believed to reflect the 
relative strength of the underlying concept.  
Empirically, these questionaries’ have most often been developed and analysed using 
a statistical technique known as factor analysis - a technique considered “the heart of the 
measurement of psychological constructs” (Nunnally, 1978, pp. 112-113). One of two factor 
analytic models are typically employed which, although differing in theory, tend to be 
interpreted in the same way in practice (Bollen 2002; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van 
Heerden, 2004). In reflective factor models, questionnaire items (or indicators) are believed 
to reflect the operations of the underlying latent or unobservable phenomenon. These are 
causal models which borrow their theory of measurement from the physical sciences 
(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003). The causal theory in reflective models can 
easily be illustrated by the idea of a number of different thermometers all reflecting the 
underlying construct of room temperature. As the latent construct of room temperature varies, 
so too will the readings of the observed indicators (i.e. thermometer readings will co-vary). 
Importantly, the observed indicators cannot be said to influence each other (i.e. the reading of 
one thermometer should not directly or causally influence the reading of another).  
The latent construct of formative models can be contrasted with those in reflective 





Those items are often quite disparate, as exemplified by the prototypical formative construct, 
Socio Economic Status, which is composed of indicators of education, occupational prestige, 
income, and neighbourhood. Unlike in reflective models, changes in the items of formative 
models change the construct itself, which can lead to a plethora of constructs bearing the 
same name. Because the arrows of causality travel from the indicators to the construct, 
formative models are not well suited to the classical idea of measurement, by which one 
measures something that actually exists.  
Although theoretically distinct, formative models are often treated as analogous with 
reflective models in psychological investigation: to the extent to which the researcher is 
concerned with investigating something that really exists, they tend to view the covariance 
observed in their indicators as caused by changes in the unobservable latent construct. Put 
differently, irrespective of the models employed, the latent constructs in factor analytic 
studies are often interpreted as the common cause of change in the observed items (Pearl, 
2000). Of course, unlike in the physical sciences from which the common cause model is 
borrowed, any understanding of the actual mechanism or physical chain by which a latent 
psychological construct actually causes the changes in questionnaire items, remains 
outstanding. This can easily be contrasted to the physical sciences analogy; for example, in 
the example of temperature, the latent construct can be said to cause the change in the 
thermometer indicators by recourse to principles of thermal expansion, by which mercury 
expands, causing it to rise up the thin thermometer column. 
In mindfulness research, the trait often appears to stand in for the common cause of 
the changes in observations in the questionnaire items. In making this analogy with the 
physical sciences, the latent construct – itself bearing no direct reference to a real entity (the 
arrows in the models only travel from the latent construct to the indicators) – gains substance. 





researcher interested in measuring: something has to exist to be measured, and something has 
to exist to cause change in something else (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003). 
Common parlance further consolidates this interpretation in that we might say John is 
considered more mindful than Sarah, because he is more equanimeous and compassionate 
than her. The next natural step is to seek the neurobiological correlates of this substantive 
entity, and appropriate technologies come to be employed for this purpose. As a result of this 
process, mindfulness comes to reside in the brain. This process has been well established in 
other areas in the psychological literature where latent constructs have been interpreted this 
way. In psychopathology, mental illness is diagnosed by its symptoms, and a disease process 
is believed to underpin this (indeed, the word symptom itself, by definition invokes a latent 
construct). Likewise, a similar idea has been advanced in personality research, whereby traits 
such as neuroticism are believed to cause certain behaviour (McCrae and Costa, 1995). In 
both cases, bio-markers in the brain have been sought, although this endeavour appears 
unrewarding to date (Deacon, 2013; Kapur, Phillip & Insel, 2012; Lacasse & Leo, 2005; 
Matins De-Souza, 2013). Plausibly, a similar situation may well emerge in the contemplative 
sciences. 
If we accept the argument that latent psychological constructs have no casual 
properties, the question remains as to what causes the observed covariance in indicators. In 
the case of psychopathology, covariance has been explained by plausible causal links 
between the symptoms themselves. For example, in Major Depression, one can easily 
imagine causal links between the core symptoms of insomnia, fatigue, a loss of concentration, 
worry and low mood (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Fried & Cramer, 2017). Such direct 
symptom-by-symptom interactions can explain the phenomenon of depression without 
invoking a causal disease entity depression. Likewise, in personality we can imagine causal 





around having more friends. An underlying extraversion trait is not needed to explain this: 
people, who like parties, meet more people, which results in more friends. As a result, they 
get invited to more parties, and so on (Cramer et al., 2012). The current research project 
extends this logic to the items of mindfulness questionnaires. We need not invoke a 
substantive mindfulness entity to explain the covariance we might find on the measures.   
Network models of mindfulness 
Garland, Farb, Goldin and Fredrickson (2015) have called for a de-reification of 
constructs in mindfulness research in order to advance the field of contemplative science. 
They suggest that “it may be fruitful, for instance, to consider that there may be no actual 
entity called “mindfulness,” but rather a network of interacting cognitive and affective 
processes…that we, for scholarly convenience, label “mindfulness” (p. 2). Recently, a novel 
statistical methodology has arisen which can model this intuition at the level of self-report 
questionnaires. Provided the items chosen for a questionnaire represent distinct or unique 
information (as they should to avoid content overlap and multi-collinearity), they can be 
represented as nodes in a network. The links that connect these nodes to form a network, are 
the correlations or partial correlations between them. In creating a mindfulness network, 
research can than draw on existing analyses unique to network science, such as global 
properties of network density (the sum of all connections) and local properties such as 
centrality (the relative importance of a given node in the network).  
 The current project was a cross-sectional study, but it suggested that a mindfulness 
network will form when initially uncorrelated nodes, existing in the general population, come 
to be corralled together through intentional mindfulness practices. At a critical point, this 
network may become self-sustaining when the nodes come to feedback upon themselves. 
When this happens a stable state occurs, and mindfulness might be said to emerge from the 





which cannot be reduced to the respective components alone), this stable state can be 
considered a real entity given its casual properties. Taken together, this developmental model 
can be considered a mutualist model (van der Maas et al., 2006), and it informs the major 
hypothesis that networks of mindfulness practitioners should be characterised by greater 
global density than those of non-practitioners i.e. they should have more connections of 
greater strength).   
The ontology of constructs in networks  
As noted, the ontology of a network construct might be considered real when it 
demonstrates properties irreducible and unpredictable from its components. In the absence of 
this, an emergent variable might better be considered a social or pragmatic construction 
which summarises the system (Kukla, 2001; Zachar & Kendler, 2007). In Network Science, 
an emergent state with novel causal properties has been termed an attractor state (Barrett, 
2011; Maul, 2013), and networks shift into these states in what is known as a phase shift.  
 An attractor state is in equilibrium, and a state of equilibrium always exists within an 
environment (Cramer et al., 2012). In their network studies of personality, Cramer and 
colleagues (2012) viewed personality traits as states of equilibrium, noting that it was the 
environment which helped determine, or at least maintain, the relatively fixed behavioural 
repertoires humans seem to settle into (see also Kendler, Gardner & Prescott, 2003 for an 
interactional theory of personality). In interaction with each other and the environment, 
cognitions, affects and behaviours come to be either reinforced or inhibited (for example, it 
becomes difficult to both love parties and dislike being around people at the same time). As 
such, constellations emerge as these cognitions, affects and behaviours come to flock 
together.   
 These models mirror that advanced by John Dewey (1916/2004) in the early twentieth 





there was nothing outside the flux, which became the maxim of a school of philosophy known 
as Pragmatism. Like Cramer and colleagues’ (2012) conceptualisation, Dewey noted that 
habits form because they are effective in enabling the person to find equilibrium within the 
surrounding environment. He suggested that to change a habit, a person might intentionally 
alter their environment, yet reliable change ultimately required acquiring new habits through 
practice. In acquiring new habits, Dewey believed that the system of existing habits comes to 
be disrupted as certain habits are reinforced, whilst others wane or are never eventuated. As 
such, habit acquisition involved fundamental change to the person’s subjectivity. This could 
be conceived an ethical endeavour, to the extent to which a person may wish to better 
themselves. The question left begging is hence, which types of ethical practices might be 
most disruptive to an existing system of habits? 
Mindfulness as ethical practice 
Michel Foucault (1988) suggested that the prevalent idea that there is something 
hidden in ourselves was illusionary (see also Rose, 1998), and in this way, he mirrored the 
Pragmatist belief that there was no soul or self which directed a person’s activity. In his late 
work, Foucault started to study the ethical practices of antiquity which he saw as a means to 
alter one’s subjectivity. Foucault termed these self-care practices, and he went so far as to say 
that the ancient Socratic injunction to know thyself was actually subordinate to an injunction 
to take care of oneself. Self-care practices were conducted in the service of preparing the self 
for knowledge, which Foucault (1982/2005) contrasted with philosophy, which concerned 
knowledge itself: 
 We will call “philosophy” the form of thought that asks what it is that enables the 
subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions and 
limits of the subject’s access to the truth. If we call this “philosophy,” then I think we 





carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the 
truth. We will call “spirituality” then the set of these researches, practices, and 
experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions 
of looking, modifications of existence, etc, which are, not for knowledge but for the 
subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth (p. 15).  
 
Foucault’s work referenced a number of practices (many of which bear resemblance 
to current activities under the umbrella of mindfulness) which were crucially similar in one 
way: their intention was not for knowledge, but the subject.   
Autotelic activities and eudemonia 
Autotelic activities are activities conducted for them-selves. Put differently, the means 
are the ends in autotelic activity – the difference only being a passage of time. Autotelic 
activity is central to Virtue Ethics, a branch of western ethics closely resembling Buddhist 
thought. Virtue Ethics is closely associated itself with Aristotle, who believed that every 
action aims at some good. In doing an action well, the good of that act becomes manifest and 
the individual was said to achieve eudemonia. Eudemonia can be translated as both 
flourishing and happiness, but at core, the term captures the notion that the ends of a virtuous 
practice is simply the flourishing of the means.  
 The concept of eudemonia is evident in the mindfulness literature both implicitly and 
explicitly. Garland and colleagues (2015) explicitly talk of eudemonia as being important for 
mindfulness, and have attempted to capture it through self-report. More subtly, Grossman and 
van Dam (2011) suggest something akin to eudemonia in their recommendations that 
mindfulness questionnaires measure not simply how skilled individuals are in various 
practices, but also the extent to which they value those characteristics. The idea is also 





mindfulness literature (see for example being versus doing in Segal, Teasdale & Williams, 
2012). In allowing something to play out, we let it flourish (and perhaps achieve its internal 
good).  
 Mindfulness has always been interesting in that its operational definitions, for 
example "paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-
judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4) resembles the typical instruction which might be 
directed to a novice practitioner. When applied to various activities, it becomes even more 
apparent that typical instruction is precisely that to focus on the means for itself, as opposed 
to the ends (for example, it is certainly not the ends celebrated in mindful walking!). In this 
way, mindfulness is a set of techniques to facilitate autotelic activity and experience. To the 
extent to which a person wishes to move out of their familiar repertoire of cognition, affect 
and behaviour, they will need to disrupt the equilibrium they currently exist within. Such 
equilibrium might be said to represent a cooperative contingency in that it is stability depends 
on the cooperation of relevant personal and environmental factors (i.e., it is contingent on 
this). Mindfulness, and the self-care practices that precede it, are prototypical non-contingent 
activities (they have no ends), and are hence aptly suited to disrupting a cooperative 
contingency. By repeatedly acting non-contingently, the person exposes themselves again and 
again to potential new beginnings. In doing so, they transform themselves. 
      Autotelic practices have little informational value, which is to say that these practices 
– if interpreted literally – are red herrings for a researcher interested in their truth. Bruno 
Latour (2005) is a social anthropologist who has applied network thinking to his field of 
anthropology. Latour (2005) suggests that to understand the truth of an autotelic ethical 
practice, we must focus on what it does, not what it says. Latour (2005) was particularly 
interested in religion – whose truth value remains contentious in contemporary society. 





talk, what attests to the truth of an utterance is not its correspondence to some putatively 
objective reality but its renewal of speakers’ and hearers’ confidence in the reality of 
something vital: a sense of closeness; a promise of futurity” (Latour, 2005, p. 31). He goes on 
to say that that the truth value of love talk depends squarely on the ability of the lovers to re-
enact the injunction to love again “in the minute they are reaching for one another” (p. 45) 
Indeed: “the great mistake of the lover whom when asked “do you love me?” answered, “I 
have already told you so many years ago, why do you ask again?” Why? Because it is no use 
having told me so in the past, if you cannot tell me again, now, and make me alive to you 
again, close and present anew (p. 46)”. 
 To understand religion and love talk, the researcher needs to understand what these 
things do, for their truth lies in their transformative power, not their content. Religious talk 
and love talk are not easy; they are crafts which require practice, but crucially also, the right 
intention – the intention to bring a person right to the immediate present for purposes of 
renewing a relationship. The content of the means by which this is achieved is superfluous, 
for they must be judged by the intention in which they are performed – the extent to which 
they generally aspire to be a loving or religious performance. The ends of love and religion, is 
simply the flourishing of the means. The same too has been argued of mindfulness: it requires 
intention and skill, and its efficacy depends on the ability of these two factors to be 
employed. To some extent, the rest might be said to be secondary.  
Consilience between practice theories and a network perspective: Implications for 
research.  
In developing an understanding of what is mindfulness? – a question which has 
perplexed many, we have come to perhaps an unsatisfying conclusion that it is exactly what 
is says it is, for example, "paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present 





no deep truth to be found in neurobiology. Evan Thompson (2014) suggested that saying 
mindfulness resides in the brain is akin to saying flight resides in the wings: Mindfulness is 
enabled, but it certainly does not cause anything as a factor analytic model might suggest. 
Given the intentional element of mindfulness, the mindfulness networks of this project sought 
to analyse mindfulness at the level of self-report. The networks of practitioners were 
hypothesised to be denser than their non-practitioner counterparts on the mutualism 
assumption that uncorrelated practices relevant to mindfulness will become increasingly 
correlated as they are repeatedly enacted. Density is reflected in more and stronger 
connections between practices, and in this way can be said to index the unification of which 
Dewey (1916/2004) talks about. In this way, density index’s subjectivity and hence a network 
model accommodates a notion of transformation much better than any approach relying on 
sum scores alone. Networks are created from covariance, not sum scores, and hence a 
network approach raises the quite intriguing prospect that two individuals with the same sum-
score, might have vastly different networks (see van Borkulo et al., 2015 for a paper in which 
this situation occurred in psychopathology networks). In such a situation, the researcher may 
be misled should they be evaluating the effectiveness of an intervention on sum-score alone.  
 Mindfulness has been argued to be a set of techniques to direct a person to the means 
of activity rather than the ends. Done well, the activity, and the autotelic experience it fosters, 
will flourish. A network approach again accommodates this conceptualisation well as density 
simply reflects the flourishing of a networks operation: the ends of a mindfulness network is 
simply the flourishing functioning of its means. Mindfulness, as with any non-contingent (or 
autotelic) activity has been argued to be precisely what is required to disrupt a system in 
equilibrium (i.e., cooperative contingency). Future research might investigate how such 
systems (for example a psychopathology system) are disrupted - possibility in real-time if 





the modelling of the waxing and strengthening of connections, and they are limited only by 
their choice of nodes.  The network approach also affords statistical techniques which are 
hard to envisage within a factor analytic approach. Networks are architectures with central 
and peripheral nodes. Network researchers have often suggested that central nodes might 
constitute important intervention targets, for when change occurs in them, it will rapidly 
spread throughout the rest of the system. The network models in this project offer the promise 
of identifying those most central mindful practices, which might provide useful starting 
points for interventions (e.g., Boschloo et al., 2016; Fried et al., 2016) 
 In summary, this essay has sought to demonstrate how existing factor analytic 
approaches to mindfulness reify the construct such that it becomes a thing. In contrast, 
mindfulness has been argued to be a dynamic equilibrium state. A network methodology was 
advanced as the most appropriate way of capturing this conceptualisation, and links were 
made between network theory and other social and philosophical theory. This is important, 
because in drawing social theory with empirical research, the network approach arguably 
does a better job in capturing the ethical, intentional and embodied aspects of mindfulness, 
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